Sustainable Supply Chains: Multicriteria Decision-Making and Policy Analysis for the Environment by Woolley, Trisha D.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Open Access Dissertations
2-2010
Sustainable Supply Chains: Multicriteria Decision-
Making and Policy Analysis for the Environment
Trisha D. Woolley
University of Massachusetts Amherst, twoolley@txwes.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations
Part of the Business Commons
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Open Access Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Woolley, Trisha D., "Sustainable Supply Chains: Multicriteria Decision-Making and Policy Analysis for the Environment" (2010).
Open Access Dissertations. 152.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/152
SUSTAINABLE SUPPLY CHAINS:
MULTICRITERIA DECISION-MAKING AND POLICY
ANALYSIS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
A Dissertation Presented
by
TRISHA D. WOOLLEY
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
February 2010
Isenberg School of Management
c© Copyright by Trisha D. Woolley 2010
All Rights Reserved
SUSTAINABLE SUPPLY CHAINS:
MULTICRITERIA DECISION-MAKING AND POLICY
ANALYSIS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
A Dissertation Presented
by
TRISHA D. WOOLLEY
Approved as to style and content by:
Anna Nagurney, Chair
June Dong, Member
Robert Nakosteen, Member
John Stranlund, Member
D. Anthony Butterfield, Ph.D. Program Director
Isenberg School of Management
To my family.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to extend my sincerest gratitude to my esteemed
advisor and dissertation chair, John F. Smith Memorial Professor Anna Nagurney. I
am deeply indebted to Professor Nagurney for her years of outstanding mentorship,
guidance, and support, of which this research would not have been possible. Professor
Nagurney has given me a tremendous amount of inspiration though her dedication
and passion to the highest quality of research as well as her professionalism and
incomparable work ethic.
I am especially grateful for having an exceptional doctoral committee. I would
like to thank Professor John Stranlund, Professor June Dong, and Professor Robert
Nakosteen for their thoughtful suggestions and comments. I also would like to thank
Professors Iqbal Agha, Ben Branch, D. Anthony Butterield, Tom O’Brien, Ronald
Karren, and Ray Pfeiffer for their support and encouragement during my doctoral
studies.
I would like to extend a thank you to my colleagues and friends in the Virtual
Center for Supernetworks including Professor Qiang “Patrick” Qiang, Amir Masoumi,
Professor Zugang “Leo” Liu, Min Yu, Professor Jose Cruz, and Professor Tina Walkol-
binger for their friendship, support, and encouragement as well as personal, profes-
sional, and editorial advice. I would also like to thank the administrative support
that I have received at the Isenberg School of Management at the University of Mas-
sachusetts Amherst from Irene Benoit, Nicole Carlson, Keri Jane Crist, Cerrianne
Fisher, Rebecca Jerome, Diane Keedy, Diane Kelley, Audrey Kieras, Susan Milne,
Jacqui Moro, Mary Parker, Ellen Pekar, Judith Purcell, and Lynda Vassallo.
v
Special thanks to Josh Anderson, for his love and support, listening to me, sharing
my ideas and goals, and in my joy and sorrow, and for our beautiful baby girl, Isabel
Jolie Anderson.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Carolyn and Edward Woolley, for
supporting my dreams, always being there for me, loving, caring, and believing in
me. My accomplishments would not have been possible without the sacrifices that
my parents have made for me.
I would like to acknowledge support in part by NSF Grant No.: IIS-0002647 and
by the John F. Smith Memorial Fund at the Isenberg School of Management. This
support is gratefully appreciated.
vi
ABSTRACT
SUSTAINABLE SUPPLY CHAINS:
MULTICRITERIA DECISION-MAKING AND POLICY
ANALYSIS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
FEBRUARY 2010
TRISHA D. WOOLLEY
B.Sc., MARIST COLLEGE
M.B.A, MARIST COLLEGE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Anna Nagurney
It is believed that the critical next step from examinations of operations and the
environment is the study of sustainability and supply chains (Linton, Klassen, and
Jayaraman (2007)). Environmental quality and preservation as well as meeting the
stress of emission reductions is rapidly becoming an important issue for public policy
(Wilkinson, Hill, and Gollan (2001)). However, Lambertini and Mantovani (2007)
note the disregard, unrelated to regulatory requirements, of research practitioners
to the potential benefits of appropriate competition policy measures and consumer
pressures (Srivastara (2007)). In addition, a firm’s success, notably, in terms of
financial and/or environmental practices, has been tied, in part, to the strength of its
ability to coordinate and integrate activities along the entire supply chain (Spekman,
vii
Kamauff Jr., and Myhr (1998)), and to effectively implement multicriteria decision-
making tools to aid in their strategic decisions.
I present five essays in this dissertation. For each model I utilize the theory of
variational inequalities, derive the formulation, present qualitative properties, and
provide numerical examples. The first essay develops the multitiered sustainable sup-
ply chain network model with multicriteria decision-making. In the second essay I
construct a modeling and computational framework that allows for the determina-
tion of optimal carbon taxes applied to electric power plants in the context of electric
power supply chain (generation/distribution/consumption) networks. The third essay
considers electric power supply chain networks and develops a model of tradable pol-
lution permits in the case of multiple pollutants and spatially distinct receptor points.
In the fourth essay, I quantify and assess, from a system-optimized sustainable sup-
ply chain network perspective, the environmental effects resulting when a horizontal
supply chain integration occurs. In the fifth and final essay, I extend the work of
Nagurney (2009) to the multiproduct supply chain network domain to quantify the
impacts.
This dissertation is heavily based on the following papers: Nagurney, Liu, and
Woolley (2006), Nagurney, Liu, and Woolley (2007), Woolley, Nagurney, and Stran-
lund (2009), Nagurney and Woolley (2009) and Nagurney, Woolley, and Qiang (2009).
viii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, I develop a novel framework to incorporate sustainability
into multitiered, multicriteria supply chain network models with policy interventions.
I explicitly address in a modeling context the application of multicriteria decision-
making, environmental supply chain management; alternatively, green logistics, and
policy schemes that include taxation and tradable permit markets. I also analyze,
quantitatively, the relationship between environmental and cost synergy as a result
of supply chain integration through pre and post horizontal mergers; as well as the
synergy benefits through mergers/acquisitions associated with the general and richer
multiproduct domain.
I represent the decision-makers throughout the entire supply chain, which, accord-
ing to the literature, can lead to the realization of the minimization of environmen-
tal emissions and waste through a multicriteria decision-making framework (Oakley
(1993)). Government mandated policies can then be applied to provide incentives
for firms to incorporate environmental considerations into their decision-making pro-
cesses given the current competitive state. Alternatively, due to consumer concern and
awareness in regards to environmental quality, firms may voluntarily integrate/merge
supply chains to not only achieve cost, but environmental synergistic gains which can
be quantitatively assessed.
I present five essays in this dissertation. The first essay includes the sustain-
able supply chain model with multicriteria decision-making with the introduction
of alternative manufacturing plants for each manufacturer with distinct associated
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environmental emissions. In the second essay I develop a modeling and compu-
tational framework that allows for the determination of optimal carbon taxes ap-
plied to electric power plants in the context of electric power supply chain (gener-
ation/distribution/consumption) networks. The third essay considers electric power
supply chain networks in which the power generators have distinct power plants and
associated technologies and I develop a model of tradable pollution permits in the
case of multiple pollutants and spatially distinct receptor points. In the fourth es-
say, I quantify and assess, from the sustainable supply chain network perspective,
the environmental effects resulting when a merger/integration occurs and the result-
ing synergy from possible strategic gains. In the fifth and final essay, I present the
multiproduct supply chain network models with explicit capacities, prior to and post
their horizontal integration and propose a measure to allow for the quantification and
assessment of the synergy benefits, if any. For each model I provide the network for-
mulation and structure, present quantitative properties and equilibrium/optimality
conditions, and advocate an appropriate algorithm for the computation of numerical
examples.
This Chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.1 includes the research motivation.
I provide the appropriate literature review in Section 1.2, and in Section 1.3, I provide
an overview of the research for this dissertation.
1.1 Research Motivation
It is believed that the critical next step from examinations of operations and
the environment is the study of sustainability and supply chains (Linton, Klassen,
and Jayaraman (2007)). Sustainability, which includes environmental quality and
preservation as well as meeting the stress of emissions reductions, is rapidly becoming
an important issue for business and also for public policy. A survey conducted by the
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Business Council reported that over 40% of CEOs consider environmental and global
warming issues of critical importance (Creyts et al. (2007)).
3M, the US based global conglomerate which manufactures pressure-sensitive tape,
reflective materials, video and audio tape, laser imaging equipment, as well as health-
care products, has a program called Pollution Prevention Pays (3P). This strategy
focuses on the prevention of pollution at the source rather than managing and re-
moving it after it has been created. The company’s policy, according to Esty and
Winston (2006), is that “anything not in a product is considered a cost...everything
coming out of a plant is either a product, by-product (which can be reused or sold),
or waste. Why, they ask, should there be any waste? This is a policy that every
company needs to start emulating” (Penfield (2008)).
The general definition of sustainability is “development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs” (WCED (1987)). Companies are grappling with efforts to limit resources,
including energy, to create eco-friendly products, cut toxic emissions, as well as to
help the poor and cooperate with nonprofit groups (Engardio et al. (2007)).
Moreover, there is evidence for concern among businesses, consumers, economic
development experts, conservationists and human rights activists alike. The release
of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, through the combustion of fossil fuels (coal,
oil, and natural gas), has risen 30% in the 200 years since the industrial revolution
(Burruss (2004)). The average surface temperature of the earth, expressed as a global
average, has increased by about 0.74C over the past hundred years (between 1906
and 2005) with 11 of the 12 warmest years occurring between 1995–2006 (IPCC
(2007)). The environmental disamenity has damaged fragile ecosystems, resulting
in, for example, altered precipitation patterns, species distinction, natural disasters,
changing water supplies, and crop yields.
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Sustainability concerns the environmental impact on future generations. In the US
alone, greenhouse gas emissions are projected to rise 35% between 2005 and 2030 due
to fewer forests and agricultural land to absorb the carbon, an increasing population,
expansion of the US economy, and an increased use of fossil fuel fired power plants
to generate energy (Creyts et al. (2007)). As a remedy, governmental agencies can
support sustainability by the provision of environmental standards and regulatory
frameworks to conserve resources used for inputs and to monitor quality of life, in an
economic environment where industrial competitiveness be negatively affected by the
cost to implement such initiatives (Wilkinson, Hill, and Gollan (2001)).
Several environmental regulations have been geared towards, specifically, the elec-
tric power industry, which underpins modern society. The power industry is expected
to grow by 39% between 2005–2030 due to population growth and other factors. Ac-
cording to the Department of Energy, the cheapest form of electricity generation,
coal-fired power plants, are expected to meet this growth in demand, accounting for
81% of the incremental load of electric power through 2030, and of which is also re-
sponsible for a majority of the electricity generated carbon emissions (Creyts et al.
(2007)). Regulatory mandates lead electric power companies to efficiency improve-
ments, though, for example, taxes and/or tradable pollution permit programs. The
benefits of such initiatives, shown in a study conducted by Currie and Neidell (2005)
throughout the 1990s in California, which coincides with the 1990 Clean Air Act,
found reductions in the level of carbon monoxide saved approximately 1000 infant
lives from pollution effects.
Lambertini and Mantovani (2007) note the disregard, unrelated to regulatory
requirements, of research practitioners to the potential benefits of appropriate com-
petition policy measures and consumer pressures (Srivastara (2007)). It has been
argued that customers and suppliers punish polluters in the marketplace that violate
environmental rules, also called a “reputational penalty” (Klein and Leffler (1981),
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Klassen and McLaughlin (1996)). It is interesting to note, however, that some firms
in the public eye have not only met, but exceeded, required environmental mandates
(Lyon (2003)). In the US, over 1,200 firms voluntarily participated in the EPA’s
33/50 program, agreeing to reduce certain chemical emissions 50% by 1995 (Arora
and Cason (1996)). Corporations are influenced by the ecologically-conscious mar-
ketplace that, according to a survey sponsored by DuPont and Mohawk Industries in
October of 2007, despite the weak economy 65% of consumers are willing to pay an
additional 8.3% for products made with renewable resources (Environmental Leader
(2008)).
Environmental performance can be seen as a source of reputational, competitive,
and financial advantage (Miles and Covin (2000), Fabian (2000)). A method for
companies to achieve voluntary efficiency, through supply chain merger/integration,
can, possibly, result in synergistic gains. A firm’s success, notably, in terms of financial
and/or environmental practices, has been tied, in part, to the strength of its ability to
coordinate and integrate activities along the entire supply chain (Spekman, Kamauff
Jr., and Myhr (1998)), and to effectively implement multicriteria decision-making
tools to aid in their strategic decisions.
1.2 Literature Review
This review of the literature includes sustainable supply chains, multicriteria
decision-making, and supply chain management. I introduce sustainable policy in-
terventions by first discussing the electric power industry as an application for such
policies. I recall notable contributions on the topic of environmental taxes and trad-
able permit systems.
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1.2.1 Sustainable Supply Chains
The integration of an environmental perspective into a business context can be
traced back to the 1990s, and is linked to the book Our Common Future (WCED
(1987)), also referred to as the Brundtland Report (Linton, Klassen, and Jayaraman
(2007)). Sustainability requires analyzing activities throughout the supply chain (cf.
Croom, Romano, and Giannakis (2000) and references therein), which may require
an organization to operate sub-optimally, that is, there is a noted inverse relationship
between a cost perspective and creating the greatest value along the supply chain
(Linton, Klassen, and Jayaraman (2007)).
Operations research/management science (OR/MS) tools and methods are useful
in making these trade-offs in a more coherent way (Bloemhof-Ruwaard and Nunen
(2005)). There is still a debate as to the method to operationalize sustainability,
as questions arise such as what resources future generations require, the level of
emissions that can be released without negatively affecting future generations, what
policies would be required to achieve sustainability, the effect of market forces, etc.
(Wilkinson, Hill, and Gollan (2001), Linton, Klassen, and Jayaraman (2007)).
The nature of the topic of sustainability and supply chains is broad due to the
realm of questions to be addressed. This dissertation focus on pollution management,
including source reduction and pollution prevention, throughout the supply chain to
help regulatory agencies meet ecological and societal concerns, along with the effect
on the key players in the supply chain and their associated interaction. Bloemhof-
Ruwaard and Nunen (2005) refer to this as the “Triple Bottom Line” (3BL) concept,
which focuses on forward logistics (Rodrigue, Slack, and Comtois (2001)) to address
the dimensions of People, Planet and Profit.
I now introduce seminal papers on multicriteria decision-making as well as supply
chain management as related to the framework of sustainable supply chains.
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1.2.1.1 Multicriteria Decision-Making
Multicriteria decision-making (MCDM) has been one of the fastest growing method-
ologies in many disciplines. Research and OR/MS development in the field of sustain-
able supply chains considers multiple objectives, the central problem being how to
evaluate a set of alternatives in terms of a number of criteria (Triantaphyllou (2000))
in which the solution sought must be in accordance with preferences of the decision-
maker (Gal, Stewart, and Hanne (1999), Jones, Mirrazavi, and Tamiz (2002)). Since
multifunctional groups within organizations and external stakeholders have a role in
decisions related to organizations and the natural environment, those decisions be
strategic and usually complex. One of the latest issues organizations face, that of
greening the supply chain, requires techniques that behavioral decision research has
shown humans are poorly equipped to solve (Sarkis (2003), Kiker (2005)).
The first to study multicriteria decision-making on networks, which focused on
transportation networks, were Schneider (1968) and Quandt (1967). Since then the
literature has grown from considering not only fixed travel times and travel costs with
only two criteria, to an infinite number of decision-makers, a large finite number of
decision criteria, along with elastic demands. The first model which could handle
congestion and, thus, was flow-dependent, was developed by Dafermos (1981) that
considered two criteria, while Nagurney and Dong (2000) developed the first general
elastic demand multicriteria network equilibrium model with two criteria and fixed
weights that were class and link-dependent. Refer to Nagurney and Dong (2002) for
a list of noteworthy multicriteria traffic network equilibrium contributions since 1968
as well as to Leurent (1998).
Regarding supply chain applications, traditionally, the research has focused on
a single objective to either minimize costs or to maximize profits (Cohen and Lee
(1989), Tsiakis, Shah, and Pantelides (2001), Altiparmak et al. (2006)). The initial
focus of multiobjective supply chain modeling was developed to allow use of a per-
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formance measurement system that included factors such as cost, customer service
levels, quality, and flexibility of volume or delivery (Sabri and Beamom (2000), Talluri
and Baker (2002), Xu, Liu, and Wang (2008)).
A notable model relating a multicriteria framework to supply chain networks
was proposed by Dong, Zhang, and Nagurney (2002) which considered multicrite-
ria decision-making within a supply chain context with two tiers of decision-makers
and assumed that the demands at the consumer markets were fixed. Chen and Lee
(2004) then studied a multiproduct, multiechelon, and multiperiod scheduling supply
chain model with multiple goals and with uncertain market demands and product
prices. Dong et al. (2005) presented a model for multicriteria decision-making in
a multitiered supply chain network in an equilibrium context, which also accommo-
dated random demands at multiple consumer markets. Nagurney and Matsypura
(2005b) studied the dynamics of a multicriteria global supply chain network econ-
omy that sought to maximize profits and to minimize perceived risk and uncertainty,
which was dependent not only on the decision-makers’ transactions, but also on that
of others.
The general projections of multicriteria decision-making into environmental appli-
cations range from hazardous chemical waste landfill (Accorsi, Apostolakis, and Zio
(1999), Bonano et al. (2000), Apostolakis (2001)), water resource management (Gre-
gory et al. (2001)), forestry planning (Kangas et al. (2001)) to fisheries (McDaniels
(1995), Brown et al. (2001)). However, in terms of supply chains, the literature
is sparse, since environmental issues have only recently received attention, and dis-
tinctly in the context of applied studies (see Hitchens, Birnie, and Thompson (2000)),
conceptual, and survey studies (cf. Hill (1997) and the references therein).
Nagurney and Toyasaki (2003) were the first to develop a theoretical framework
that allowed for multicriteria decision-makers in different tiers of the supply chain
with environmental considerations, and the weight of the criteria (environmental) to
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depend on the environmental consciousness of each decision-maker. Product prices,
quantities, and the emissions generated were then computed. Cruz (2008) then built
on the work of Nagurney and Toyasaki (2003) to additionally consider the minimiza-
tion of risk and the associated levels of social responsibility. He explicitly determined
the equilibrium levels of social responsibility of the decision-makers, product quanti-
ties and prices.
Additional works include that by Oliveira and Antunes (2004) which present
a multiple-objective model, that uses input-output environmental/energy matrices,
based on the linear structure of inter-industry production linkages that assesses eleven
environmental burdens with respect to changes in economic activities. Specific ap-
plications of multicriteria decision-making include work by Luo, Zhou, and Caudill
(2001) which proposed a multiobjective optimization model for the supply chain of
Internet-based manufacturing systems to explore the impact of an emerging e-business
on system agility and environmental performance of mechatronic production systems.
For additional works see: Luptacik and Bohm (1994), Albino, Izzo, and Uhtz (2002),
Sarkis (2003), Ehrgott and Luptacik (2003), Wang, Huang, and Dismukes (2004),
Figueira, Greco, and Ehrgott (2005), Ehrgott (2005), Letmathe and Balakrishnan
(2005), and Kull and Talluri (2008).
In this dissertation, I utilize the theory of variational inequalities to determine the
optimal prices and quantities transacted to maximize profits, as well as to minimize
pollution levels. The theory of variational inequalities has been applied to study a
plethora of multicriteria decision-making equilibrium problems as related to the envi-
ronment and supply chains, as well as in the context of transportation and telecom-
munications (see Nagurney and Dong (2002)). For example, Dong and Nagurney
(2001) introduced variable weights in the context of a financial equilibrium model in
which each sector of the economy sought to both minimize risk and maximize return.
They showed that the economic system conditions governing the instrument prices
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and financial equilibrium conditions can be formulated as a variational inequality
problem. Nagurney, Dong, and Mokhtarian (2002a) then created an abstract multi-
class (transportation and telecommunication mode alternatives), multicriteria (time,
cost, risk, safety, etc.) network equilibrium model with elastic demand, and also with
fixed demand, framework for decision-making in the Information Age and presented
the governing equilibrium conditions as well as providing the variational inequality
formulations.
In this dissertation, I add to the current literature and develop a theoretical frame-
work which makes a significant extension to the work of Nagurney and Toyasaki
(2003) and Nagurney (2000, 2006b) which introduced environmental concerns into a
supply chain network equilibrium framework (see also Nagurney, Dong, and Mokhtar-
ian (2002b)), through the introduction of alternative manufacturing plants for each
manufacturer with distinct associated environmental emissions. I establish that the
prices associated with the environmental criteria of the various decision-makers can
be interpreted as taxes. I also prove that the supply chain model with environmen-
tal concerns can be reformulated and solved as an elastic demand transportation
network equilibrium problem over an appropriately constructed abstract network or
supernetwork (Nagurney and Dong (2002)).
1.2.1.2 Supply Chain Management and Integration
As noted earlier, firms that are forced to focus on the bottom line have the oppor-
tunity to improve financial and environmental performance through the management
of the supply chain as a whole. For example, GM reduced its disposal costs by $12
million by establishing a reusable container program with its suppliers and Andersen
Corporation implemented several programs that reduced waste at its source and had
internal rates of return (IRR) exceeding 50% (USEPA (2000)). Logistics costs are
estimated to be 30% of cost of goods sold, leading to potential savings through coor-
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dination that cannot be ignored due to competitive pressures to decrease costs while
maintaining excellent customer service (Thomas and Griffin (1996)).
The coordination of the supply chain involves a set of techniques to improve firm
competitiveness and efficiency at the channel level rather than at the firm level, as
Albino, Izzo, and Uhtz (2002) state, “the real competition is not company against
company but supply chain against supply chain for the cost effective achievement
of superior service.” Alliances are created that usually increase the financial and
operational performance of each channel member through increased sharing of infor-
mation and reductions in total cost and inventories (Maloni and Benton (1997)), as
well as to reduce the proliferation of unexpected and/or undesirable events through
the network (Guilln et al. (2005)). See also Carothers and Adams (1991), Lee and
Billington (1992), Langley and Holcomb (1992), Christopher (1992), Shapiro, Singhal,
and Wagner (1993), Macbeth and Ferguson (1994), Ragatz, Handfield, and Scannell
(1997), Croom, Romano, and Giannakis (2000), Horvath (2001), and Skjoett-Larsen,
Thernoe, Andresen (2003), and Langabeer and Seifert (2003)).
The concept of Supply Chain Management (SCM) was introduced in the early
1980s; yet it as has seen remarkably growth in importance since only the early 1990s.
The growth and development of SCM was not driven by only internal motives, but by
a number of external factors such as reliance on outsourcing (for example, by the late
1980s, nearly 60% of the total product cost in the US was attributed to outsourcing
(Ballou (1992)), increased globalization, improvements in technology and information
availability, the growing consumer awareness of climate change, dwindling natural
resources, and general environmental concerns (Gunasekaran, Patel, and Mcgaughey
(2004)).
There have been several definitions used to define SCM due to the lack in con-
ceptual understanding of the topic (see Croom, Romano, and Giannakis (2000) and
references therein for a synopsis). A general definition is as follows, “a network of
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firms interacting to deliver a product or service to the end customer, linking flows
from raw material supply to final delivery” (Ellram (1990)). There is a wealth of
literature addressing both production planning and distribution planning; however,
few models attempt to address these problems simultaneously (Cattanach (1995),
Thomas and Griffin (1996) and references therein).
A specific supply chain management concept, Green Supply Chain Management
(GSCM), has recently emerged, in which its contribution lies in identifying collabo-
rations in order to positively impact the environment, carbon footprints, and energy
costs (Wycherley (1999)). GSCM consists of “integrating environmental thinking into
supply chain management, including product design, material sourcing and selection,
manufacturing processes, delivery of the final product to the consumers as well as
end–of–life management of the product after its useful life” (Srivastara (2007)). Not
surprisingly, Oakley (1993) noted that total quality environmental management must
also consider multicriteria decision-making.
Pertinent GSCM works include that by Krikke, Bloemhof, and Van Wassenhove
(2003) which deals with trying to optimize a supply chain design for refrigerators,
and analyzing the trade-off between supply chain costs and environmental measures
(e.g. energy use and residual waste). See also Beckman, Worhach, and Sheng (1995),
Bloemhof-Ruwaard et al. (1995), Zhang et al. (1997), Rodrigue, Slack, and Comtois
(2001), Murphy and Poist (2003), Masui (2005), and Srivastava (2007).
An application of supply chain management is the facilitated integration where
collaboration in purchasing can occur either by vertical or horizontal mergers between
buyers and sellers (Huber, Sweeney, and Smyth (2004)). Equivalently, “network” or-
ganizations have been used to represent the collaboration and study the integration
effects (Powell (1990), Alstyne (1997)). As an OR/MS application, Ivaldi and Ver-
boven (2005) measured the effects of the proposed VolvoScania horizontal merger
using an estimated oligopoly model with product differentiation and computed post-
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merger equilibrium prices and welfare changes under various alternative scenarios.
Additionally, Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) studied various exogenous market
structures, and computed the outputs, prices and resulting profits endogenously using
a Cournot-Nash equilibrium model from horizontal mergers. For more literature on
the topic refer to Eckbo (1983), Perry and Porter (1985), Farrell and Shapiro (1990)
and references therein.
The importance of metrics to evaluate supply chain performance and the resulting
implications on horizontal mergers are increasingly important to ensure achievement
of organizational goals, and the proper assessment of the effectiveness of the tech-
niques or strategies employed (Gunasekaran, Patel, and Mcgaughey (2004)). How-
ever, Beamon (1998) noted, “research in supply chain modeling has only scratched
the surface of how supply chain strategies (or decision variables) may affect a given
performance measure, or a set of performance measures.” Lee and Billington (1993)
attribute that incomplete performance measures for the assessment of the entire sup-
ply chain may lead to inefficiencies. For an evaluation of performance measurements
see Lee and Whang (1993), Chen (1997), and Beamon (1998, 1999).
Operational synergy has been proposed as a means to measure the cost effec-
tiveness of integration of the supply chain through horizontal (same industry) merg-
ers/acquisitions (Chatterjee (1986), Brush (1996)). Synergy is defined by Chatterjee
(2007) as “the combination of disparate parts within the new organization can lead to
more revenues, more efficiency, or more of both than what the individual parts could
muster as stand alone units.” Moreover, Chatterjee (2007) believes that, based on aca-
demic research, interviews and evidence, when cost reduction rather than potential
revenue gain is the stated goal of a merger it is much easier to achieve success.
Even though there have been noted successful mergers (e.g. Kraft-General Foods
and Novartis), there have been numerous times when the anticipated synergy was
not realized (e.g. AOL/Time-Warner) considering that the merger failure rate is
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estimated to be between 74% and 83% (Devero (2004)). This leads to the need for
efficient tools and understanding of the merger/integration process (Eccles, Lanes,
and Wilson (1999)).
Literature on the topic include Soylu et al. (2006) which evaluated synergy using a
mixed integer multiperiod, discrete-continuous time model for the integration of vari-
ous energy process systems and provided a comparative analysis. For additional works
see: Farrell and Shapiro (1990, 2001), Juga (1996), Nijkamp and Reggiani (1998),
Gowrisankaran (1999), Min and Zhou (2002), Gupta and Gerchak (2002), Stennek
(2003), Spector (2003), Alptekinoglu and Tang (2005), and Xu (2007). Nagurney
(2009) presented a new theoretical framework for the quantification of strategic advan-
tages associated with horizontal mergers through the integration of system–optimized
supply chain networks. She presents both the pre– and post– models of horizontal
mergers and defined a measure for the quantification of the associated gains.
Interestingly, Stanwick and Stanwick (2002) claim that the proposed merger can
be greatly compromised if environmental issues are ignored. I explicitly address the
issue of supply chain integration and environmental concerns in this dissertation.
Lambertini and Mantovani (2007) proposed a new framework using a differential
game to find that firms collude in the context of a horizontal merger in order to reduce
environmental externalities. However, the authors do not consider cost synergies or
a supply chain framework.
In this dissertation, I contribute to the current literature to identify the relation-
ship between post-merger operational synergy and the effects on the environment
and, thus, ultimately, society, from a quantitative perspective. I build on the work by
Nagurney (2009) to quantify and assess, from a supply chain network perspective, the
environmental effects resulting when a merger or acquisition occurs and the resulting
synergy from possible strategic gains.
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Specifically, I develop a multicriteria decision-making supply chain network frame-
work that captures the economic activities of manufacturing, storage, and distribution
both pre and post the merger. The models yield the system optima associated with
the minimization of the total costs and the total emissions under firm-specific prices
associated with environmental criteria. Using a proposed synergy measure that cap-
tures the total generalized cost I also provide numerical examples.
I then consider the multiproduct dimension of supply chains with distinct firms
and their horizontal integration. Between 1972 and 1997, on the average, two-thirds
of US supply firms altered their mix of products every five years (Bernard, Redding,
and Schott (2006)). Firms experience efficiency gains by running a multiuse plant
where input costs may be divided among different products. While Davis and Wilson
(2006) studied differentiated product competition in an equilibrium framework, they
did not, however, focus on the integration/merger of the supply chain as a whole.
I develop the multiproduct supply chain network models prior to and post their
horizontal integration with explicit capacities associated with the economic activities
of production, storage, and distribution; an approach that is closely related to that of
Dafermos (1973) who proposed transportation network models with multiple classes of
transportation. I build on the novel work of Nagurney (2009) to also focus on the case
of horizontal mergers (or acquisitions) and I extend the contributions in Nagurney
(2009) to the much more general and richer setting of multiple product supply chains.
I utilize a system-optimization perspective for the model development and propose
a measure, which allows one to quantify and assess, from a supply chain network
perspective, the synergy benefits associated with the integration of multiproduct firms
through mergers/acquisitions.
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1.2.2 Policy Interventions
The provision of standards and regulatory frameworks help regulatory agencies
support environmental sustainability (Wilkinson, Hill, and Gollan (2001)). I specifi-
cally focus on the electric power industry as a supply chain application for emission
reductions through environmental policies.
The dominant industrial source of air emissions in the US today is the result of
electricity generation. For example, fossil fuel-fired power plants are responsible for
67% of the nation’s sulfur dioxide emissions, 23% of nitrogen oxide emissions, and
40% of man-made carbon dioxide emissions (USEPA (2007)). The US electric power
industry spent $24 billion on compliance with federal environmental laws between
2002–2005. Governments are increasingly constructing legislation aimed to reduce
pollution levels; it is estimated that the electric power industry spend $47.8 billion
between 2007–2025 to comply with three new federal regulations, namely the Clean
Air Interstate Rule, the Clean Air Mercury Rule, and the Clean Air Visibility Rule,
which aim to reduce nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and mercury emissions (USEPA
(2005)).
Pollution by the electric power entities can be controlled by price, in the form, for
example, of a carbon tax that is imposed for emissions that exceed a predetermined
bound, or by quantity, as in the case of pollution permit trading schemes, which
involve the trading of permits to emit pollutants. Entities that are given credits
(or allowances) by a central authority can then trade, via free markets, providing
economic incentives (Tietenberg (2006)).
I utilize the theory of variational inequalities for the quantitative analysis and
computation of equilibria of optimal prices and quantities of products transacted as
well as the resulting emissions and equilibrium tax and permit prices given a net-
work structure. The theory of variational inequalities has been utilized to study an
abundance of equilibrium problems in regards to policy analysis as related to eco-
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nomics and operations research (see Nagurney (1993)). Specifically, the theory has
been applied to spatial economic market equilibrium problems with policy interven-
tions (Nagurney and Zhao (1991), Nagurney, Thore, and Pan (1996) and in financial
markets (Nagurney and Dong (1995a, 1995b), Dhanda, Nagurney, and Ramanujam
(1999)).
In this dissertation I explore both a tradable permit and carbon taxation schemes
as means to curb emissions and to improve the environmental quality as related to,
specifically, the electric power industry. I first provide insights into the relationship
between the two policies; then I introduce an overview of notable works related to the
electric power industry. Lastly, I recall the background on each policy scheme and
outline the pertinent literature in order to identify opportunities to contribute to the
advancement of knowledge on this topic.
1.2.2.1 Tradable Permits versus Carbon Taxes
There is a debate as to whether a price or quantity instrument should be used
to achieve reductions in emissions and costs imposed on society. The abundance of
the literature to-date that discusses the comparison of the policies shows the level
of importance, reliance, and implementation of both environmental schemes. The
favored policy tool for pollution control by most countries has been taxes, presumably,
due to the familiarity and implementation. An exception, however, is the use of
permits to control air pollution in the US (e.g. the RECLAIM program) (Norregaard
and Reppelin-Hill (2000)).
Pezzey (1992) agues that, “there can be no general presumption that control by
quantity is superior to control by price,” due to the variety of circumstances that
lead to imperfect competition such as uncertainty (Baumol and Oates (1988), Weitz-
man (1974), White and Wittman (1983)), vulnerability to monopoly (Malueg (1990),
Xepapadeas (1997)), technology investments (Requate (1993)), as well as transac-
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tion costs (Koustaal (1997)). Thus, he claims, that efficient control can be achieved
though a quantity or price instrument in a symmetrically efficient and acceptable
way. Interestingly, a hybrid of taxes and tradable permits may be desirable under
uncertainty (Roberts and Spence (1976), Baumol and Oates (1988), Pezzey (2003)).
See also Bohm and Russell (1985) for additional dimensions for comparing alternative
instruments.
1.2.2.2 The Electric Power Industry
Currently, especially with oil trading at more than $100 per barrel in 2008, energy
is the major supply chain focus for companies, with an emphasis on reduction in
costs and energy consumption, and the use of alternative energy options (ethanol,
biomass, fuel cells, wind, solar, nuclear, and other various energy options) (Penfield
(2008)). For example, the retail giant Wal-Mart has at least vowed to become a
major sustainability player, as stated on its website, “We have a goal to be supplied
by 100% renewable energy, to create zero waste, and to sell products that sustain our
resources and environment” (Penfield (2008)).
The impact of the electric power industry on the economy is obvious, as it has
been a factor noted to contribute to recessionary periods through the rise in energy
prices. For example, the last three recession periods in the US (1974–75, 1980–82,
and 1990–91) were preceded by spikes in oil prices (Greenspan (2001)). The electric
industry is monitored closely by policymakers for the potential effects of cyclical
behavior of the macroeconomy in the short run and for sustainability issues in the
long run (Greenspan (2001)).
Noteworthy contributions on the topic of electric power modelling include works on
issues such as deregulation and competition (Kahn (1998), Hobbs, Metzler, and Pang
(2000), Day, Hobbs, and Pang (2002)), and market power (Bolle (1992), Green and
Newbery (1992), von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), Green (1996), Newbery and Pollitt
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(1997), Newbery (1998), Wolfram (1998, 1999)). See also Schweppe et al. (1988),
Hogan (1992), Chao and Peck (1996), Wu et al. (1996), Jing-Yuan and Smeers (1999),
Boucher and Smeers (2001), Conejo and Prieto (2001), Willems (2002), Casazza and
Delea (2003), Contreras, Klusch, and Krawczyk (2004), Green (2005), and Nagurney
(2006a), and the volumes edited by Singh (1999) and Zaccour (1998).
Nagurney and Matsypura (2005a) were the first to introduce a general electric
power supply chain network equilibrium model that included power generators, sup-
pliers, transmission service providers, and consumers at the demand markets. In
particular, variational inequality theory was used to determine pricing and compu-
tation of solutions. This was based on the supply chain network equilibrium models
that handle competition and cooperation and provide the resulting product flows and
prices in the work of Nagurney (2006b).
Wu et al. (2006) expanded the work of Nagurney and Matsypura (2005a) and con-
structed an electric power supply chain network equilibrium model with carbon taxes
that are applied a priori to distinct power generator/power plant combinations and
demonstrated that the model could be reformulated and solved as a transportation
network equilibrium problem with elastic demands.
1.2.2.3 Carbon Tax Policies
The first seminal contribution on the efficiency enhancing use of taxes to correct
for negative externalities was by Pigou in 1920; hence, the term Pigouvian taxes. The
expression carbon tax has been used to signify an environmental tax on fossil fuels
(coal, oil, gas) in terms of a carbon equivalent, which is the dominant green house
gas (Nicoletti and Martins (1992)). In theory, emitters are required to pay a charge
per unit of emissions equal to the value of the external social cost or damage caused
by the extra unit of emissions.
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A carbon tax is an example of a Pigouvian tax because it addresses a negative ex-
ternality, which represents the social cost of production that is not internalized. If the
Pigouvian tax is set equal to the marginal external cost, it induce the polluting firm
to internalize the full social costs of its contribution to the pollution damage (Baumol
and Oates (1988)). This creates a financial incentive for firms to reduce emissions to
the point where the tax is equal to the marginal costs of additional control. However,
interestingly, Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) claim that environmental taxes, like all
other policy remedies, usually exacerbate pre-existing tax distortions and, optimally,
should lie below the Pigouvian level (social marginal damages).
Oates (1995) has been credited with questioning the revenue potential, that is,
the ability to create the “double dividend”, which not only provides the incentive
to reduce emissions and offset other taxes, like labor and capital taxes, but demon-
strates that the negative impacts of pollution may be compensated through the use
of generated fiscal revenues (Baranzini (1997), Goulder, Parry, and Burtraw (1997),
Bovenberg (1999), Baranzini, Goldemberg, and Speck (2000), and Pezzey (2003)). In
a study performed by the International Monetary Fund in 1995, Denmark had the
highest ratio of green tax revenue to GDP, above 4%, while Mexico and the US had
the lowest ratios, about 1% (Norregaard and Reppelin-Hill (2000)).
Researchers have been drawn to the topic of carbon taxes to address issues regard-
ing the short and long run effects. Specifically, the macroeconomic effects of carbon
taxes was studied by Sondheimer (1991). A survey of long-run macroeconomic conse-
quences of greenhouse gas abatement was conducted by Boero, Clarke, and Winters
(1991). The distributional effects of carbon taxes have been addressed by Poterba
(1991), Scott (1992), Smith (1992), and more recently by Metcalf (2007) and Dinan
(2007).
The above studies were, subsequently, extended to include behavioral response to
the effects brought upon by a carbon tax. Such works include Pearson and Smith
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(1991) and Symons, Proops, and Gay (1994). Symons, Proops, and Gay (1994) used
an input-output model to study the impact of carbon taxes on fossil fuel and the
prices of consumer goods and consumer demand, which was then used to estimate
the fossil fuel use and carbon emissions. The model allows for a simulation of various
levels of carbon taxes to assess the impact on government revenue and consumer
welfare.
Pearce (1991) provides a literature review of carbon tax studies and their effects.
For additional research topics addressing carbon taxes, refer to the works by Bau-
mol (1972), Ingham and Ulph (1989), Chandler and Nicholls (1990), Dewees (1992),
Nicoletti and Martins (1992), Casler and Rafiqui (1993), Gay and Proops (1993),
Proops, Faber, and Wagenhals (1993), Parry, Williams, and Goulder (1999), Goulder
et al. (1999), Karki, Mann, and Salehfar (2006), McFarland and Herzog (2006), and
Kasahara et al. (2007).
Interesting, Bye and Nyborg (2003) compare a uniform tax regime to a differenti-
ated carbon tax and conclude that there is a slight welfare improvement. They also
point out that a uniform carbon tax is equivalent to an auctioned tradable emission
permit system. In this dissertation, I add to the current literature and create an
electric power supply chain network equilibrium model with alternative technologies
that incorporates an endogenous tax. I also show the relationship between this model
and that of a sustainable supply chain network.
As noted earlier, Wu et al. (2006) constructed an electric power supply chain
network equilibrium model with carbon taxes that are applied a priori to distinct
power generator/power plant combinations and demonstrated that the model could
be reformulated and solved as a transportation network equilibrium problem with
elastic demands. However, in that model, the government authority would have to
conduct simulation exercises to determine the carbon tax assignment in order to
achieve some goal. In contrast, I demonstrate how carbon taxes can be determined
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optimally and endogenously within a generalized electric power supply chain network
equilibrium model.
In particular, I allow the government to impose bound(s) on the total amount
of carbon emissions and the optimal carbon taxes guarantee that the bound(s) are
not exceeded. Hence, a mathematical modeling framework that can capture the
interactions between decision-makers in an electric power supply chain network from
power generators, along with the power plant production options; the suppliers as well
as the ultimate consumers, coupled with the incorporation of environmental policies,
such as carbon taxes, is of great practical as well as policy-making importance.
1.2.2.4 Emission Trading Schemes
The historical origin of a tradable permit scheme to address pollution issues was
first introduced in 1966 by Crocker, whose work was on air pollution, which was
followed by Dales in 1968, who studied prices and property rights for water permits.
However, the seminal contribution by Montgomery (1972) has provided theoretical
insight that much research in this area has been built upon. Montgomery showed that,
regardless of the initial allocation, marketable pollution permits be cost-effective, and
that markets can attain an equilibrium that meet set standards of environmental
quality.
Montgomery had analyzed an ambient-based permit (APS) system (which confers
the right to deliver pollutants in terms of pollutant concentrations at receptor points)
and an emission-based permit system (EPS) (which grants the holder of the permit
the right to emit pollutants up to a specified rate). Krupnick, Oates, and Verg
(1983), McGartland and Oates (1985), and McGartland (1988) extended this work to
propose, to evaluate, and to compare alternative forms of marketable permit systems.
In theory, marketable permits have been shown to effectively deal with the spatial
nature of pollutants, that is, the location of the source as well as the receptor of
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the environmental damage are considered differentiating among polluters (Baumol
and Oates (1988), Tietenberg (1995a), Dhanda, Nagurney, and Ramanujam (1999)).
Studies show that, for certain pollutants, if spatial differentiation is not built into the
system, then the cost-savings from employing an economic-incentive-based approach
be lost (Mendelsohn (1986)). Spatial differentiation be illustrated in the models of
my dissertation.
Researchers contributed to the theoretical expansion of the knowledge of trad-
able permits and focused on the interaction of the efficiency and effectiveness of a
tradable permit system in the presence of market imperfections such as market power
(Hahn (1984), Misiolek and Elder (1989)), technological change (Milliman and Prince
(1989)), research and development (Magat (1978), Spence (1984), Levin and Reiss
(1988)), transaction costs (Stavins (1995)), uncertainty (Roberts and Spence (1976),
Baumol and Oates (1988), Stavins (1996)), and noncompliance (Malik (1990), Keeler
(1991), Egteren and Weber (1996), Stranlund (2007)). See Tietenberg (1980) and
Tietenberg (1995b) for a comprehensive survey of the literatures on tradable permits.
Nagurney and Dhanda (1996) were the first to use utilize the theory of variational
inequality as a methodology for the qualitative analysis and computation of equilibria
in the markets of emission permits. The model takes into account various market
structures, the spatial nature of the pollutants to compute the equilibrium allocation
of licenses and prices, as well as the quantity and prices of firm product transactions.
Nagurney, Dhanda, and Stranlund (1997) then expanded on this work to construct
a general market model that includes multiple products and multiple pollutants and
computed the profit-maximized quantities of the multiple products, the equilibrium
quantities, allocation and prices of emission permits. See also the book by Dhanda,
Nagurney, and Ramanujam (1999).
There are few models that consider interactions of electricity markets with trad-
able permit markets. Johnson and Pekelney (1996), Tschirhart and Wen (1999), as
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well as Lapierda, Ventosa, and Llamas (2003) modeled the electric power industry
with an endogenous permit price but did not show the effect of all the decision-makers
in the electric power supply chain network. For example, Montero (2001) considers
multipollutants, but not the electric power industry. Mansur (2001) developed a pro-
cess model that incorporated the electricity and a multiple permit market of sulfur
dioxide and nitrous oxide permits. The model computed the equilibrium electricity
prices in the PJM market (which stands for Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland
and is the largest power grid operator in North America). However, the permit prices
were exogenous to the model and the production cost curves included the permit
effects on electricity costs.
Chen and Hobbs (2005) included the electric power market and the marketable
permits using linear complementarity models of Nash-Cournot competition. The
model determined, endogenously, nitrous oxide permit prices only. Chen and Hobbs
(2005) also considered market power in the emission market and included a network
representation to allow for transmission congestion. They claimed that, if market
power is exercised to withdraw generation from the network, the emissions impact
is a function of the substitution generation that occurs. Crespo and Herrera (2002)
stated that the estimates of costs, emissions, and prices could be distorted without
an adequate representation of transmission.
The work of Chen and Hobbs (2005) was further extended to incorporate market
power, that is, the ability of the largest producer in an electric power market to
influence the price of not only the electricity, but the permits market. The largest
firm follows a Stackelberg game in which, the smaller sized firms act second and
follow a Cournot game (Chen et al. (2006)). However, while the work of Chen and
Hobbs (2005) and Chen et al. (2006) consider the tradable permits market with the
interaction of the electric power market, they only consider, endogenously, a single
pollutant. Conversely, while Nagurney, Dhanda, and Stranlund (1997) endogenously
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determine the prices and quantities transacted in a multiple permit markets, they do
not consider the electric power supply chain context.
Schwarz (2005), who focused on the electric power industry, noted that there
has been little economics-related research on multipollutants and their effects. This
is deemed necessary since the equivalency ratio between two pollutants may vary
between seasons, across regions, and, possibly, over time as the composition of the at-
mosphere changes (WRAP (2003)). Multipollutant regulations aid in the investment
decisions of firms when future emission regulations are mandated (Schwarz (2005))
as technology investments for pollutants vary.
To add to the current literature I model the permit market in the case of emis-
sions generated by electric power production to include multiple pollutants and, thus,
multiple permit markets for those pollutants as well as spatially dispersed emission
receptor points. Moreover, unlike the previous literature, I emphasize the use of al-
ternative power plants as well as the underlying supply chain aspects of electric power
generation and distribution.
Technology is a particulary pertinent issue as it relates to the nature of tradable
permit schemes. Title IV of the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act declared
marketable emission permits as an economic incentive-based environmental program
that encourages firms to use alternative forms of technologies to reduce emissions
and thus trade excess permits in the market for revenue (Wooley and Morss (2001)).
Hence, not only I consider spatially distinct receptor points, but also alternative forms
of technology to generate electricity.
The new model allows for the determination of the equilibrium numbers and prices
of the various tradable pollution permits simultaneously with the equilibrium electric
power flows and prices. The model builds upon the electric power supply chain model
with alternative power plant technologies developed by Wu et al. (2006), which,
however, only considered a single pollutant (and, in effect, a single receptor point),
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and was transformed into a transportation network equilibrium model (see also, e.g.,
Nagurney and Liu (2005)).
1.3 Research Overview
This dissertation consists of eight chapters. In the first Chapter, I aim to provide
an overview of the motivation, contribution, and background literature to the research
that I conducted. Chapter 2 includes the methodologies and foundational models,
theories, and applications that this research is based on.
In Chapter 3 of the dissertation, I develop a novel supply chain model in which
the manufacturers can produce the homogeneous product in different manufacturing
plants with associated distinct environmental emissions. I assume that the manufac-
turers, the retailers with which they transact, as well as the consumers at the demand
markets for the product are multicriteria decision-makers with the environmental cri-
teria priced distinctly by the different decision-makers. Additionally, I establish that
the prices associated with the environmental criteria of the various decision-makers
can be interpreted as taxes.
Also in Chapter 3, I prove that the supply chain model with environmental con-
cerns can be reformulated and solved as an elastic demand transportation network
equilibrium problem. This research, hence, begins the construction of a bridge be-
tween sustainable supply chains and transportation networks, which aid the compu-
tational efficiency. This Chapter of the dissertation is based on Nagurney, Liu, and
Woolley (2007) but includes the generalization of emission functions which allows for
numerous applications of the model.
In Chapter 4, I develop a modeling and computational framework that allows for
the determination of optimal carbon taxes applied to electric power plants in the con-
text of electric power supply chain (generation/distribution/consumption) networks.
The adoption of carbon/pollution taxes both internationally and regionally has been
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fueled by global climate change and fuel security risks with a significant portion of
such policy interventions directed at the electric power industry.
The general framework that I develop in Chapter 4 allows for three distinct types
of carbon taxation environmental policies, beginning with a completely decentralized
scheme in which taxes can be applied to each individual generator/power plant in
order to guarantee that each assigned emission bound is not exceeded, to two versions
of a centralized scheme, one which assumes a fixed bound over the entire electric power
supply chain in terms of total carbon emissions and the other which allows the bound
to be a function of the tax. Chapter 4 of the dissertation is based on Nagurney, Liu,
and Woolley (2006), but, as in Chapter 3, includes the generalization of emission
functions.
In Chapter 5 of the dissertation I model the trading of emission rights by electric
power producers who emit multiple pollutants with impacts that depend on the spatial
dispersion of sources and receptors. The control of multiple, spatially differentiated
pollutants via emission trading calls for multiple pollution permit markets. Moreover,
unlike the previous literature, I emphasize the use of alternative power production
technologies as well as the underlying supply chain aspects of electric power generation
and distribution.
The new model developed in Chapter 5 allows for the determination of the equi-
librium numbers and prices of the various tradable pollution permits simultaneously
with the equilibrium electric power flows and prices. The model builds upon the elec-
tric power supply chain model with alternative power plant technologies developed
by Wu et al. (2006), which, however, only considered a single pollutant (and, in
effect, a single receptor point). This Chapter of the dissertation is based on Woolley,
Nagurney, and Stranlund (2009).
In Chapter 6 of the dissertation I quantify and assess, from a supply chain net-
work perspective, the environmental effects resulting when a merger or acquisition
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occurs and the resulting synergy from possible strategic gains. I develop a multicri-
teria decision-making supply chain network framework that captures the economic
activities of manufacturing, storage, and distribution pre and post the merger (or
integration). The models yield the system optima associated with the minimization
of the total costs and the total emissions under firm-specific prices. This work is built
on the recent work of Nagurney (2009) who developed a system-optimization perspec-
tive for supply chain network integration in the case of horizontal mergers. In this
Chapter, I also focus on the case of horizontal mergers (or acquisitions) and I extend
the contributions in Nagurney (2009) to include multicriteria decision-making and
environmental concerns. This multicriteria decision-making optimization framework
that not only minimizes costs but also minimizes emissions.
In addition, in Chapter 6, I propose a synergy measure which is then used to ana-
lyze the synergy effects associated with a merger, in terms of the operational synergy,
that is, the reduction, if any, in the cost of production, storage, and distribution, as
well as the environmental benefits in terms of the reduction of associated emissions
(if any). There is virtually no literature to-date that discusses the relationship be-
tween post-merger operational synergy and the effects on the environment and, thus,
ultimately, society. I attempt to address this issue from a quantitative perspective.
This Chapter of the dissertation is based on Nagurney and Woolley (2009).
In Chapter 7 of the dissertation, I develop multiproduct supply chain network
models prior to and post their horizontal integration with explicit capacities asso-
ciated with the economic activities of production, storage, and distribution; an ap-
proach that is closely related to that of Dafermos (1973) who proposed transportation
network models with multiple classes of transportation. I build on the novel work of
Nagurney (2009) to also focus on the case of horizontal mergers (or acquisitions) and
I extend the contributions in Nagurney (2009) to the much more general and richer
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setting of multiple product supply chains. I utilize a system-optimization perspective
for the model development and provide the variational inequality formulations.
I develop a measure to quantify the synergy, if any, and the respective relation-
ships from the production, shipment, and final consumption of multiple products
throughout the network pre and post merger. I provide the variational inequality
formulations as well as propose a computational procedure which fully exploits the
underlying network structure to illustrate the theoretical and computational frame-
work with numerical examples. This Chapter of the dissertation is based on Nagurney,
Woolley, and Qiang (2009).
I conclude the dissertation in Chapter 8 and provide venues for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGIES AND BASIC MODELS
This Chapter provides the methodologies and fundamental models that are used
in the dissertation. I first recall variational inequality theory, which is the basic
methodology for this dissertation, and is applied in Chapter 3 through Chapter 7
of this dissertation. It is a powerful methodology that can be applied to numerous
problems to solve network economic equilibrium models as well as system-optimized
problems. I also provide qualitative results of solutions.
Additionally, in this Chapter, I recall the elastic demand transportation net-
work equilibrium problem with known travel disutility functions due to Dafermos
(1982) which is utilized in Chapter 3 to establish the supernetwork equivalence
of the supply chain network equilibrium model to that of the transportation net-
work equilibrium model with known travel disutility functions. Next, I briefly relate
user-optimization to system-optimization problems before introducing the system-
optimized problem which is related to Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. The system-
optimized problem is utilized for supply chain network integration in the case of hori-
zontal mergers/acquisitions. Subsequently, I introduce the system-optimized problem
for multiple modes/classes of transportation that is utilized in Chapter 7 of this dis-
sertation.
Lastly, I provide the algorithms for the solution of finite-dimensional variational
inequalities. I first recall the Euler method (cf. Dupuis and Nagurney (1993)) which
is utilized in Chapter 3 through Chapter 5 of this dissertation. Then, I recall the
modified projection method (Korpelevich (1977)) and the equilibration algorithm (cf.
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Dafermos and Sparrow (1969), Nagurney (1993)), which are utilized in Chapter 6 and
Chapter 7. Moreover, I briefly relate the modified projection method to that of the
Euler method.
2.1 Variational Inequality Theory
In this Section I briefly provide an overview of the theory of variational inequal-
ities. Except where noted, all theorems and definitions presented in this Chapter
are taken from Nagurney (1999). Variational inequality theory, which was first de-
fined over infinite-dimensional space by Hartman and Stampacchia (1966), is used
throughout this dissertation to solve finite-dimensional network equilibrium problems.
Finite-dimensional theory was advanced when Dafermos (1980) recognized that traf-
fic network equilibrium conditions, as stated by Smith (1979), had a structure of a
variational inequality. For further discussion and proofs see Nagurney (1999).
Definition 2.1
The finite-dimensional variational inequality problem, VI(F,K), is to determine a
vector X∗ ∈ K ⊂ Rn, such that
〈F (X∗)T , X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (2.1)
where F is a given continuous function from K to Rn, K is a given closed convex set
and 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product in n-dimensional Euclidean space.
Optimization problems, including constrained and unconstrained, can be formu-
lated as variational inequality problems. The following definition identify the rela-
tionship between variational inequality theory and an optimization problem.
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Proposition 2.1
Let X∗ be a solution to the optimization problem:
Minimize f(X) (2.2)
subject to: X ∈ K,
where f is continuously differentiable and K is closed and convex. Then X∗ is a
solution of the variational inequality problem:
〈∇f(X∗)T , X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (2.3)
where ∇f(X) is the gradient vector of f with respect to X.
Proposition 2.2
If f(X) is a convex function and X∗ is a solution to VI(∇f,K), then X∗ is a solution
to the optimization problem (2.2). If the feasible set K = Rn, then the unconstrained
optimization problem is also a variational inequality problem.
The variational inequality problem can be reformulated as an optimization prob-
lem given that certain symmetry conditions hold. I now present the definition of
positive semidefinite, positive definite and strongly positive definite.
Definition 2.2
An n × n matrix M(X), whose elements mij(X); i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , n are func-
tions defined on the set S ⊂ Rn, is said to be positive semidefinite on S if
vTM(X)v ≥ 0,∀v ∈ Rn, X ∈ S. (2.4)
It is said to be positive definite on S if
vTM(X)v > 0,∀v 6= 0, v ∈ Rn, X ∈ S. (2.5)
32
It is said to be strongly positive definite on S if
vTM(X)v ≥ α‖v‖2, for some α > 0,∀v ∈ Rn, X ∈ S. (2.6)
The variational inequality problem can be reformulated as a convex optimization
problem when the Jacobian matrix of F (X) is symmetric and positive semidefinite.
However, the variational inequality is the more general problem formulations that can
also handle a function F (X) with an asymmetric Jacobian.
Theorem 2.1
Assume that F (X) is continuously differentiable on K and that that Jacobian matrix
∇f(X) =

∂F1
∂X1
. . . ∂F1
∂Xn
...
. . .
...
∂Fn
∂X1
. . . ∂Fn
∂Xn
 (2.7)
is symmetric and positive semidefinite. Then there is a real-valued convex function
f : K 7−→ R1 satisfying
∇f(X) = F (X) (2.8)
with X∗ the solution of VI(F,K) also being the solution of the mathematical program-
ming problem:
Minimize f(X)
subject to: X ∈ K,
where f(X) =
∫
F (X)Tdx, and
∫
is a line integral.
I now provide the conditions for basic existence and uniqueness results of solutions
to the variational inequality problem.
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Theorem 2.2
If K is a compact set and F(X) is continuous on K, then the variational inequality
problem admits at least one solution X∗.
Theorem 2.3
If the feasible set K is unbounded, then VI(F,K) admits a solution if and only if
there exists an R > 0 and a solution of VI(F,S), X∗R, such that ‖X∗R‖ < R, where
S = {X : ‖X‖ ≤ R}.
Theorem 2.4
Suppose that F(X) satisfies the coercivity condition
〈(F (X)− F (X0))T , X −X0〉
‖X −X0‖ → ∞ (2.9)
as ‖X‖ → ∞ for X ∈ K and for some X0 ∈ K, then VI(F,K) always has a solution.
Given certain monotonicity conditions, the qualitative properties of existence and
uniqueness can be obtained easily. I now recall definitions of monotonicity, strict
monotonicity, strong monotonicity, and Lipschitz continuity.
Definition 2.3 (Monotonicity)
F(X) is monotone on K if
〈[F (X1)− F (X2)]T , X1 −X2〉 ≥ 0, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K. (2.10)
Definition 2.4 (Strict Monotonicity)
F(X) is strictly monotone on K if
〈[F (X1)− F (X2)]T , (X1 −X2)〉 > 0, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K, X1 6= X2. (2.11)
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Definition 2.5 (Strong Monotonicity)
F(X) is strongly monotone on K if for some α > 0
〈[F (X1)− F (X2)]T , (X1 −X2)〉 ≥ α‖X1 −X2‖2, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K. (2.12)
Definition 2.6 (Lipschitz Continuity)
F(X) is Lipschitz continuous on K if there exists an L > 0, where L is the Lipschitz
constant, such that
‖F (X1)− F (X2)‖ ≤ L‖(X1 −X2)‖, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K. (2.13)
Theorem 2.5
Suppose that F(X) is strictly monotone on K. Then the solution is unique, if one
exists.
Theorem 2.6
There exists precisely one solution X∗ to VI(F,K) if F(X) is strongly monotone.
It is important to note that strong monotonicity of the function F guarantees
both existence and uniqueness given an unbounded feasible set K. However, if the
feasible set K is compact, hence closed and bounded, then only the strict monotonicity
condition needs to hold for uniqueness to be guaranteed, while existence is guaranteed
if F is continuous.
2.2 The Transportation Network Equilibrium Model with
Given Disutility Functions
In this Section, I recall the transportation network equilibrium model with elastic
demands with given travel disutility functions, due to Dafermos (1982), in which the
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travel disutility functions are assumed continuous, known and given. This model is
utilized in Chapter 3 to establish the supernetwork equivalence of the supply chain
network equilibrium model to that of the transportation network equilibrium model
with known travel disutility functions.
Consider a network G with the set of links L with nL elements, the set of paths P
with nP elements, and the set of origin/destination (O/D) pairsW with nW elements.
I denote the set of paths joining O/D pair w by Pw. Links are denoted by a, b, etc;
paths by p, q, etc., and O/D pairs by w1, w2, etc.
Denote the flow on path p by xp and the flow on link a by fa. The user travel cost
on a link a is denoted by ca and the user travel cost on a path p by Cp.
The link flows are related to the path flows through the following conservation of
flow equations:
fa =
∑
p∈P
xpδap, ∀a ∈ L, (2.14)
where δap = 1 if link a is contained in path p, and δap = 0, otherwise. Hence, the flow
on a link is equal to the sum of the flows on paths that contain that link.
The user costs on paths are related to user costs on links through the following
equations:
Cp =
∑
a∈L
caδap, ∀p ∈ P, (2.15)
that is, the user cost on a path is equal to the sum of user costs on links that make
up the path.
For the sake of generality, one can allow the user cost on a link to depend upon
the entire vector of link flows, denoted by f , so that
ca = ca(f), ∀a ∈ L. (2.16)
I assume, as given, continuous travel disutility functions, such that
λw = λw(d), ∀w, (2.17)
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where d is the vector of travel demands with travel demand associated with O/D pair
w being denoted by dw.
The following conservation of flow equations must hold:
∑
p∈Pw
xp = dw, ∀w. (2.18)
Definition 2.7 (Transportation Network Equilibrium with Given Disutility
Functions)
In equilibrium, the following conditions must hold for each O/D pair w ∈ W and each
path p ∈ Pw:
Cp(x
∗)− λw(d∗)
 = 0, if x
∗
p > 0,
≥ 0, if x∗p = 0.
(2.19)
The interpretation of conditions (2.19) is as follows: only those paths connecting
an O/D pair are used that have minimal travel costs and those costs are equal to
the travel disutility associated with traveling between that O/D pair. As proved
in Dafermos (1982), the transportation network equilibrium conditions (2.19) are
equivalent to the following variational inequality in path flows: determine (x∗, d∗) ∈
K12 (where the following notation is used: Kij is the feasible set i in Chapter j), such
that
∑
w∈W
∑
p∈Pw
Cp(x
∗)× [xp − x∗p]− ∑
w∈W
λw(d
∗)× [dw − d∗w] ≥ 0, ∀(x, d) ∈ K12,
where
K12 ≡ {(x, d)|(x, d) ∈ RnP+nW+ and dw =
∑
p∈Pw
xp,∀w}. (2.20)
I now recall the equivalent variational inequality in link form due to Dafermos
(1982).
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Theorem 2.7
A link flow pattern and associated travel demand pattern is a transportation network
equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality problem: determine
(f ∗, d∗) ∈ K22 satisfying
∑
a∈L
ca(f
∗)× (fa − f ∗a )−
∑
w∈W
λw(d
∗)× (dw − d∗w) ≥ 0, ∀(f, d) ∈ K22, (2.21)
whereK22 ≡ {(f, d) ∈ RnL+nW+ | there exists an x satisfying (2.14)
and dw =
∑
p∈Pw xp,∀w}.
Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten (1956) were the first to formulate rigorously the
transportation network equilibrium conditions (2.19) in the context of user link cost
functions and travel disutility functions that admitted symmetric Jacobian matrices
so that the equilibrium conditions (2.19) coincided with the Kuhn-Tucker optimality
conditions of an appropriately constructed optimization problem. The variational in-
equality formulation, in turn, allows for asymmetric functions (see also, e.g., Nagurney
(1999) and the references therein).
2.3 User-Optimization versus System-Optimization
In the following Section 2.4, I recall the system-optimized problem. I would like
to briefly compare system-optimization (S-O) to that of user-optimization (U-O).
Wardrop (1952) proposed two principles to characterize users’ behavior in a trans-
portation network. The first principle, coined later by Dafermos and Sparrow (1969)
as User-Optimization, stated that “the journey times of all routes actually used are
equal and less than those which would be experienced by a single vehicle on any
unused route” (Wardrop (1952)). The second principle stated “the average journey
time is minimal” (Wardrop (1952)), which was later coined by Dafermos and Sparrow
(1969) as System-Optimization.
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The behavior of the users of the networks themselves in a user-optimized network
is that of noncooperation. Individuals seek to minimize their own travel cost or time,
which, although optimal from each traveler’s perspective, it may not be optimal from a
societal one, where a central controller seeks to minimize the total cost throughout the
network. The user-optimized network equilibrium conditions require that all utilized
paths connecting an O/D pair have equal and minimal travel costs. However, in the
system-optimized problem, optimality conditions state that the marginal of the total
cost on each used path connecting an O/D pair is equalized and minimal (Nagurney
(2002)). For more information, see also Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten (1956),
Dafermos and Sparrow (1969), Nagurney (1999), and Yang and Huang (2004).
2.4 The System-Optimized Model
In this Section, I recall the system-optimized (S-O) model that is utilized in Chap-
ter 6 of the dissertation for supply chain network integration in the case of horizontal
mergers/acquisitions. It should be noted that in Chapter 6, with the addition of link
capacities, direct system-optimized formulations are not used. As in Section 2.2, the
network G = [N,L] and the user link cost functions are assumed to be continuous.
However, in the S-O problem, there is a central controller who routes the traffic in an
optimal manner so as to minimize the total cost in the network.
Moreover, the demand associated with each O/D pair is now fixed. I denote
the travel demand associated with traveling between O/D pair w by dw where dw is
assumed fixed and known for all w.
For simplicity, the user link cost functions are now assumed to be ca = ca(fa), ∀a ∈
L. The total cost on link a, denoted by cˆa(fa), is, hence, given by:
cˆa(fa) = ca(fa)× fa, ∀a ∈ L, (2.22)
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that is, the total cost on a link is equal to the user link cost on the link times the
flow on the link.
As noted earlier, in the system-optimized problem, there exists a central controller
who seeks to minimize the total cost in the network system, that is,
Minimizef∈K32
∑
a∈L
cˆa(fa), (2.23)
where the total cost, TC, is expressed as
TC =
∑
a∈L
cˆa(fa), (2.24)
and K32 ≡ {f ∈ RnL+ | there exists an x satisfying dw =
∑
p∈Pw xp,∀w and
fa =
∑
p∈P xpδap,∀a ∈ L}. It is assumed that the total link cost functions are convex.
Clearly, the feasible set is convex.
The associated cost on each path, p, denoted by Cˆp, is as follows:
Cˆp = Cpxp, ∀p ∈ P, (2.25)
which is the user cost on a path times the flow on the path, where the user cost on a
path, Cp, is given by (2.15).
In lieu of (2.14), (2.15), and (2.16), the cost on a path p can be expressed as a
function of the path flow variables. Hence, objective function (2.23), alternatively,
stated in path flow variables only, is as follows:
Minimizex∈K42
∑
p∈P
Cp(x)xp (2.26)
subject to (2.18) and the nonnegativity of the path flows, where
K42 ≡ {x|x ∈ RnP+ and dw =
∑
p∈Pw xp,∀w holds}.
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Definition 2.8 (System-Optimality Conditions)
The objective function (2.23) in the S-O problem is convex, and the feasible set K2 is
convex, under the assumption of increasing user link cost functions. Therefore, the
optimality conditions are: for each O/D pair w ∈ W and each path p ∈ Pw, the flow
pattern x (and the corresponding link flow pattern f), satisfying constraints (2.14)
and (2.18), and the nonnegativity of the path flows, must satisfy:
Cˆ
′
p(x)
 = µw, if xp > 0,≥ µw, if xp = 0, (2.27)
where Cˆ
′
p(x) denotes the marginal of the total cost on path p, given by:
Cˆ
′
p(x) =
∑
a∈L
∂cˆa(fa)
∂fa
δap, (2.28)
evaluated in (2.27) at the solution and µw is the Lagrange multiplier associated with
constraint (2.18) for that O/D pair w.
According to the optimality conditions (2.27), in the S-O problem, the marginal
of the total cost on each used path connecting an O/D pair is equalized and minimal
(see also, e.g., Dafermos and Sparrow (1969)).
2.4.1 The System-Optimized Model for Multiple Modes/Classes of Trans-
portation
In this Section, I present the system-optimized (S-O) problem with multiple
modes/classes that is extended in Chapter 7 of the dissertation for supply chain net-
work integration in the case of horizontal mergers/acquisitions with multiple modes/
classes of transportation. This work is most closely related to Dafermos (1973) who
proposed transportation network models with multiple modes/classes of transporta-
tion. The notation used is as described in Section 2.4, the network, G = [N,L], and
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the user link cost functions are assumed continuous, there is a central controller, and
the demand associated with each O/D pair is fixed.
I include now the multiple modes/classes of transportation denoted as i; i =
1, . . . , I. The following conservation of flow equations must hold:
f ia =
∑
p∈P
xipδap, ∀a ∈ L; i = 1, . . . , I, (2.29)
where δap = 1 if link a is contained in path p, and δap = 0, otherwise. Additionally,
the following conservation of flow equations must hold:
∑
p∈Pw
xip = d
i
w, ∀i = 1, . . . , I;∀w. (2.30)
The total cost function on a link, a, with transportation mode/class i, is denoted
by cˆia(f
1
a , . . . , f
I
a ), is, hence, given by:
cˆia(f
1
a , . . . , f
I
a ) = c
i
a(f
1
a , . . . , f
I
a )× f ia, ∀a ∈ L, i = 1 . . . I (2.31)
where the user link cost functions are given as cia = c
i
a(f
1
a , . . . , f
I
a ), ∀a ∈ L; i =
1, . . . , I. It is assumed that the cost on each link is a function of the flow of all the
modes/classes on the link.
The objective in the multimode/class system-optimized problem to minimize the
total cost in the network system, can now be expressed as,
Minimizef∈K52
∑
a∈L
I∑
i=1
cˆia(f
1
a , . . . , f
I
a ), (2.32)
where the total cost, TC, is expressed as
TC =
∑
a∈L
I∑
i=1
cˆia(f
1
a , . . . , f
I
a ), (2.33)
andK52 ≡ {f ∈ RnL+ | there exists an x satisfying diw =
∑
p∈Pw x
i
p,∀w;∀i = 1, . . . , I and
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f ia =
∑
p∈P x
i
pδap,∀a ∈ L;∀i = 1, . . . , I}. As in Section 2.4 the feasible set K52 is
convex.
The associated cost on each path, p, for mode/class i, denoted by Cˆip, is as follows:
Cˆip = C
i
px
i
p, ∀p ∈ P ; i = 1, . . . , I. (2.34)
The objective function (2.32), alternatively, stated in path flow variables only, is as
follows:
Minimizex∈K62
∑
p∈P
I∑
i=1
Cip(x)x
i
p (2.35)
subject to (2.30) and the nonnegativity of the path flows, where
K62 ≡ {x|x ∈ RnP+ and diw =
∑
p∈Pw x
i
p,∀w ; i = 1 . . . I, holds}.
Definition 2.9 (Multimodal/Multiclass System-Optimality Conditions)
The optimality conditions for each O/D pair w ∈ W and each path p ∈ Pw, and each
mode/class i, the flow pattern x (and the corresponding link flow pattern f), satisfying
constraints (2.29) and (2.30), and the nonnegativity of the path flows, must satisfy:
Cˆ
′i
p (x)
 = µ
i
w, if x
i
p > 0,
≥ µiw, if xip = 0,
(2.36)
where Cˆ
′i
p (x) denotes the marginal of the total cost on path p, with mode/class i, given
by:
Cˆ
′i
p (x) =
∑
a∈L
I∑
j=1
δap
∂cˆja
∂f ia
(2.37)
evaluated in (2.36) at the solution and µw is the Lagrange multiplier associated with
constraint (2.30) for that O/D pair w.
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2.5 Algorithms
The iterative progression to the equilibrium by a variational inequality algorithm
is usually through some equilibration procedure. In this Section I recall the Euler
method (for use in Chapter 3 through Chapter 5 of this dissertation), the modified
projection method, and the equilibration algorithm (related to Chapter 6 and Chapter
7). I also provide a brief comparison of modified projection and the Euler method.
2.5.1 The Euler Method
In this Section, I recall the Euler method, which is induced by the general iterative
scheme of Dupuis and Nagurney (1993). Nagurney and Zhang (1996) applied the
Euler method to solve variational inequality (2.20), which is in path flows (see also
Zhang and Nagurney (1997)).
I now present the Euler method for the solution of variational inequality (2.1).
Convergence results can be found in the above references. Note that T represents an
iteration counter.
Step 0: Initialization
Set X0 ∈ K.
Let T = 1 and set the sequence {αT } so that
∑∞
T =1 αT =∞, αT > 0 for all T , and
αT → 0 as T → ∞.
Step 1: Computation
Compute XT ∈ K by solving variational inequality subproblem:
〈XT + αT F (XT −1)−XT −1, X −XT 〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K. (2.38)
Step 2: Convergence Verification
If |XT − XT −1| ≤ , with  > 0, a pre-specified tolerance, then stop; otherwise, set
T =: T + 1, and go to Step 1.
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For convergence conditions, see Dupuis and Nagurney (1993).
2.5.2 The Modified Projection Method
The modified projection method of Korpelevich (1977) can be used to solve a
finite-deminsional variational inequality problem. For convergence, this method re-
quires monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the function F that enters variational
inequality (2.1) (and that a solution exists).
I now present the modified projection method. Note that T represents an iteration
counter.
Step 0: Initialization
Set X0 ∈ K. Let T = 1 and let α be a scalar such that 0 < α ≤ 1
L
, where L is the
Lipschitz continuity constant (cf. (2.13)).
Step 1: Computation
Compute X
T
by solving the variational inequality subproblem:
〈XT + αF (XT −1)−XT −1, X −XT 〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K. (2.39)
Step 2: Adaptation
Compute XT by solving the variational inequality subproblem:
〈XT + αF (XT −1)−XT −1, X −XT 〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K. (2.40)
Step 3: Convergence Verification
If max |XTl − XT −1l | ≤ , for all l, with  > 0, a pre-specified tolerance, then stop;
else set T =: T + 1, and go to Step 1.
Theorem 2.9 (Convergence)
If F(X) is monotone and Lipschitz continuous (and a solution exists), the modified
projection algorithm converges to a solution of variational inequality (2.1).
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2.5.3 The Equilibration Algorithms
The equilibration algorithms of Dafermos and Sparrow (1969) (see also Nagurney
(1993)) can be used to exploit the problem structure to efficiently proceed to the equi-
librium. The modified projection method utilizes a sequence of diagonal quadratic
programming problems that are network optimization problems where the feasible
set has a characteristic network structure. Thus, a sequence of, typically, symmetric
network equilibrium problems are solved when the variational inequality algorithms
are applied to the network equilibrium problems. Traffic network equilibrium prob-
lems are an example of variational inequality problems where the feasible set has a
network structure.
The efficiency of the modified projection method depends on the network-based
algorithm used for the solution of the embedded mathematical programming problem.
I now present, for the solution of the S-O problem in the case of linear and separable
user link travel cost functions, the S-O equilibration algorithm that can be embedded
in the modified projection method to attain the solution to the S-O problem. It should
be noted that there are both S-O and U-O versions of the equilibration algorithms.
For more information see Dafermos and Sparrow (1969) and Nagurney (1999).
The first equilibration algorithm is given for a single O/D pair in which the central
controller seek to minimize the total cost in the network (cf. (2.23)). The user link
cost functions (cf. 2.16) are assumed given by
ca = gafa + ha, ∀a ∈ L; ga, ha ≥ 0, ∀a. (2.41)
The total cost on a link is then defined as:
cˆa(fa) = (gafa + ha)× fa; ∀a ∈ L; ga, ha ≥ 0, ∀a. (2.42)
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The total cost on a path p, Cˆp, is:
Cˆp =
∑
a∈L
cˆa(fa)δap, ∀p ∈ P. (2.43)
The marginal of the total cost on the paths is given as
Cˆ ′p =
∑
a∈L
cˆ′aδap, ∀p ∈ P, (2.44)
where
cˆ′a(fa) = 2gafa + ha, ∀a ∈ L; ga, ha ≥ 0, ∀a. (2.45)
The second S-O equilibration algorithm can be utilized for multiple O/D pairs.
2.5.3.1 Single O/D Pair Equilibration
Step 0: Initialization
Create an initial feasible link flow pattern that is also a feasible path flow pattern.
Set T = 1 where T represents an iteration counter.
Step 1: Selection and Convergence Verification
Determine
r = {p|maxpCˆ ′p, xT −1p > 0}
q = {p|minpCˆ ′p}.
If |Cˆ ′r − Cˆ ′q| ≤ , with the prespecified tolerance,  > 0, then stop; else go to Step 2.
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Step 2: Computation
Compute the following:
∆′ =
[Cˆ ′r − Cˆ ′q]∑
a∈L 2ga(δaq − δar)2
(2.46)
∆ = min{∆′, xT −1r }.
Set:
xTr = x
T −1
r −∆; xTq = xT −1q +∆
xTp = x
T −1
p , ∀p 6= q ∪ r.
Then let T = T + 1 and proceed to Step 1.
2.5.3.2 Multiple O/D Pair Equilibration
To start, Let E1 ≡ EwJ ◦ . . . ◦Ew1 where Ewi is the equilibration operator for a fixed
O/D pair wi.
Step 0: Initialization
Create an initial feasible link flow pattern that is also a feasible path flow pattern.
Set T = 1 where T represents an iteration counter.
Step 1: Equilibration
Apply E1. Note that E1 equilibrates only one pair of paths for an O/D pair before
proceeding to the next O/D pair, and so on.
Step 2: Convergence Verification
If |Cˆ ′rwi − Cˆ ′qwi | ≤ ; i = 1, ..., J, with the prespecified tolerance,  > 0, where r =
{p|maxpwi Cˆ ′pwi , xT −1pwi > 0}; i = 1, ..., J, and q = {pwi|minpwi Cˆ ′pwi}; i = 1, ..., J, then
stop; else let T = T + 1 and proceed to Step 1.
2.5.4 Comparison of the Modified Projection and the Euler Method
The Euler method (2.38) and the modified projection method (2.39) – (2.40) differ
in the step size, α. The modified projection method utilizes a constant step size, α,
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while the Euler method makes use of an altering step size, αT , that diminishes with
each T . The Euler method can be used as an alternative discrete-time approxima-
tion method for the continuous-time projected dynamical system (cf. Dupuis and
Nagurney (1993)) while the modified projection method focuses on the solution of
the variational inequality.
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CHAPTER 3
SUSTAINABLE SUPPLY CHAIN AND
TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS
Transportation provides the foundation for the linking of economic activities.
Without transportation, inputs to production processes do not arrive, nor can finished
goods reach their destinations. In today’s globalized economy, inputs to production
processes may lie continents away from assembly points and consumption locations,
further emphasizing the critical infrastructure of transportation in product supply
chains.
At the same time that supply chains have become increasingly globalized, en-
vironmental concerns due to global warming and associated security risks regarding
energy supplies have drawn the attention of numerous constituencies (cf. Cline (1992),
Poterba (1993), and Painuly (2001)). Indeed, companies are increasingly being held
accountable not only for their own performance in terms of environmental account-
ability, but also for that of their suppliers, subcontractors, joint venture partners,
distribution outlets and, ultimately, even for the disposal of their products. Con-
sequently, poor environmental performance at any stage of the supply chain may
damage the most important asset that a company has, which is its reputation.
As noted in the Introduction, in this Chapter, a significant extension of the supply
chain network model of Nagurney and Toyasaki (2003), which introduced environmen-
tal concerns into a supply chain network equilibrium framework (see also Nagurney,
Dong, and Mokhtarian (2002b)), is made through the introduction of alternative
manufacturing plants for each manufacturer with distinct associated environmental
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emissions. In addition, I demonstrate that the new supply chain network equilib-
rium model can be transformed into a transportation network equilibrium model
with elastic demands over an appropriately constructed abstract network or super-
network. This theoretical result can be exploited in practice through the computation
of numerical examples.
This Chapter is based on Nagurney, Liu, and Woolley (2007), but includes the gen-
eralization of emission functions which aids in the numerous possible applications of
the model, and is organized as follows. Section 3.1 develops the multitiered, multicri-
teria supply chain network model with distinct manufacturing plants and associated
emissions and presents the variational inequality formulation of the governing equi-
librium conditions. It is also established that the prices associated with the environ-
mental criteria of the various decision-makers can be interpreted as taxes. Section 3.2
demonstrates how the new supply chain network model with environmental concerns
can be transformed into a transportation network equilibrium model over an appro-
priately constructed abstract network or supernetwork. This equivalence provides a
new interpretation of the equilibrium conditions governing sustainable supply chains
in terms of path flows. In Section 3.3 the Euler method algorithm (see Section 2.5.1)
developed for the computation of solutions to elastic demand transportation network
equilibrium problems is applied to solve numerical supply chain network problems in
which there are distinct manufacturing plants available for each manufacturer and
emissions associated with production as well as with transportation/transaction and
the operation of the retailers are included. The numerical examples illustrate the
potential power of this approach for policy analysis. Summary and conclusions are
presented in Section 3.4.
The contributions in this Chapter further demonstrate the generality of the con-
cepts of transportation network equilibrium, originally proposed in the seminal book
of Beckmann, McGuire, andWinsten (1956) (see also Boyce, Mahmassani, and Nagur-
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ney (2005)). Indeed, recently, it has been shown by Nagurney (2006a) that supply
chains can be reformulated and solved as transportation network problems. More-
over, the papers by Nagurney and Liu (2005) and Wu et al. (2006) demonstrate, as
hypothesized by Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten (1956), that electric power gen-
eration and distribution networks can be reformulated and solved as transportation
network equilibrium problems. See also the book by Nagurney (2006b) for a variety
of transportation-based supply chain network models and applications and the book
by Nagurney (2000) on sustainable transportation networks.
3.1 The Supply Chain Model with Alternative Manufactur-
ing Plants and Environmental Concerns
In this Section I develop the supply chain network model that includes manufac-
turing plants as well as multicriteria decision-making associated with environmental
concerns. I consider I manufacturers, each of which generally owns and operates
M manufacturing plants. Each manufacturing plant is associated with a different
primary production process and energy consumption combination with associated
environmental emissions. There are also J retailers, T transportation/transaction
modes between each retailer and demand market, with a total of K demand markets,
as depicted in Figure 3.1. The majority of the needed notation is given in Table 3.1.
An equilibrium solution is denoted by “∗”. All vectors are assumed to be column
vectors, except where noted otherwise.
The top-tiered nodes in the supply chain network in Figure 3.1, enumerated by
1, . . . , i . . . , I, represent the I manufacturers, who are the decision-makers who own
and operate the manufacturing plants denoted by the second tier of nodes in the
network. The manufacturers produce a homogeneous product using the different
plants and sell the product to the retailers in the third tier.
52
Table 3.1. The Notation for the Supply Chain Network Model
Notation Definition
qim quantity of product produced by manufacturer i using plant m,
where i = 1, . . . , I;m = 1, . . . ,M
qm I-dimensional vector of the product generated by manufacturers
using plant m with components: q1m, . . . , qIm
q IM -dimensional vector of all the production outputs generated
by the manufacturers at the plants
Q1 IMJ-dimensional vector of flows between the plants of the
manufacturers and the retailers with component imj denoted
by qimj
Q2 JTK-dimensional vector of product flows between retailers and
demand markets with component jtk denoted by qtjk and
denoting the flow between retailer j and demand market k via
transportation/transaction mode t
d K-dimensional vector of market demands with component k
denoted by dk
fim(qm) production cost function of manufacturer i using plant m
with marginal production cost with respect to qim denoted
by ∂fim
∂qim
cimj(qimj) transportation/transaction cost incurred by manufacturer i
using plant m in transacting with retailer j with marginal
transaction cost denoted by
∂cimj(qimj)
∂qimj
h J-dimensional vector of the retailers’ supplies of the product
with component j denoted by hj, with hj ≡
∑I
i=1
∑M
m=1 qimj
cj(h) ≡ cj(Q1) operating cost of retailer j with marginal operating cost
with respect to hj denoted by
∂cj
∂hj
and the marginal operating
cost with respect to qimj denoted by
∂cj(Q
1)
∂qimj
ctjk(q
t
jk) the transportation/transaction cost associated with the
transaction between retailer j and demand market k via
transportation/transaction t
cˆtjk(Q
2) unit transportation/transaction cost incurred by consumers at
demand market k in transacting with retailer j via mode t
ρ3k(d) demand market price function at demand market k
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Figure 3.1. The Supply Chain Network with Manufacturing Plants
Node im in the second tier corresponds to manufacturer i’s plant m, with the
second tier of nodes enumerated as: 11, . . . , IM . It is assumed that each manufacturer
seeks to determine his optimal production portfolio across his manufacturing plants
and his sales allocations of the product to the retailers in order to maximize his own
profit. It is also assumed that each manufacturer seeks to minimize the total emissions
associated with production and transportation to the retailers.
Retailers, which are represented by the third-tiered nodes in Figure 3.1, func-
tion as intermediaries. The nodes corresponding to the retailers are enumerated as:
1, . . . , j, . . . , J with node j corresponding to retailer j. They purchase the product
from the manufacturers and sell the product to the consumers at the different demand
markets. It is assumed that the retailers compete with one another in a noncoopera-
tive manner. Also, it is assumed that, due to consumer pressures to influence firms to
behave environmentally responsibly (Srivastara (2007)), the retailers are multicrite-
ria decision-makers with environmental concerns and they also seek to minimize the
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emissions associated with transacting (which can include transportation) with the
consumers as well as in operating their retail outlets.
The bottom-tiered nodes in Figure 3.1 represent the demand markets, which can
be distinguished from one another by their geographic locations or the type of asso-
ciated consumers such as whether they correspond, for example, to businesses or to
households. There are K bottom-tiered nodes with node k corresponding to demand
market k.
The retailers need to cover the direct costs and to decide which transporta-
tion/transaction modes should be used and how much product should be delivered.
The structure of the network in Figure 3.1 guarantees that the conservation of flow
equations associated with the production and distribution are satisfied. The flows on
the links joining the manufacturers in Figure 3.1 to the plant nodes are respectively:
q11, . . . , qim, . . . , qIM ; the flows on the links from the plant nodes to the retailer nodes
are given, respectively, by the components of the vector Q1, whereas the flows on the
links joining the retailer nodes with the demand markets are given by the respective
components of the vector: Q2.
Of course, if a particular manufacturer does not own M manufacturing plants,
then the corresponding links (and nodes) can just be removed from the supply chain
network in Figure 3.1 and the notation reduced accordingly. Similarly, if a mode of
transportation/transaction is not available for a retailer/demand market pair, then
the corresponding link may be removed from the supply chain network in Figure
3.1 and the notation changed accordingly. On the other hand, multiple modes of
transportation/transaction from the plants to the retailers can easily be added as
links to the supply chain network in Figure 3.1 joining the plant nodes with the
retailer nodes (with an associated increase in notation).
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I now describe the behavior of the manufacturers, the retailers, and the consumers
at the demand markets. I then state the equilibrium conditions of the supply chain
network and provide the variational inequality formulation.
3.1.1 The Multicriteria Decision-Making Behavior of the Manufacturers
and Their Optimality Conditions
Let ρ∗1imj denote the unit price charged by manufacturer i for the transaction
with retailer j for the product produced at plant m. ρ∗1imj is an endogenous variable
and can be determined once the complete supply chain network equilibrium model
is solved. Since it is assumed that each individual manufacturer i; i = 1, . . . , I, is a
profit maximizer, the profit-maximization objective function of manufacturer i can
be expressed as follows:
Maximize
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
ρ∗1imjqimj −
M∑
m=1
fim(qm)−
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
cimj(qimj). (3.1a)
The first term in the objective function (3.1a) represents the revenue and the next
two terms represent the production cost and transportation/transaction costs, respec-
tively.
In addition, it is assumed that manufacturer i is concerned with the total amount
of emissions generated both in production of the product at the various manufacturing
plants as well as in transportation of the product to the various retailers. Letting
eim(qim) denote the emissions generation function for those emissions generated per
unit of product produced at plant m of manufacturer i; and eimj(qimj) the emissions
generation function for those emissions generated in transporting the product from
plant m of manufacturer i to retailer j, one would have that the second objective
function of manufacturer i is given by:
Minimize
M∑
m=1
eim(qim) +
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
eimj(qimj). (3.1b)
56
A nonnegative constant, αi, is now assigned to the emissions-generation criterion
(3.1b). αi can be assumed the price that each manufacturer, i, would be willing to
pay for each unit of emission. Thus, αi, represents the environmental concern for each
manufacturer, i, and a higher αi represents a greater concern for the environment.
Thus, one can construct a value function for each manufacturer (see e.g., Nagurney
and Dong (2002), Nagurney and Toyasaki (2003), and the references therein). Conse-
quently, the multicriteria decision-making problem for manufacturer i is transformed
into:
Maximize
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
ρ∗1imjqimj −
M∑
m=1
fim(qm)−
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
cimj(qimj)
−αi(
M∑
m=1
eim(qim) +
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
eimj(qimj)) (3.1c)
subject to:
J∑
j=1
qimj = qim, m = 1, . . . ,M, (3.2)
qimj ≥ 0, m = 1, . . . ,M ; j = 1, . . . , J. (3.3)
Conservation of flow equation (3.2) states that the amount of product produced
at a particular plant of a manufacturer is equal to the amount of product transacted
by the manufacturer from that plant with all the retailers (and this holds for each
of the manufacturing plants). Expression (3.3) guarantees that the quantities of the
product produced at the various manufacturing plants are nonnegative.
Assume that the production cost, the transportation cost, and the emission func-
tions for each manufacturer are continuously differentiable and convex (cf. (3.1c),
subject to (3.2) and (3.3)), and that the manufacturers compete in a noncooperative
manner in the sense of Nash (1950, 1951). The optimality conditions for all manu-
facturers simultaneously, under the above assumptions (see also Gabay and Moulin
57
(1980), Bazaraa, Sherali, and Shetty (1993), and Nagurney (1999)), coincide with the
solution of the following variational inequality: determine (q∗, Q1∗) ∈ K13 satisfying
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fim(q
∗
m)
∂qim
+ αi
∂eim(q
∗
im)
∂qim
]
× [qim − q∗im]
+
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
[
∂cimj(q
∗
imj)
∂qimj
+ αi
∂eimj(q
∗
imj)
∂qimj
− ρ∗1imj
]
× [qimj − q∗imj] ≥ 0,
∀(q,Q1) ∈ K13, where K13 ≡ {(q,Q1)|(q,Q1) ∈ RIM+IMJ+ and (3.2) holds}.
(3.4)
3.1.2 The Multicriteria Decision-Making Behavior of the Retailers and
Their Optimality Conditions
The retailers, in turn, are involved in transactions both with the manufacturers
and with the consumers at demand markets.
It is reasonable to assume that the total amount of product sold by a retailer j;
j = 1, . . . , J , is equal to the total amount of the product that he purchased from the
manufacturers and that was produced via the different manufacturing plants available
to the manufacturers. This assumption can be expressed as the following conservation
of flow equations:
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
qtjk =
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
qimj, j = 1, . . . , J. (3.5)
Let ρt∗2jk denote the price charged by retailer j to demand market k via trans-
portation/transaction mode t. This price is determined endogenously in the model
once the entire network equilibrium problem is solved. As noted above, it is assumed
58
that each retailer seeks to maximize his own profit. Hence, the profit-maximization
objective function faced by retailer j may be expressed as follows:
Maximize
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
ρt∗2jkq
t
jk − cj(Q1)−
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
ρ∗1imjqimj −
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
ctjk(q
t
jk). (3.6a)
The first term in (3.6a) denotes the revenue of retailer j; the second term denotes
the operating cost of the retailer, and the third term denotes the payments for the
product to the various manufacturers. The last term in (3.6a) denotes the transporta-
tion/transaction costs. Note that here imperfect competition is assumed in terms of
the operating cost but, of course, if the operating cost functions cj; j = 1, . . . , J
depend only on the product handled by j (and not also on the product handled by
the other retailers), then the dependence of these functions on Q1 can be simplified
accordingly (and this is a special case of the model). The latter would reflect perfect
competition.
In addition, for notational convenience, let
hj ≡
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
qimj, j = 1, . . . , J. (3.7)
As defined in Table 3.1, the operating cost of retailer j, cj, is a function of the
total product inflows to the retailer, that is:
cj(h) ≡ cj(Q1), j = 1, . . . , J. (3.8)
Hence, his marginal cost with respect to hj is equal to the marginal cost with respect
to qimj:
∂cj(h)
∂hj
≡ ∂cj(Q
1)
∂qimj
, j = 1, . . . , J ; m = 1, . . . ,M. (3.9)
In addition, assume that each retailer seeks to minimize the emissions associated
with managing his retail outlet and with transacting with consumers at the demand
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markets. Let ej(hj) denote the emissions generation function representing those emis-
sions generated by retailer j; j = 1, . . . , J , and is a function of all product inflows
to the retailer; and let etjk(q
t
jk) denote the amount of emissions generated which is a
function of each unit of product transacted between k and j via t, for j = 1, . . . , J ;
k = 1, . . . , K, and t = 1, . . . , T . Then one would have that the second objective
function of retailer j is given by:
Minimize ej(hj) +
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
etjk(q
t
jk). (3.6b)
A nonnegative constant, βj, is now assigned to the emissions-generation criterion
(3.6b). βj can be assumed the price that each retailer, j, would be willing to pay for
each unit of emission; which represents the environmental concern for each retailer, j,
and a higher βj represent a greater concern for the environment. One can construct
retailer j’s multicriteria decision-making problem, given by:
Maximize
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
ρt∗2jkq
t
jk − cj(Q1)−
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
ρ∗1imjqimj −
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
ctjk(q
t
jk) (3.6c)
−βj(ej(hj) +
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
etjk(q
t
jk))
subject to (3.7) and:
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
qtjk =
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
qimj, (3.10)
qimj ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I, m = 1, . . . ,M, (3.11)
qtjk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , K; t = 1, . . . , T. (3.12)
Assume that the transaction costs, the operating costs (cf. (3.6a)), and the emis-
sion functions (cf. 3.6b) are all continuously differentiable and convex, and that the
retailers compete in a noncooperative manner. Hence, the optimality conditions for
all retailers, simultaneously, under the above assumptions (see also Dafermos and
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Nagurney (1987), Nagurney, Dong, and Zhang (2002)), can be expressed as the fol-
lowing variational inequality: determine (h∗, Q2∗, Q1∗) ∈ K33 such that
J∑
j=1
[
∂cj(h
∗)
∂hj
+ βj
∂ej(h
∗
j)
∂hj
]
× [hj − h∗j ]
+
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctjk(q
t∗
jk)
∂qtjk
+ βj
∂etjk(q
t∗
jk)
∂qtjk
− ρt∗2jk
]
× [qtjk − qt∗jk]
+
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
[
ρ∗1imj
]× [qimj − q∗imj] ≥ 0, ∀(h,Q1, Q2, ) ∈ K33, (3.13)
where K33 ≡ {(h,Q2, Q1)|(h,Q2, Q1) ∈ RJ(1+TK+IM)+ and (3.7) and (3.10) hold}.
3.1.3 The Equilibrium Conditions for the Demand Markets
At each demand market k; k = 1, . . . , K, the following conservation of flow equa-
tion must be satisfied:
dk =
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
qtjk. (3.14)
Assume also that the consumers at the demand markets may be environmentally-
conscious in choosing their modes of transaction with the retailer with an associated
nonnegative constant of ηk for demand market k. Since the demand market price
functions are given, the market equilibrium conditions at demand market k then take
the form: for each retailer j; j = 1, ..., J and transportation/transaction mode t;
t = 1, ..., T :
ρt∗2jk + cˆ
t
jk(Q
2∗) + ηk
∂etjk(q
t∗
jk)
∂qtjk
 = ρ3k(d
∗), if qt∗jk > 0,
≥ ρ3k(d∗), if qt∗jk = 0.
(3.15)
Equation (3.15) above states that if the quantity consumed at demand market,
k, shipped by retailer j, via transaction/transportation mode t, is positive, the total
cost to each demand market (which includes the price that the the retailer charges
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the demand market plus the transaction costs that the demand market ensues for
those transactions with retailer, j, plus the marginal cost of emissions for each de-
mand market, k) must be equal to the price the demand market is willing to pay;
else the quantity consumed at demand market, k, shipped by retailer j, via transac-
tion/transportation mode t, is zero.
Nagurney and Toyasaki (2003) (see also Nagurney and Toyasaki (2005)) considered
similar demand market equilibrium conditions but in the case in which the demand
functions, rather than the demand price functions as above, were given. The demand
price functions were given for the demand market equilibrium conditions in Nagurney,
Liu, and Woolley (2007) and the emission functions were fixed and given.
The interpretation of conditions (3.15) is as follows: consumers at a demand
market purchase the product from a retailer via a transportation/transaction mode,
provided that the purchase price plus the unit transportation/transaction cost plus
the marginal cost of emissions associated with that transaction is equal to the price
that the consumers are willing to pay at that demand market. If the purchase price
plus the unit transportation/transaction cost plus the marginal cost of emissions asso-
ciated with that transaction exceeds the price the consumers are willing to pay, then
there be no transaction between that retailer and demand market via that trans-
portation/transaction mode. The equivalent variational inequality governing all the
demand markets takes the form: determine (Q2∗, d∗) ∈ K43, such that
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
ρt∗2jk + cˆ
t
jk(Q
2∗) + ηk
∂etjk(q
t∗
jk)
∂qtjk
]
× [qtjk − qt∗jk]−
K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk − d∗k] ≥ 0,
∀(Q2, d) ∈ K43, whereK43 ≡ {(Q2, d)|(Q2, d) ∈ RK(JT+1)+ and (3.14) holds}. (3.16)
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3.1.4 The Equilibrium Conditions for the Supply Chain Network with
Manufacturing Plants and Environmental Concerns
In equilibrium, the optimality conditions for all the manufacturers, the optimality
conditions for all the retailers, and the equilibrium conditions for all the demand
markets must be simultaneously satisfied so that no decision-maker has any incentive
to alter his transactions.
Definition 3.1 (Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Manufacturing
Plants and Environmental Concerns)
The equilibrium state of the supply chain network with manufacturing plants and
environmental concerns is one where the product flows between the tiers of the network
coincide and the product flows and prices satisfy the sum of conditions (3.4), (3.13),
and (3.16).
I now state and prove:
Theorem 3.1 (Variational Inequality Formulation of the Supply Chain
Network Equilibrium with Manufacturing Plants and Environmental Con-
cerns)
The equilibrium conditions governing the supply chain network according to Definition
3.1 coincide with the solution of the variational inequality given by: determine
(q∗, h∗, Q1∗, Q2∗, d∗) ∈ K53 satisfying:
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fim(q
∗
m)
∂qim
+ αi
∂eim(q
∗
im)
∂qim
]
×[qim−q∗im]+
J∑
j=1
[
∂cj(h
∗)
∂hj
+ βj
∂ej(h
∗
j)
∂hj
]
×[hj−h∗j ]
+
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
[
∂cimj(q
∗
imj)
∂qimj
+ αi
∂eimj(q
∗
imj)
∂qimj
]
× [qimj − q∗imj]
+
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctjk(q
t∗
jk)
∂qtjk
+ cˆtjk(Q
2∗) + (βj + ηk)
∂etjk(q
t∗
jk)
∂qtjk
]
× [qtjk − qt∗jk]
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−
K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk − d∗k] ≥ 0, ∀(q, h,Q1, Q2, d) ∈ K53, (3.17)
where K53 ≡ {(q, h,Q1, Q2, d)|(q, h,Q1, Q2, d) ∈ RIM+J+IMJ+TJK+K+
and (3.2), (3.5), and (3.7) hold}.
Proof:
I first prove that an equilibrium according to Definition 3.1 coincides with the
solution of variational inequality (3.17). Indeed, summation of (3.4), (3.13), and
(3.16), after algebraic simplifications, yields (3.17).
I now prove the converse, that is, a solution to variational inequality (3.17) satisfies
the sum of conditions (3.4), (3.13), and (3.16), and is, therefore, a supply chain
network equilibrium pattern according to Definition 3.1.
First, add the term ρ∗1imj−ρ∗1imj to the first term in the third summand expression
in (3.17). Then, the term ρt∗2jk−ρt∗2jk is added to the first term in the fourth summand
expression in (3.17). Since these terms are all equal to zero, they do not change
(3.17). Hence, one would obtain the following inequality:
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fim(q
∗
m)
∂qim
+ αi
∂eim(q
∗
im)
∂qim
]
×[qim−q∗im]+
J∑
j=1
[
∂cj(h
∗)
∂hj
+ βj
∂ej(h
∗
j)
∂hj
]
×[hj−h∗j ]
+
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
[
∂cimj(q
∗
imj)
∂qimj
+ αi
∂eimj(q
∗
imj)
∂qimj
+ ρ∗1imj − ρ∗1imj
]
× [qimj − q∗imj]
+
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctjk(q
t∗
jk)
∂qtjk
+ cˆtjk(q
t∗
jk) + (βj + ηk)
∂etjk(q
t∗
jk)
∂qtjk
+ ρt∗2jk − ρt∗2jk
]
× [qtjk − qt∗jk]
−
K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk − d∗k] ≥ 0, ∀(q, h,Q1, Q2, d) ∈ K53, (3.18)
which can be rewritten as:
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fim(q
∗
m)
∂qim
+ αi
∂eim(q
∗
im)
∂qim
]
× [qim − q∗im]
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+
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
G∑
g=1
[
∂cimj(q
∗
imj)
∂qimj
− ρ∗1imj + αi
∂eimj(q
∗
imj)
∂qimj
]
× [qimj − q∗imj]
+
J∑
j=1
[
∂cj(h
∗)
∂hj
+ βj
∂ej(h
∗
j)
∂hj
]
× [hj − h∗j ]
+
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctjk(q
t∗
jk)
∂qtjk
− ρt∗2jk + βj
∂etjk(q
t∗
jk)
∂qtjk
]
× [qtjk − qt∗jk]
+
J∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
I∑
i=1
[
ρ∗1imj
]× [qimj − q∗imj]
+
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
ρt∗2jk + cˆ
t
jk(q
t∗
jk) + ηk
∂etjk(q
t∗
jk)
∂qtjk
]
× [qtjk− qt∗jk]−
K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk−d∗k] ≥ 0,
∀(q, h,Q1, Q2, d) ∈ K53. (3.19)
Clearly, (3.19) is the sum of the optimality conditions (3.4) and (3.13), and the
equilibrium conditions (3.16), and is, hence, according to Definition 3.1 a supply chain
network equilibrium.
Remark
Note that, in the above model, it is assumed that the various decision-makers are
environmentally conscious (to a certain degree) depending upon the prices that they
assign to the respective environmental criteria denoted by αi; i = 1, . . . , I for the
manufacturers; by βj; j = 1, . . . , J for the retailers, and by ηk; k = 1, . . . , K for the
consumers at the respective demand markets. These prices are associated with the en-
vironmental emissions generated in production, transportation/transaction, and the
operation of the retail outlets as the product “moves” through the supply chain, driven
by the demand for the product at the demand markets. This implies (assuming all
prices are not identically equal to zero), environmentally-conscious decision-makers.
It is worth emphasizing that the prices can also be interpreted as taxes , for example,
carbon taxes (cf. Wu et al. (2006) and Nagurney, Liu, and Woolley (2007)), which
would be assigned by a governmental authority. Such a framework was devised by Wu
et al. (2006) in the case of electric power supply chains. However, in that model, the
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carbon emissions only occurred in the production of electric power using alternative
power-generation plants, which could utilize different forms of energy (renewable or
not, for example). Hence, the carbon taxes were only associated with the manufactur-
ers and the power-generating plants. In the case of the supply chain network model in
this Chapter, in contrast, pollution can be emitted not only at the production stage,
but also in the transportation of the product, as well as during the operation of the
retail outlets. In order to construct sustainable supply chains, it is essential to have
a system-wide view of pollution generation.
I now describe how to recover the prices associated with the first and third tiers
of nodes in the supply chain network. Clearly, the components of the vector ρ∗3
can be directly obtained from the solution to variational inequality (3.17). I now
describe how to recover the prices ρ∗1imj, for all i,m, j, and ρ
t∗
2jk for all j, k, t, from the
solution of variational inequality (3.17). The prices associated with the retailers can
be obtained by setting (cf. (3.15)) ρt∗2jk = ρ
∗
3k − ηk
∂etjk(q
t∗
jk)
∂qtjk
− cˆtjk(Q2∗) for any j, t, k
such that qt∗sk > 0. The top-tiered prices, in turn, can be recovered by setting (cf.
(3.4)) ρ∗1imj =
∂fim(q
∗
m)
∂qimj
+
∂cimj(q
∗
imj)
∂qimj
+ αi
∂eimj(q
∗
imj)
∂qimj
for any i,m, j such that q∗imj > 0.
Corollary 3.1 (Variational Inequality Formulation for the Case of Fixed
Emissions)
Assume that the emission functions are fixed and given (see Nagurney, Liu, and
Woolley (2007)). Hence, in this special case, variational inequality (3.17) collapses
to: determine (q∗, h∗, Q1∗, Q2∗, d∗) ∈ K63 satisfying:
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fim(q
∗
m)
∂qim
+ αieim
]
× [qim − q∗im] +
J∑
j=1
[
∂cj(h
∗)
∂hj
+ βjej
]
× [hj − h∗j ]
+
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
[
∂cimj(q
∗
imj)
∂qimj
+ αieimj
]
× [qimj − q∗imj]
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+
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctjk(q
t∗
jk)
∂qtjk
+ cˆtjk(Q
2∗) + (βj + ηk)etjk
]
×[qtjk−qt∗jk]−
K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)×[dk−d∗k] ≥ 0,
∀(q, h,Q1, Q2, d) ∈ K63, (3.20)
where
K63 ≡ {(q, h,Q1, Q2, d)|(q, h,Q1, Q2, d) ∈ RIM+J+IMJ+TJK+K+
The proof is straightforward.
In this Chapter, I have focused on the development of a supply chain network
model with a view towards sustainability in which the price associated with environ-
mental concern (equivalently, taxes) are known/assigned a priori. In order to achieve
a particular environmental goal (see also Nagurney (2000)), for example, in the case of
a bound on the total emissions in the entire supply chain, one could conduct simula-
tions associated with the different prices in order to achieve the desired policy result.
An interesting extension would be to construct a model in which the prices/taxes are
endogenous, as was done in the case of electric power supply chains and carbon taxes
by Nagurney, Liu, and Woolley (2007). However, as also discussed therein, the trans-
portation network equilibrium reformulation may be lost for the full supply chain
(although still exploited computationally during the iterative algorithmic process).
3.2 The Transportation Network Equilibrium Reformulation
of the Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model with
Manufacturing Plants and Environmental Concerns
In this Section, I show that the supply chain network equilibrium model presented
in Section 3.1 is isomorphic to a properly configured transportation network equilib-
rium model as in Section 2.2 through the establishment of a supernetwork equivalence
of the former.
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Figure 3.2. The GS Supernetwork Representation of the Supply Chain Network
Equilibrium with Manufacturing Plants
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I now establish the supernetwork equivalence of the supply chain network equi-
librium model to the transportation network equilibrium model with known travel
disutility functions described in Section 2.2. This transformation allows, as demon-
strated in Section 3.3, to apply algorithms developed for the latter class of problems
to solve the former.
Consider a supply chain network with manufacturing plants as discussed in Section
3.1 with given manufacturers: i = 1, . . . , I; given manufacturing plants for each
manufacturer: m = 1, . . . ,M ; retailers: j = 1, . . . , J ; transportation/transaction
modes: t = 1, . . . , T , and demand markets: k = 1, . . . , K. The supernetwork, GS , of
the isomorphic transportation network equilibrium model is depicted in Figure 3.2
and is constructed as follows.
It consists of six tiers of nodes with the origin node 0 at the top or first tier and
the destination nodes at the sixth or bottom tier. Specifically, GS consists of a single
origin node 0 at the first tier, and K destination nodes at the bottom tier, denoted,
respectively, by: z1, . . . , zK . There are K O/D pairs in GS denoted by w1 = (0, z1),
. . ., wk = (0, zk),. . ., wK = (0, zK). Node 0 is connected to each second-tiered node xi;
i = 1, . . . , I by a single link. Each second-tiered node xi, in turn, is connected to each
third-tiered node xim; i = 1, . . . , I; m = 1, . . . ,M by a single link, and each third-
tiered node is then connected to each fourth-tiered node yj; j = 1, . . . , J by a single
link. Each fourth-tiered node yj is connected to the corresponding fifth-tiered node
yj′ by a single link. Finally, each fifth-tiered node yj′ is connected to each destination
node zk; k = 1, . . . , K at the sixth tier by T parallel links.
Hence, in GS , there are I + IM + 2J +K + 1 nodes; I + IM + IMJ + J + JTK
links, K O/D pairs, and IMJTK paths. I now define the link and link flow notation.
Let ai denote the link from node 0 to node xi with associated link flow fai , for
i = 1, . . . , I. Let aim denote the link from node xi to node xim with link flow faim for
i = 1, . . . , I; m = 1, . . . ,M . Also, let aimj denote the link from node xim to node yj
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with associated link flow faimj for i = 1, . . . , I; m = 1, . . . ,M , and j = 1, . . . , J . Let
ajj′ denote the link connecting node yj with node yj′ with associated link flow fajj′
for jj′ = 11′, . . . , JJ ′. Finally, let atj′k denote the t-th link joining node yj′ with node
zk for j
′ = 1′, . . . , J ′; t = 1, . . . , T , and k = 1, . . . , K and with associated link flow
fat
j′k
. The link flows are grouped into the vectors as follows: group the {fai} into the
vector f 1; the {faim} into the vector f 2, the {faimj} into the vector f 3; the {fajj′}
into the vector f 4, and the {fat
j′k
} into the vector f 5.
Thus, a typical path connecting O/D pair wk = (0, zk), is denoted by p
t
imjj′k and
consists of five links: ai, aim, aimj, ajj′ , and a
t
j′k. The associated flow on the path is
denoted by xpt
imjj′k
. Finally, let dwk be the demand associated with O/D pair wk
where λwk denotes the travel disutility for wk.
Note that the following conservation of flow equations must hold on the network
GS :
fai =
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
J ′∑
j′=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
xpt
imjj′k
, i = 1, . . . , I, (3.21)
faim =
J∑
j=1
J ′∑
j′=1′
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
xpt
imjj′k
, i = 1, . . . , I;m = 1, . . . ,M, (3.22)
faimj =
J ′∑
j′=1′
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
xpt
imjj′k
, i = 1, . . . , I;m = 1, . . . ,M ; j = 1, . . . , J, (3.23)
fajj′ =
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
xpt
imjj′k
, jj′ = 11′, . . . , JJ ′, (3.24)
fat
j′k
=
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
xpt
imjj′k
, j′ = 1′, . . . , J ′; t = 1, . . . , T ; k = 1, . . . , K. (3.25)
Also, one would have that
dwk =
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
JJ ′∑
jj′=11′
T∑
t=1
xpt
imjj′k
, k = 1, . . . , K. (3.26)
If all path flows are nonnegative and (3.21)–(3.26) are satisfied, the feasible path
flow pattern induces a feasible link flow pattern.
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A feasible link flow pattern can be constructed for GS based on the corresponding
feasible supply chain flow pattern in the supply chain network model, (q, h,Q1, Q2, d) ∈
K53, in the following way:
qi ≡ fai , i = 1, . . . , I, (3.27)
qim ≡ faim , i = 1, . . . , I;m = 1, . . . ,M, (3.28)
qimj ≡ faimj , i = 1, . . . , I;m = 1, . . . ,M ; j = 1, . . . , J, (3.29)
hj ≡ fajj′ , jj′ = 11′, . . . , JJ ′, (3.30)
qtjk = fat
j′k
, j = 1, . . . , J ; j′ = 1′, . . . , J ′; t = 1, . . . , T ; k = 1, . . . , K, (3.31)
dk =
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
qtjk, k = 1, . . . , K. (3.32)
Observe that although qi is not explicitly stated in the model in Section 3.1, it is
inferred in that
qi =
M∑
m=1
qim, i = 1, . . . , I, (3.33)
and simply represents the total amount of product produced by manufacturer i.
Note that if (q,Q1, h,Q2, d) is feasible then the link flow and demand pattern
constructed according to (3.27)–(3.32) is also feasible and the corresponding path
flow pattern which induces this link flow (and demand) pattern is also feasible.
One can now assign user (travel) costs on the links of the network GS as follows:
with each link ai one can assign a user cost cai defined by
cai ≡ 0, i = 1, . . . , I, (3.34)
caim ≡
∂fim
∂qim
+ αi
∂eim
∂qim
, i = 1, . . . , I;m = 1, . . . ,M, (3.35)
with each link aimj assigned a user cost caimj defined by:
caimj ≡
∂cimj
∂qimj
+ αi
∂eimj
∂qimj
, i = 1, . . . , I;m = 1, . . . ,M ; j = 1, . . . , J, (3.36)
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with each link jj′ assigned a user cost defined by
cajj′ ≡
∂cj
∂hj
+ βj
∂ej
∂hj
, jj′ = 11′, . . . , JJ ′. (3.37)
Finally, a user cost is assigned for each link atj′k which is defined by
cat
j′k
≡ ∂c
t
jk
∂qtjk
+ cˆtjk + (βj + ηk)
∂etjk
∂qtjk
, j′ = j = 1, . . . , J ; t = 1, . . . , T ; k = 1, . . . , K.
(3.38)
Then a user of path ptimjj′k, for i = 1, . . . , I; m = 1, . . . ,M ; jj
′ = 11′, . . . , JJ ′;
t = 1, . . . , T ; k = 1, . . . , K, on network GS in Figure 3.2 experiences a path travel
cost Cpt
imjj′k
given by
Cpt
imjj′k
= cai + caim + caimj + cajj′ + catj′k
=
∂fim
∂qim
+αi
∂eim
∂qim
+
∂cimj
∂qimj
+αi
∂eimj
∂qimj
+
∂cj
∂hj
+βj
∂ej
∂hj
+
∂ctjk
∂qtjk
+ cˆtjk+(βj+ηk)
∂etjk
∂qtjk
. (3.39)
Also, the (travel) demands associated with the O/D pairs are assigned as follows:
dwk ≡ dk, k = 1, . . . , K, (3.40)
and the (travel) disutilities:
λwk ≡ ρ3k, k = 1, . . . , K. (3.41)
Consequently, the equilibrium conditions (2.19) for the transportation network
equilibrium model on the network GS state that for every O/D pair wk and every
path connecting the O/D pair wk:
Cpt
imjj′k
− λwk =
∂fim
∂qim
+ αi
∂eim
∂qim
+
∂cimj
∂qimj
+ αi
∂eimj
∂qimj
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+
∂cj
∂hj
+ βj
∂ej
∂hj
+
∂ctjk
∂qtjk
+ cˆtjk + (βj + ηk)
∂etjk
∂qtjk
− λwk

= 0, if x∗
pt
imjj′k
> 0,
≥ 0, if x∗
pt
imjj′k
= 0.
(3.42)
I now show that the variational inequality formulation of the equilibrium condi-
tions (3.42) in link form as in (2.22) is equivalent to the variational inequality (3.17)
governing the supply chain network equilibrium with manufacturing plants and en-
vironmental concerns. For the transportation network equilibrium problem on GS ,
according to Theorem 2.7, one would have that a link flow and travel disutility pat-
tern (f ∗, d∗) ∈ K22 is an equilibrium (according to (3.41)), if and only if it satisfies the
variational inequality:
I∑
i=1
cai(f
1∗)× (fai − f ∗ai) +
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
caim(f
2∗)× (faim − f ∗aim)
+
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
caimj(f
3∗)× (faimj − f ∗aimj) +
JJ ′∑
jj′=11′
cajj′ (f
4∗)× (fajj′ − f ∗ajj′ )
+
J ′∑
j′=1′
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
cat
j′k
(f 5∗)×(fat
j′k
−f ∗at
j′k
)−
K∑
k=1
λwk(d
∗)×(dwk−d∗wk) ≥ 0, ∀(f, d) ∈ K22.
(3.43)
After the substitution of (3.27)–(3.38) and (3.40)–(3.41) into (3.43), one would
have the following variational inequality: determine (q∗, h∗, Q1∗, Q2∗, d∗) ∈ K53 satis-
fying:
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fim(q
∗
i )
∂qim
+ αi
∂eim(q
∗
im)
∂qim
]× [qim − q∗im] +
J∑
j=1
[
∂cj(h
∗)
∂hj
+ βj
∂ej(h
∗
j)
∂hj
]× [hj − h∗j ]
+
I∑
i=1
M∑
m=1
J∑
j=1
[
∂cimj(q
∗
imj)
∂qimj
+ αi
∂eimj(q
∗
imj)
∂qimj
]× [qimj − q∗imj]
+
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctjk(q
t∗
jk)
∂qtjk
+ cˆtjk(Q
2∗) + (βj + ηk)
∂etjk(q
t∗
jk)
∂qtjk
]× [qtjk − qt∗jk]
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−
K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk − d∗k] ≥ 0, ∀(q, h,Q1, Q2, d) ∈ K53. (3.44)
Variational inequality (3.44) is precisely variational inequality (3.17) governing
the supply chain network equilibrium. Hence, one would have the following result:
Theorem 3.2
A solution (q∗, h∗, Q1∗, Q2∗, d∗) ∈ K53 of the variational inequality (3.17) governing the
supply chain network equilibrium coincides with the (via (3.27)–(3.38) and (3.40)–
(3.42)) feasible link flow and travel demand pattern for the supernetwork GS con-
structed above and satisfies variational inequality (3.43). Hence, it is a transportation
network equilibrium according to Theorem 2.7.
I now further discuss the interpretation of the supply chain network equilibrium
conditions. These conditions define the supply chain network equilibrium in terms
of paths and path flows, which, as shown above, coincide with Wardrop’s (1952)
first principle of user-optimization in the context of transportation networks over the
network given in Figure 3.2. Hence, one now have an entirely new interpretation
of supply network equilibrium with environmental concerns which states that only
minimal cost paths be used from the super source node 0 to any destination node.
Moreover, the cost on the utilized paths for a particular O/D pair is equal to the
disutility (or the demand market price) that the users are willing to pay.
In Section 3.3, Theorem 3.2 can be utilized to exploit algorithmically the the-
oretical results obtained above through the computation of equilibrium patterns of
numerical supply chain network examples using an algorithm previously used for the
computation of elastic demand transportation network equilibria. Of course, existence
and uniqueness results obtained for elastic demand transportation network equilib-
rium models as in Dafermos (1982) as well as stability and sensitivity analysis results
(see also Nagurney and Zhang (1996)) can now be transferred to sustainable supply
chain networks using the formalism/equivalence established above.
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3.3 Numerical Examples
In this Section, numerical examples are provided to demonstrate how the theo-
retical results in this Chapter can be applied in practice. These examples are from
Nagurney, Liu, and Woolley (2007). The Euler method was used for the numerical
computations. The Euler method (cf. Section 2.5.1) is induced by the general it-
erative scheme of Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) and has been applied by Nagurney
and Zhang (1996) to solve variational inequality (2.20) in path flows (equivalently,
variational inequality (2.21) in link flows). Convergence results can be found in the
above references.
The Euler method is described as follows. For the solution of (2.20), the Euler
method takes the form: at iteration τ compute the path flows for paths p ∈ P (and
the travel demands) according to:
xτ+1p = max{0, xτp + ατ (λw(dτ )− Cp(xτ ))}. (3.45)
The simplicity of (3.45) lies in the explicit formula that allows for the computation of
the path flows in closed form at each iteration. The demands at each iteration simply
satisfy (2.18) and this expression can be substituted into the λw(·) functions.
The Euler method was implemented in FORTRAN and the computer system used
was a Sun system at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. The convergence
criterion utilized was that the absolute value of the path flows between two successive
iterations differed by no more than 10−4. The sequence {ατ} in the Euler method (cf.
(3.44)) was set to: {1, 1
2
, 1
2
, 1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
, . . .}. The Euler method was initialized by setting
the demands equal to 100 for each O/D pair with the path flows equally distributed.
The Euler method was also used to compute solutions to electric power supply chain
network examples, reformulated as transportation network equilibrium problems in
Wu et al. (2006).
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In all the numerical examples, the supply chain network consisted of two man-
ufacturers, with two manufacturing plants each, two retailers, one transportation/
transaction mode, and two demand markets as depicted in Figure 3.3. The supernet-
work representation which allows for the transformation (as proved in Section 3.2) to
a transportation network equilibrium problem is given also in Figure 3.3. Hence, in
the numerical examples (see also Figure 3.2) one would have that: I = 2, M = 2,
J = 2, J ′ = 2′, K = 2, and T = 1.
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Figure 3.3. The Supply Chain Network and Corresponding Supernetwork GS for
the Numerical Examples
The notation is presented here and in the subsequent examples in the form of the
supply chain network equilibrium model of Section 3.1. The equilibrium solutions
for the numerical examples, along with the translations of the computed equilibrium
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link flows, and the travel demands (and disutilities) into the equilibrium supply chain
flows and prices are given in Table 3.2.
3.3.1 Example 3.1
The data for the first numerical example is given below. In order to construct
a benchmark, it was assumed that all the prices associated with the environmental
criteria were equal to zero, that is: α1 = α2 = 0, β1 = β2 = 0, and η1 = η2 = 0.
The production cost functions for the manufacturers were given by:
f11(q1) = 2.5q
2
11 + q11q21 + 2q11, f12(q2) = 2.5q
2
12 + q11q12 + 2q22,
f21(q1) = .5q
2
21 + .5q11q21 + 2q21, f22(q2) = .5q
2
22 + q12q22 + 2q22.
The transportation/transaction cost functions faced by the manufacturers and
associated with transacting with the retailers were given by:
cimj(qimj) = .5q
2
imj + 3.5qimj, i = 1;m = 1, 2; j = 1, 2;
cimj(qimj) = .5q
2
imj + 2qimj, i = 2;m = 1, 2; j = 1, 2;
The operating costs of the retailers, in turn, were given by:
c1(Q
1) = .5(
∑2
i=1 qi1)
2, c2(Q
1) = .5(
∑2
i=1 qi2)
2.
The demand market price functions at the demand markets were:
ρ31(d) = −d1 + 500, ρ32 = −d2 + 500,
and the unit transportation/transaction costs between the retailers and the consumers
at the demand markets were given by:
cˆ1jk(q
1
jk) = q
1
jk + 5, j = 1, 2; k = 1, 2.
All other transportation/transaction costs were assumed to be equal to zero. It
was assumed that the manufacturing plants emitted pollutants where e11 = e12 =
e21 = e22 = 5 for emission functions of the following form:
77
eim(qim) = eimqim, i = 1, 2;m = 1, 2.
All other emission generation functions were assumed to be equal to zero. The super-
network representation of this example depicted in Figure 3.3 with the links enumer-
ated as in Figure 3.3 was utilized in order to solve the problem via the Euler method.
Note that there are 13 nodes and 20 links in the supernetwork in Figure 3.3. Using
the procedure outlined in Section 3.3, one can define an O/D pair as w1 = (0, z1)
and O/D pair w2 = (0, z2) and the O/D pair travel disutilities were associated with
the demand market price functions as in (3.48) and the user link travel cost func-
tions as given in (3.41)–(3.45) (analogous constructions were done for the subsequent
examples).
The Euler method converged in 56 iterations and yielded the equilibrium solution
given in Table 3.2 (c.f. also the supernetwork in Figure 3.3). In Table 3.2 the trans-
lations of the computed equilibrium pattern(s) into the supply chain network flow,
as well as the demand and price notation using (3.34)–(3.40) and (3.47)–(3.48), were
provided.
All eight paths connecting each O/D pair were used, that is, had positive flow
and the travel costs for paths connecting each O/D pair were equal to the travel
disutility for that O/D pair. The optimality/equilibrium conditions were satisfied
with excellent accuracy. The total amount of emissions in this example was: e11q
∗
11+
e12q
∗
12 + e21q
∗
21 + e22q
∗
22 = 1, 089.
3.3.2 Example 3.2
The following variant of Example 3.1 was solved. The data was kept identical to
that in Example 3.1 except that now the prices associated with the environmental
concern of the manufacturers were: α1 = α2 = 1, with all other values equal to zero.
The Euler method converged in 56 iterations and yielded the equilibrium link
flows, travel demands and travel disutilities (cf. Figure 3.3) given in Table 3.2. It can
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be noted that, in this example, all paths were again used. The total emissions gener-
ated was equal to: 1, 077.85 and, hence, as expected, given that both manufacturers
now associated positive prices with environmental concern, the total emissions were
reduced, relative to the amount emitted in Example 3.1.
3.3.3 Example 3.3
Example 3.3 was constructed as follows from Example 3.2. The data were identical
to the data in Example 3.2, except that it was now assumed that the first retailer
used a polluting mode of transportation to deliver the product to the consumers at
the demand markets so that e111 = e
1
12 = 10 for emission functions of the following
form:
e11k(q
1
1k) = e
1
1kq
1
1k, k = 1, 2.
It was also assumed that the consumers were now environmentally conscious and
that the prices associated with the environmental criteria at the demand markets
were η1 = η2 = 1.
The Euler method converged in 67 iterations and yielded the new equilibrium
pattern given in Table 3.2. In this example (as in Examples 3.1 and 3.2), all paths
connecting each O/D pair were used, that is, they had positive equilibrium flows.
The total amount of pollution emitted was now: e11q
∗
11 + e12q
∗
12 + e21q
∗
21 + e22q
∗
22 +
e1∗11q
1
11 + e
1∗
12q
1∗
12 = 1, 585.95.
3.3.4 Example 3.4
In Example 3.4, the following question was asked, how high would η1 and η2 have
to be so that the demand markets did not utilize retailer 1 at all and the associated
link flows would be zero on those transportation/transaction links? Simulations were
conducted which found that with η1 = η2 = 32 the desired result was achieved (with
η1 = η2 = 30 there were still positive flows on those polluting links).
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The Euler method converged in 102 iterations with the computed equilibrium
link flows, travel demands and travel disutilities given in Table 3.2, along with the
equivalent equilibrium supply chain network flows/transactions, demand, and prices.
There were four paths used (and four not used) in each O/D pair. The total amount
of emissions was now: 756.70. Hence, environmentally conscious consumers could
significantly reduce the environmental emissions through the economics and the un-
derlying decision-making behavior in the supply chain network.
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Table 3.2: The Equilibrium solutions of Examples 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4
Equilibrium Values Example 3.1 Example 3.2 Example 3.3 Example 3.4
f ∗a1 = q
∗
1 48.17 47.68 47.17 42.04
f ∗a2 = q
∗
2 169.62 167.89 166.20 109.34
f ∗a11 = q
∗
11 33.37 33.03 32.69 25.87
f ∗a12 = q
∗
12 14.80 14.65 14.48 16.37
f ∗a21 = q
∗
21 33.71 33.37 33.02 26.17
f ∗a22 = q
∗
22 135.91 134.53 133.17 83.17
f ∗a11′ = h
∗
1 108.90 107.79 103.82 0.00
f ∗a22′ = h
∗
2 108.90 107.79 109.54 151.58
f ∗a111 = q
∗
111 16.69 16.52 15.60 0.00
f ∗a112 = q
∗
112 16.69 16.52 17.09 25.87
f ∗a121 = q
∗
121 7.40 7.32 6.61 0.00
f ∗a122 = q
∗
122 7.40 7.32 7.87 16.37
f ∗a211 = q
∗
211 16.85 16.68 15.77 0.00
f ∗a212 = q
∗
212 16.85 16.68 17.25 26.17
f ∗a221 = q
∗
221 67.96 67.26 65.84 0.00
f ∗a222 = q
∗
222 67.96 67.26 67.33 83.17
f ∗
a1
1′1
= q1∗11 54.45 53.89 51.91 0.00
f ∗
a1
1′2
= q1∗12 54.45 53.89 51.91 0.00
f ∗
a1
2′1
= q1∗21 54.45 53.89 54.77 75.79
f ∗
a1
2′2
= q1∗22 54.45 53.89 54.77 75.79
d∗w1 = d
∗
1 108.90 107.79 106.68 75.79
d∗w2 = d
∗
2 108.90 107.79 106.68 75.79
λ∗w1 = ρ31 391.11 392.23 393.30 424.41
λ∗w2 = ρ32 391.11 392.23 393.30 424.41
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3.4 Summary and Conclusions
In this Chapter, I developed the multitiered, multicriteria supply chain network
model with distinct manufacturing plants and associated emissions and presented the
variational inequality formulation of the governing equilibrium conditions. This model
was built on the supply chain network model of Nagurney, Liu, and Woolley (2007) to
include the generalization of emission functions. Moreover, Nagurney and Toyasaki
(2003) introduced environmental concerns into a supply chain network equilibrium
framework (see also Nagurney, Dong, and Mokhtarian (2002b)) but not with the
inclusion of alternative manufacturer plants. I establish that the prices associated
with the environmental criteria of the various decision-makers can be interpreted as
taxes.
Recently, it has been shown by Nagurney (2006a) that supply chains can be refor-
mulated and solved as transportation network problems (see also Nagurney (2000),
Nagurney and Liu (2005), Nagurney (2006b), and Wu et al. (2006)). The new sup-
ply chain network model with environmental concerns developed in this Chapter was
then transformed into a transportation network equilibrium model with elastic de-
mands over an appropriately constructed abstract network or supernetwork. This
equivalence provides a new interpretation of the equilibrium conditions governing
sustainable supply chains in terms of path flows. The generality of the concepts of
transportation network equilibrium, originally proposed in the seminal book of Beck-
mann, McGuire, and Winsten (1956) (see also Boyce, Mahmassani, and Nagurney
(2005)) are further demonstrated by the contributions of this Chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
OPTIMAL ENDOGENOUS CARBON TAXES FOR
ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY CHAINS WITH POWER
PLANTS
Electric power is one of the fundamental resources that have fueled modern econom-
ies and societies from the lighting and heating of homes and offices to the running
of computers, which underpin the communications, manufacturing processes and fi-
nancial services, and even transportation. Electric power is so essential to every day
lives that when failures arise the impact is wide and vividly apparent as the biggest
blackout in US history in 2003 graphically illustrated. Indeed, in modern societies
there are few goods or services that do not depend directly on electricity. Globally, in
2002, 16.1 trillion kilowatt hours were supplied, with United States being the largest
producer and consumer of electric energy (see Thompson Gale (2006)). In the past
half-century, the total annual electricity use in the US alone has grown every year
but two. The US electrical industry has more than half a trillion dollars of net assets,
$220 billion in annual sales, and consumes almost 40% of domestic primary energy
(coal, natural gas, uranium, and oil), or about 40 quadrillion British Thermal Units
(BTUs) (see Edison Electric Institute (2000), Energy Information Administration
(2000, 2005)). This industry is growing, expecting the total global consumption of
electricity to reach 23.1 trillion kilowatt hours in 2025. For background on the electric
power industry, see Casazza and Delea (2003), Singh (1999), Zaccour (1998), as well
as Section 1.2.2.2.
However, despite the major positive economic impacts of electric power, the heavy
reliance on fossil fuel sources before conversion to electricity has had, at the same time,
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an immense environmental impact. For example, of the total US emissions of carbon
dioxide and nitrous oxide, more than a third arises from generating electricity. In
China, in turn, the electric power sector currently accounts for more than one-third
of its annual coal consumption with such power plants generating over 75% of the air
pollution in China (see Pew Center (2006)). Fossil fuels, which are estimated to be
used to generate 36% of electricity production into 2020, and presently account for
39% of the electricity generated worldwide. With growing accumulating evidence of
global warming, any policy aimed at mitigating the immense risks of unstable climate
must directly consider the electricity industry (Poterba (1993) and Cline (1992)).
As noted in Wu et al. (2006), pollution taxes, and, in particular, carbon taxes are
a powerful policy mechanism that can address market failures in energy. Currently,
market prices for energy do not capture its many external costs in the form of regional
and global pollution and also hide market distortions. The usefulness of carbon taxes
has been noted by among others, Baranzini, Goldemberg, and Speck (2000), whereas
Painuly (2001) has argued for the encouragement of power generation from renewable
sources, including solar power and wind power through the use of green credits. Such
credits are now being utilized in the European Union as well as in several states
in the US (cf. RECS (1999) and Schaeffer et al. (1999)). Hence, a mathematical
modeling framework that can capture the interactions among decision-makers in an
electric power supply chain network from power generators, along with the power
plant production options; the suppliers as well as ultimate consumers, coupled with
the incorporation of environmental policies, such as carbon taxes, is of great practical
as well as policy-making importance.
It was shown in Chapter 3 that the prices associated with the environmental
emissions generated through production, transportation/transaction, and retail out-
let operations as the product “moves” throughout the supply chain can be interpreted
as taxes assigned by a regulatory agency. Recently, Wu et al. (2006) developed such
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a framework and proposed an electric power supply chain network equilibrium model
with carbon taxes that are applied a priori to distinct power generator/power plant
combinations and demonstrated that the model could be reformulated and solved
as a transportation network equilibrium problem with elastic demands. However, in
that model, the government authority would have to conduct simulation exercises to
determine the carbon tax assignment in order to achieve some goal. In this Chap-
ter, in contrast, I demonstrate how carbon taxes can be determined optimally and
endogenously within a generalized electric power supply chain network equilibrium
model. In particular, I allow the government to impose bound(s) on the total amount
of carbon emissions and the optimal carbon taxes guarantee that the bound(s) are
not exceeded.
Since electric power plants may be under different governmental jurisdictions ei-
ther in the US or abroad I propose both a decentralized carbon taxation scheme as
well as two centralized schemes. In the former environmental policy framework, a
bound on carbon emissions can be applied on each power generator/power plant with
a resulting distinct tax; in the latter framework there is a single carbon emission
bound imposed on the entire electric power supply chain network with a resulting
single tax.
This Chapter is based on Nagurney, Liu, and Woolley (2006), but as in Chap-
ter 3, includes the generalization of emission functions which aids in the numerous
applications of the model, and is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, I present the
electric power supply chain network equilibrium model with three distinct carbon
taxation schemes. In Section 4.2, several numerical examples are presented in which
the optimal taxes, the electric power flows between tiers of decision-makers as well as
the demand market prices, are computed. The prices at the demand markets at the
equilibrium are also reported. In Section 4.3, I summarize the results in this Chapter
and present the conclusions.
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4.1 The Electric Power Supply Chain Network Model with
Power Plants and Optimal Endogenous Carbon Taxes
In this Section I develop the electric power supply chain network equilibrium
model that includes power plants as well as carbon taxes under three distinct taxation
schemes. I begin with a decentralized taxation scheme outlined in Section 4.1.1 and
then turn to the centralized schemes in Section 4.1.2. The presentation of the model
follows the description of the electric supply chain network model with pollution taxes
(which, however, were fixed and assigned a priori) in Wu et al. (2006).
In particular, I consider G power generators (sometimes also referred to as “gen-
cos”), each of which, typically, owns and operates M power plants. A specific power
plant may use a different primary energy fuel such as, for example, coal, natural gas,
uranium, oil, sun, wind, etc., with different associated costs. In addition, each power
plant also have associated costs that fully reflect policy objectives, which here be
in the form of carbon taxes. There are S power suppliers, T transmission service
providers, and K consumer markets, as depicted in Figure 4.1. The majority of the
needed notation is given in Table 4.1. An equilibrium solution is denoted by “∗”. All
vectors are assumed to be column vectors, except where noted otherwise.
The top-tiered nodes in the electric power supply chain network in Figure 4.1,
enumerated by 1, . . . , g . . . , G, represent the G electric power generators, who are the
decision-makers who own and operate the electric power generating facilities or power
plants denoted by the second tier of nodes in the network. The gencos produce electric
power using the different power plants and sell to the power suppliers in the third
tier. Node gm in the second tier corresponds to genco g’s power plant m, with the
second tier of nodes enumerated as: 11, . . . , GM . I assume that each electric power
generator seeks to determine his optimal production portfolio across his power plants
and his sales allocations of the electric power to the suppliers in order to maximize
his own profit.
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Power suppliers, which are represented by the third tiered nodes in Figure 4.1,
function as intermediaries. The nodes corresponding to the power suppliers are enu-
merated as: 1, . . . , s, . . . , S with node s corresponding to supplier s. They purchase
electric power from the power generators and are aware as to the types of power
plants used by the generators. They also sell the electric power to the consumers
at the different demand markets. I assume that the power suppliers compete with
one another in a noncooperative manner. However, the suppliers do not physically
possess electric power at any stage of the supplying process; they only hold and trade
the right for the electric power.
The bottom-tiered nodes in Figure 4.1 represent the demand markets, which can
be distinguished from one another by their geographic locations or the type of asso-
ciated consumers such as whether they correspond, for example, to businesses or to
households. There are K bottom-tiered nodes with node k corresponding to demand
market k.
A transmission service is necessary for the physical delivery of electric power from
the power generators to the points of consumption. The transmission service providers
are the entities who own and operate the electric power transmission and distribution
systems, and distribute electric power from power generators to the consumption
markets. Since the transmission service providers do not make decisions such as to
where or from whom the electric power be delivered, they are not represented by
nodes in the network model. The structure of the network in Figure 4.1 guarantees
that the conservation of flow equations associated with the electric power production
and distribution are satisfied. The flows on the links joining the genco nodes in Figure
4.1 to the power plant nodes are respectively: q11, . . . , qgm, . . . , qGM ; the flows on the
links from the power plant nodes to the supplier nodes are given, respectively, by the
components of the vector Q1, whereas the flows on the links joining the supplier nodes
with the demand markets are given by the respective components of the vector: Q2.
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4.1.1 A Decentralized Carbon Taxation Scheme
I now describe the behavior of the electric power generators, the suppliers, and the
consumers at the demand markets. I first consider a decentralized carbon taxation
scheme. I then state the equilibrium conditions of the electric power supply chain
network and provide the variational inequality formulation. Subsequently, I discuss
how centralized taxation schemes can be substituted for the decentralized scheme.
m11 m· · · 1 · · · m1M · · · mG1 m· · · G · · · mGM
Transmission Service
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S
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SSw?


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S
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Demand Markets
Power Generators
1,· · · ,V 1,· · · ,V
Figure 4.1. The Electric Power Supply Chain Network with Power Plants
4.1.1.1 The Behavior of the Power Generators and Their Optimality Con-
ditions
Let ρ∗1gms denote the unit price charged by power generator g for the transaction
with power supplier s for power produced at plantm with g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M
and s = 1, . . . , S. ρ∗1gms is an endogenous variable and can be determined once the
complete electric power supply chain network equilibrium model is solved.
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Table 4.1. The Notation for the Electric Power Supply Chain Network Model
Notation Definition
qgm quantity of electricity produced by generator g using power
plant m, where g = 1, . . . , G;m = 1, . . . ,M
qm G-dimensional vector of electric power generated by the gencos
using power plant m with components: g1m, . . . , gGm
q GM -dimensional vector of all the electric power outputs
generated by the gencos at the power plants
Q1 GMS-dimensional vector of electric power flows between the
power plants of the power generators and the power suppliers
with component gms denoted by qgms
Q2 STK-dimensional vector of power flows between suppliers and
demand markets with component stk denoted by qtsk and
denoting the flow between supplier s and demand market k via
transmission provider t
d K-dimensional vector of market demands with component k
denoted by dk
fgm(qm) power generating cost function of power generator g using power
plant m with marginal power generating cost with respect to qgm
denoted by ∂fgm
∂qgm
cgms(qgms) transaction cost incurred by power generator g using power
plant m in transacting with power supplier s with marginal
transaction cost denoted by ∂cgms(qgms)
∂qgms
egm(qgm) amount of carbon emitted by genco g using power plant m as a
function of each unit of electric power produced with
marginal emissions generation denoted by ∂egm(qgm)
∂qgm
h S-dimensional vector of the power suppliers’ supplies of the
electric power with component s denoted by hs, with
hs ≡
∑G
g=1
∑M
m=1 qgms
cs(h) ≡ cs(Q1) operating cost of power supplier s with marginal operating
cost with respect to hs denoted by
∂cs
∂hs
and the marginal
operating cost with respect to qgms denoted by
∂cs(Q1)
∂qgms
ctsk(q
t
sk) transaction cost incurred by power supplier s in transacting with
demand market k via transmission provider t with marginal
transaction cost with respect to qtsk denoted by
∂ctsk(q
t
sk)
∂qtsk
cˆgms(qgms) transaction cost incurred by power supplier s in transacting with
power generator g for power generated by plant m with marginal
transaction cost denoted by ∂cˆgms(qgms)
∂qgms
cˆtsk(Q
2) unit transaction cost incurred by consumers at demand market k
in transacting with power supplier s via transmission provider t
ρ3k(d) demand market price function at demand market k
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Let τgm; g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M , denote the unit tax that the governmental
or responsible environmental authority charge genco g operating power plant m for
its carbon emissions and group all these taxes into the vector τ . The optimal values
of these taxes, denoted by the components of the vector τ ∗, are endogenous and are
determined once the complete model is solved. As I later see, the taxes guarantee that
bounds on the carbon emissions, also imposed by the responsible authority, are not
exceeded. The bounds are denoted by B¯gm; g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M and reflect
the maximum, or cap on carbon emissions allowed by the responsible authority for the
particular genco/power plant combination. It is assumed that, to reduce emissions
below the bound set by the governing authority, a particular generator, g, using power
plant, m, must substitute toward cleaner technologies. The complete electric power
supply chain network equilibrium model captures the complex interactions among the
various decision-makers and its solution yields the equilibrium electric power flows and
demand market prices as well as the optimal carbon taxes.
Since it is assumed that each individual power generator is a profit-maximizer,
the optimization problem of power generator g can be expressed as follows:
Maximize
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
ρ∗1gmsqgms −
M∑
m=1
fgm(qm)−
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
cgms(qgms)−
M∑
m=1
τ ∗gmegm(qgm)
(4.1)
subject to:
S∑
s=1
qgms = qgm, m = 1, . . . ,M, (4.2)
qgms ≥ 0, m = 1, . . . ,M ; s = 1, . . . , S. (4.3)
The first term in the objective function (4.1) represents the revenue and the next two
terms represent the power generation cost and transaction costs, respectively. The
last term in (4.1) denotes the total payout in carbon taxes by the genco based on the
total carbon pollution emitted by his power plants. Conservation of flow equation
(4.2) states that the amount of power generated at a particular power plant (and
90
corresponding to a particular genco) is equal to the electric power transacted by the
genco from that power plant with all the suppliers and this holds for each of the power
plants.
Assume, as was done in Wu et al. (2006), that the generating cost, the transaction
cost, as well as the emission functions for each power generator are continuously dif-
ferentiable and convex, and that the power generators compete in a noncooperative
manner in the sense of Nash (1950, 1951). The optimality conditions for all power
generators simultaneously, under the above assumptions (cf. Nagurney (1999)), coin-
cide with the solution of the following variational inequality: determine (q∗, Q1∗) ∈ K14
satisfying
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fgm(q
∗
m)
∂qgm
+ τ ∗gm
∂egm(q
∗
gm)
∂qgm
]
× [qgm − q∗gm]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
− ρ∗1gms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms] ≥ 0, ∀(q,Q1) ∈ K14, (4.4)
where K14 ≡ {(q,Q1)|(q,Q1) ∈ RGM+GMS+ and (4.2) holds}.
4.1.1.2 The Behavior of Power Suppliers and Their Optimality Condi-
tions
The power suppliers, in turn, are involved in transactions both with the power
generators and with the consumers at demand markets through the transmission
service providers.
Since electric power cannot be stored, the total amount of electricity sold by
a power supplier is equal to the total electric power that he purchased from the
generators and produced via the different power plants available to the generators,
that is:
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
qtsk =
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
qgms, s = 1, . . . , S. (4.5)
Let ρt∗2sk denote the price charged by power supplier s to demand market k via
transmission service provider t. This price is determined endogenously in the model
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once the entire network equilibrium problem is solved. As noted above, it is assumed
that each power supplier seeks to maximize his own profit. Hence the optimization
problem faced by supplier s may be expressed as follows:
Maximize
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
ρt∗2skq
t
sk − cs(Q1)
−
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
ρ∗1gmsqgms −
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
cˆgms(qgms)−
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
ctsk(q
t
sk) (4.6)
subject to:
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
qtsk =
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
qgms, (4.7)
qgms ≥ 0, g = 1, . . . , G, m = 1, . . . ,M, (4.8)
qtsk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , K; t = 1, . . . , T. (4.9)
The first term in (4.6) denotes the revenue of supplier s; the second term denotes the
operating cost of the supplier; the third term denotes the payments for the electric
power to the various gencos, and the final two terms represent the various transaction
costs.
I assume that the transaction costs and the operating costs in (4.6) are all contin-
uously differentiable and convex, and that the power suppliers compete in a nonco-
operative manner. Hence, the optimality conditions for all suppliers, simultaneously,
under the above assumptions (Nagurney and Matsypura (2005a)), can be expressed
as the following variational inequality: determine (Q2∗, Q1∗) ∈ K24 such that
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctsk(q
t∗
sk)
∂qtsk
− ρt∗2sk
]
× [qtsk − qt∗sk]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cs(Q
1∗)
∂qgms
+
∂cˆgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
+ ρ∗1gms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms] ≥ 0, (4.10)
∀(Q2, Q1) ∈ K24, where K24 ≡ {(Q2, Q1)|(Q2, Q1) ∈ RSTK+GMS+ and (4.7) holds}.
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For notational convenience, and as was done in Wu et al. (2006), let
hs ≡
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
qgms, s = 1, . . . , S. (4.11)
As defined in Table 4.1, the operating cost of power supplier s, cs, is a function of
the total electricity inflows to the power supplier, that is:
cs(h) ≡ cs(Q1), s = 1, . . . , S. (4.12)
Hence, his marginal cost with respect to hs is equal to the marginal cost with respect
to qgms:
∂cs(h)
∂hs
≡ ∂cs(Q
1)
∂qgms
, s = 1, . . . , S, m = 1, . . . ,M, g = 1, . . . , G. (4.13)
After the substitution of (4.11) and (4.13) into (4.10), and algebraic simplifica-
tion, one obtains a variational inequality equivalent to (4.10), as follows: determine
(h∗, Q2∗, Q1∗) ∈ K34 such that
S∑
s=1
∂cs(h
∗)
∂hs
× [hs − h∗s] +
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctsk(q
t∗
sk)
∂qtsk
− ρt∗2sk
]
× [qtsk − qt∗sk]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cˆgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
+ ρ∗1gms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms] ≥ 0, ∀(h,Q1, Q2, ) ∈ K34,
(4.14)
where K34 ≡ {(h,Q2, Q1)|(h,Q2, Q1) ∈ RS(1+TK+GM)+ and (4.7) and (4.11) hold}.
4.1.1.3 The Equilibrium Conditions for the Demand Markets
At each demand market k the following conservation of flow equation must be
satisfied:
dk =
S∑
s=1
T∑
t=1
qtsk, k = 1, . . . , K. (4.15)
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The market equilibrium conditions at demand market k take the form: for each power
supplier s; s = 1, ..., S and transaction mode t; t = 1, ..., T :
ρt∗2sk + cˆ
t
sk(Q
2∗)
 = ρ3k(d
∗), if qt∗sk > 0,
≥ ρ3k(d∗), if qt∗sk = 0.
(4.16)
According to (4.16) (see also Wu et al. (2006)), consumers at a demand market
purchase power from a supplier via a transmission provider, provided that the pur-
chase price plus the unit transaction cost is equal to the price that the consumers are
willing to pay at that demand market. If the purchase price plus the unit transaction
cost exceeds the price the consumers are willing to pay, then there be no transac-
tion between that supplier and demand market via that transmission provider. The
equivalent variational inequality takes the form: determine (Q2∗, d∗) ∈ K44, such that
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
ρt∗2sk + cˆ
t
sk(Q
2∗)
]× [qtsk−qt∗sk]− K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk−d∗k] ≥ 0, ∀(Q2, d) ∈ K44,
(4.17)
where K44 ≡ {(Q2, d)|(Q2, d) ∈ RK(ST+1)+ and (4.15) holds}.
4.1.1.4 The Decentralized Carbon Tax Equilibrium Conditions
Unlike the model of Wu et al. (2006), which considered pollution taxes applied
to each genco/power plant combination that were fixed and assigned a priori, I here
assume that the taxes are endogenous and optimal in the following sense. I assume, as
is commonly done in real-life environmental policy-making (see also, e.g., the book by
Dhanda, Nagurney, and Ramanujam (1999)), and as was noted earlier, that bounds
are applied in terms of the maximum carbon emissions that are allowed for each
genco/power plant combination. If the particular genco/power plant emits fewer
units of carbon than the imposed limit, then it is not taxed; a tax is assigned, if
the emissions equal the bound. Mathematically, this statement corresponds to the
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following carbon tax equilibrium conditions under a decentralized tax scheme: for all
power generators g; g = 1, . . . , G, and for all power plants m; m = 1, . . . ,M , a carbon
tax policy is said to be in equilibrium if:
B¯gm − egm(q∗gm)
 = 0, if τ
∗
gm > 0,
≥ 0, if τ ∗gm = 0.
(4.18)
Of course, if a given genco only has a subset of power plants (which may correspond
to different fuel source options), then those links would just be eliminated from the
network in Figure 4.1 and the notation altered accordingly.
4.1.1.5 The Equilibrium Conditions for the Electric Power Supply Chain
Network
In equilibrium, the optimality conditions for all the power generators, the optimal-
ity conditions for all the power suppliers, and the equilibrium conditions for all the
demand markets as well as the carbon tax equilibrium conditions must be simultane-
ously satisfied so that no decision-maker has any incentive to alter his transactions.
I now formally state the equilibrium conditions for the entire electric power supply
chain network with endogenous, decentralized carbon taxes.
Definition 4.1 (Electric Power Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with
Endogenous, Decentralized Carbon Taxes)
The equilibrium state of the electric power supply chain network with power plants and
endogenous, decentralized carbon taxes is one where the electric power flows between
the tiers of the network coincide and the electric power flows, the demands, and the
carbon taxes satisfy the sum of conditions (4.4), (4.14), (4.17), and the decentralized
carbon tax equilibrium conditions (4.18).
I now state and prove:
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Theorem 4.1 (Variational Inequality Formulation of the Electric Power
Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Decentralized Carbon Taxes)
The equilibrium conditions governing the electric power supply chain network accord-
ing to Definition 4.1 coincide with the solution of the variational inequality given by:
determine (q∗, h∗, Q1∗, Q2∗, d∗, τ ∗) ∈ K54 satisfying:
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fgm(q
∗
m)
∂qgm
+ τ ∗gm
∂egm(q
∗
gm)
∂qgm
]
× [qgm − q∗gm] +
S∑
s=1
∂cs(h
∗)
∂hs
× [hs − h∗s]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
+
∂cˆgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms]
+
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctsk(q
t∗
sk)
∂qtsk
+ cˆtsk(Q
2∗)
]
× [qtsk − qt∗sk]−
K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk − d∗k]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
B¯gm − egm(q∗gm)
]× [τgm − τ ∗gm] ≥ 0, ∀(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, τ) ∈ K54, (4.19)
where K54 ≡ {(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, τ)|(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, τ) ∈ R2GM+S+GMS+TSK+K+
and (4.2), (4.5), (4.11), and (4.15) hold}.
Proof:
I first prove that an equilibrium according to Definition 4.1 coincides with the
solution of variational inequality (4.19). Note that (see also, e.g., Nagurney (1999)),
if τ ∗ ∈ RGM+ satisfies equilibrium conditions (4.18) then it also satisfies the following
inequality:
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
B¯gm − egm(q∗gm)
]× [τgm − τ ∗gm] ≥ 0, ∀τ ∈ RMG+ . (4.20)
Summation of (4.4), (4.14), (4.17), and (4.20) (which is equivalent to the satisfaction
of the carbon tax equilibrium conditions (4.18)), after algebraic simplifications, yields
variational inequality (4.19).
96
I now prove the converse, that is, a solution to variational inequality (4.19) satisfies
the sum of conditions (4.4), (4.14), (4.17), and the carbon tax equilibrium conditions
(4.18), and is, therefore, an electric power supply chain network equilibrium pattern
according to Definition 4.1.
First, I add the term ρ∗1gms − ρ∗1gms to the first term in the third summand ex-
pression in (4.19). Then, I add the term ρt∗2sk − ρt∗2sk to the first term in the fourth
summand expression in (4.19). Since these terms are all equal to zero, they do not
change (4.19). Hence, I obtain the following inequality:
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fgm(q
∗
m)
∂qgm
+ τ ∗gm
∂egm(q
∗
gm)
∂qgm
]
× [qgm − q∗gm] +
S∑
s=1
∂cs(h
∗)
∂hs
× [hs − h∗s]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
+
∂cˆgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
+ ρ∗1gms − ρ∗1gms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms]
+
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctsk(q
t∗
sk)
∂qtsk
+ cˆtsk(q
t∗
sk) + ρ
t∗
2sk − ρt∗2sk
]
× [qtsk − qt∗sk]
−
K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk − d∗k]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
B¯gm − egm(q∗gm)
]× [τgm − τ ∗gm] ≥ 0, ∀(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, τ) ∈ K54, (4.21)
which can be rewritten as:
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fgm(q
∗
m)
∂qgm
+ τ ∗gm
∂egm(q
∗
gm)
∂qgm
]
× [qgm − q∗gm]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
− ρ∗1gms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms]
+
S∑
s=1
∂cs(h
∗)
∂hs
× [hs − h∗s] +
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctsk(q
t∗
sk)
∂qtsk
− ρt∗2sk
]
× [qtsk − qt∗sk]
+
S∑
s=1
M∑
m=1
G∑
g=1
[
∂cˆgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
+ ρ∗1gms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms]
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+
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
ρt∗2sk + cˆ
t
sk(q
t∗
sk)
]× [qtsk − qt∗sk]− K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk − d∗k]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
B¯gm − egm(q∗gm)
]× [τgm − τ ∗gm] ≥ 0, ∀(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, τ) ∈ K54. (4.22)
Clearly, (4.22) is the sum of the optimality conditions (4.4) and (4.14) and the
inequality formulations of equilibrium conditions (4.16) and (4.18) given, respectively,
by (4.17) and (4.20), and is, hence, according to Definition 4.1 an electric power supply
chain network equilibrium with endogenous, decentralized carbon taxes.
Note that the solution of variational inequality (4.19) yields the equilibrium elec-
tric power flows (see also the network in Figure 4.1), the equilibrium demands, as well
as the optimal carbon taxes. If desired, once variational inequality (4.19) is solved,
one can also determine the prices associated with the power generators; ρ∗1gms for
g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M , and s = 1, . . . , S, as well as the prices associated with the
suppliers/transmission providers/demand markets and denoted by ρt∗2sk; s = 1, . . . , S;
k = 1, . . . , K, and t = 1, . . . , T . The procedure would be similar to that described in
Wu et al. (2006).
Remark
Note that in the case of objective function (4.1) and, hence, also variational in-
equality (4.19), the taxes could also be interpreted as “prices” associated with the
minimization of the carbon emissions for each genco and power plant. Prices as-
sociated with environmental criteria in the form of total emission generation in the
context of multicriteria decision-making and supply chains have been proposed and
discussed in Nagurney and Toyasaki (2003). Of course, such prices would reflect that
the gencos assign such prices to pollution emission minimization themselves and are
self-directed, whereas environmental policies, in the form of carbon taxes, are imposed
by an authority. It is interesting to see, however, that positive, self-induced decision-
making in terms of environmental decision-making could have the same result as the
imposition of taxes. However, the prices would have to be determined endogenously
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to have the precise correspondence between the electric supply chain network with
multicriteria decision-makers and the model with carbon taxes proposed above. The
same analogies can be made for the two carbon taxation schemes below.
Corollary 4.1 (Variational Inequality Formulation of the Electric Power
Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Decentralized Carbon Taxes for
the Case of Fixed Emissions)
Assume that the emission functions are fixed and given (see Nagurney, Liu, and
Woolley (2006)). Hence, in this special case, variational inequality (4.19) collapses
to: The equilibrium conditions governing the electric power supply chain network
according to Definition 4.1 coincide with the solution of the variational inequality
given by: determine (q∗, h∗, Q1∗, Q2∗, d∗, τ ∗) ∈ K64 satisfying:
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fgm(q
∗
m)
∂qgm
+ τ ∗gmegm
]
× [qgm − q∗gm] +
S∑
s=1
∂cs(h
∗)
∂hs
× [hs − h∗s]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
+
∂cˆgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms]
+
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctsk(q
t∗
sk)
∂qtsk
+ cˆtsk(Q
2∗)
]
× [qtsk − qt∗sk]−
K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk − d∗k]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
B¯gm − egmq∗gm
]× [τgm − τ ∗gm] ≥ 0, ∀(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, τ) ∈ K64,
where K64 ≡ {(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, τ)|(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, τ) ∈ R2GM+S+GMS+TSK+K+ . (4.23)
The proof is straightforward.
4.1.2 Centralized Carbon Taxation Schemes
In the case of a centralized carbon taxation scheme, I first consider the case in
which there is a fixed bound B¯ for all the carbon emissions generated in the electric
power supply chain and the carbon tax is now denoted by T . I then turn to the case
in which the bound can vary as a function of the tax.
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4.1.2.1 The Centralized Carbon Tax Equilibrium Conditions
– Fixed Bound
In this case, one has, analogous to equilibrium conditions (4.18), the following
centralized carbon tax equilibrium conditions, which state that if the amount of car-
bon produced in equilibrium is less than the carbon emission bound then the tax be
zero; if the tax is positive, then the emissions are at the bound:
B¯ −
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
egm(q
∗
gm)
 = 0, if T
∗ > 0,
≥ 0, if T ∗ = 0.
(4.24)
Clearly equilibrium conditions (4.24) can be formulated as the inequality:
[
B¯ −
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
egm(q
∗
gm)
]
× [T − T ∗] ≥ 0, ∀T ≥ 0. (4.25)
Hence, one would have the following definition.
Definition 4.2 (Electric Power Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with
Endogenous, Centralized Carbon Taxes - Fixed Upper Bound Case)
The equilibrium state of the electric power supply chain network with power plants
and endogenous, centralized carbon taxes with a fixed upper bound on carbon emis-
sions is one where the electric power flows between the tiers of the network coincide
and the electric power flows, the demands, and the carbon taxes satisfy the sum of
conditions (4.4), (4.14), and (4.17) with T ∗ substituted for each τ ∗gm; g = 1, . . . , G;
m = 1, . . . ,M , and the centralized carbon tax equilibrium conditions (4.24) also hold.
The variational inequality for this centralized carbon taxation scheme (cf. (4.19))
is immediate and it takes the form:
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Theorem 4.2 (Variational Inequality Formulation of the Electric Power
Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Centralized Carbon Taxes and a
Fixed Upper Bound)
The equilibrium conditions governing the electric power supply chain network accord-
ing to Definition 4.2 coincide with the solution of the variational inequality given by:
determine (q∗, h∗, Q1∗, Q2∗, d∗, T ∗) ∈ K74 satisfying:
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fgm(q
∗
m)
∂qgm
+ T ∗∂egm(q
∗
gm)
∂qgm
]
× [qgm − q∗gm] +
S∑
s=1
∂cs(h
∗)
∂hs
× [hs − h∗s]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
+
∂cˆgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms]
+
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctsk(q
t∗
sk)
∂qtsk
+ cˆtsk(Q
2∗)
]
× [qtsk − qt∗sk]−
K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk − d∗k]
+
[
B¯ −
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
egm(q
∗
gm)
]
× [T − T ∗] ≥ 0, ∀(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, T ) ∈ K74, (4.26)
where K74 ≡ {(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, T )|(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, T ) ∈ RGM+S+GMS+TSK+K+1+
and (4.2), (4.5), (4.11), and (4.15) hold}.
Corollary 4.2 (Variational Inequality Formulation of the Electric Power
Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Centralized Carbon Taxes and a
Fixed Upper Bound for the Case of Fixed Emissions)
Assume that the emission functions are fixed and given (see Nagurney, Liu, and
Woolley (2006)). Hence, in this special case, variational inequality (4.26) collapses
to: The equilibrium conditions governing the electric power supply chain network
according to Definition 4.1 coincide with the solution of the variational inequality
given by: determine (q∗, h∗, Q1∗, Q2∗, d∗, T ∗) ∈ K84 satisfying:
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fgm(q
∗
m)
∂qgm
+ T ∗egm
]
× [qgm − q∗gm] +
S∑
s=1
∂cs(h
∗)
∂hs
× [hs − h∗s]
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+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
+
∂cˆgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms]
+
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctsk(q
t∗
sk)
∂qtsk
+ cˆtsk(Q
2∗)
]
× [qtsk − qt∗sk]−
K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk − d∗k]
+
[
B¯ −
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
egmq
∗
gm
]
× [T − T ∗] ≥ 0, ∀(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, T ) ∈ K84, (4.27)
where K84 ≡ {(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, T )|(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, T ) ∈ RGM+S+GMS+TSK+K+1+
The proof is straightforward.
4.1.2.2 The Centralized Carbon Taxation Scheme - Elastic Bound
I now consider a carbon taxation scheme in which the carbon emission bound is
elastic in that it is no longer fixed but is a function of the carbon tax. Such a scheme
would reflect, for example, the situation where the government might be willing to
assign a different bound on carbon emissions, depending upon the size of the tax.
Hence, I now assume rather than a bound B¯ as in (4.24), a bound denoted by B(T )
where this function is assumed to be continuous.
4.1.2.3 The Centralized Carbon Tax Equilibrium Conditions – Elastic
Bound
In this case, the carbon tax equilibrium conditions (cf. 4.24)) would be as follows.
B(T ∗)−
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
egm(q
∗
gm)
 = 0, if T
∗ > 0,
≥ 0, if T ∗ = 0.
(4.28)
Clearly equilibrium conditions (4.24) can be formulated as the inequality:
[
B(T ∗)−
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
egm(q
∗
gm)
]
× [T − T ∗] ≥ 0, ∀T ≥ 0. (4.29)
As for the behavior of the electric power supply chain network decision-makers, it
remains as described in Section 4.1.1, except that now I substitute T ∗ for each τ ∗gm;
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g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M , as I did for the centralized scheme in the case of a fixed
upper bound for carbon emissions. Such a substitution (again) needs to be made in
(4.1) and in (4.4) with the resulting definition below:
Definition 4.3 (Electric Power Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with
Endogenous, Centralized Carbon Taxes - Elastic Bound Case)
The equilibrium state of the electric power supply chain network with power plants
and endogenous, centralized carbon taxes with an elastic carbon emission bound is
one where the electric power flows between the tiers of the network coincide and the
electric power flows, the demands, and the carbon taxes satisfy the sum of conditions
(4.4), (4.14), (4.17), with T ∗ substituted for each τ ∗gm; g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M ,
and the centralized carbon tax equilibrium conditions (4.28) also holds.
The variational inequality for the centralized carbon taxation scheme with an
elastic bound is also immediate:
Theorem 4.3 (Variational Inequality Formulation of the Electric Power
Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Centralized Carbon Taxes and
an Elastic Carbon Emission Bound)
The equilibrium conditions governing the electric power supply chain network accord-
ing to Definition 4.3 coincide with the solution of the variational inequality given by:
determine (q∗, h∗, Q1∗, Q2∗, d∗, T ∗) ∈ K94 satisfying:
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fgm(q
∗
m)
∂qgm
+ T ∗∂egm(q
∗
gm)
∂qgm
]
× [qgm − q∗gm] +
S∑
s=1
∂cs(h
∗)
∂hs
× [hs − h∗s]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
+
∂cˆgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms]
+
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctsk(q
t∗
sk)
∂qtsk
+ cˆtsk(Q
2∗)
]
× [qtsk − qt∗sk]−
K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk − d∗k]
+
[
B(T ∗)−
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
egm(q
∗
gm)
]
× [T − T ∗] ≥ 0, ∀(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, T ) ∈ K94. (4.30)
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Corollary 4.3 (Variational Inequality Formulation of the Electric Power
Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Centralized Carbon Taxes and
an Elastic Carbon Emission Bound for the Case of Fixed Emissions)
Assume that the emission functions are fixed and given (see Nagurney, Liu, and
Woolley (2006)). Hence, in this special case, variational inequality (4.26) collapses
to: The equilibrium conditions governing the electric power supply chain network
according to Definition 4.1 coincide with the solution of the variational inequality
given by: determine (q∗, h∗, Q1∗, Q2∗, d∗, T ∗) ∈ K104 satisfying:
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fgm(q
∗
m)
∂qgm
+ T ∗egm
]
× [qgm − q∗gm] +
S∑
s=1
∂cs(h
∗)
∂hs
× [hs − h∗s]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
+
∂cˆgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms]
+
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
[
∂ctsk(q
t∗
sk)
∂qtsk
+ cˆtsk(Q
2∗)
]
× [qtsk − qt∗sk]−
K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk − d∗k]
+
[
B(T ∗)−
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
egmq
∗
gm
]
× [T − T ∗] ≥ 0, ∀(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, T ) ∈ K104 . (4.31)
The proof is straightforward.
Each of the variational inequality problems (4.19), (4.26), and (4.30) and be put
into standard variational inequality form (cf. (2.1)) given by: determine X∗ ∈ K such
that
〈F (X∗)T , X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (4.32)
by defining the vector X and the function F that enters the variational inequality
accordingly. Qualitative properties of existence of a solution can then be obtained for
variational inequalities (4.19) and (4.26) by noting, first, that, due to the bound(s)
on the carbon emissions, the electric power outputs are bounded. If one further
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assumes that the imposed tax can be reasonably assumed to be bounded (although
the bound may be vary large), then the feasible set be compact and existence of a
solution then follow from the standard theory of variational inequalities (see Nagurney
(1999)), since under the previously given assumptions, the corresponding function F
is continuous. In the case of variational inequality (4.30), once can assume similar
conditions or a coercivity condition on the corresponding function F . Monotonicity of
F can be obtained for both variational inequalities (4.19) and (4.26) under analogous
assumptions as those given in Nagurney and Matsypura (2005a); the same holds in
the case of F for variational inequality (4.30) with the additional assumption that
the function B(T ) is monotone.
4.2 Numerical Examples
In this Section, numerical examples are provided to demonstrate how the theo-
retical results in this Chapter can be applied in practice. These examples are from
Nagurney, Liu, and Woolley (2006).
Wu et al. (2006) proposed an Euler method for the electric power supply chain
network equilibrium problem with power plants and preassigned carbon taxes. It was
demonstrated that such the electric power supply chain problem with preassigned
taxes could be transformed into a transportation network equilibrium problem over
an appropriately constructed abstract network or supernetwork.
In the models developed in this Chapter, however, in which the carbon taxes are
no longer pre-assigned but, are endogenous and reflect particular goals of governmen-
tal/environmental authorities, one can no longer transform the variational inequalities
(4.19), (4.26), and (4.30) directly into transportation network equilibrium problems
(as was also done by Nagurney (2006a) for supply chain network equilibrium problems
in the case of products). However, one can still exploit the connection by noticing that
the variational inequality problems in this Chapter are defined over feasible sets that
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are, in effect, decomposable into subproblems in the flows and subproblems in car-
bon taxes. Furthermore, the former subproblems retain the transportation network
structure identified in Wu et al. (2006). Analogously, path flow versions of each of
these variational inequalities were constructed over the corresponding abstract trans-
portation network and there be an additional term in each case to correspond to the
particular carbon taxation scheme equilibrium condition.
The Euler method (cf. Section 2.5.1) was implemented in FORTRAN, and the
computer system used was a Sun system at the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst. The convergence criterion utilized was that the absolute value of the elec-
tric flows and the carbon taxes between two successive iterations differed by no more
than 10−6. The sequence {αT } in the Euler method was set to: {1, 12 , 12 , 13 , 13 , 13 , . . .}.
In all the numerical examples, the electric power supply chain network consisted
of two power generators, with two power plants each, two power suppliers, one trans-
mission provider, and two demand markets as depicted in Figure 4.2.
Examples 4.1 and 4.2, corresponded to instances of the electric power supply chain
network equilibrium model with a decentralized carbon taxation scheme as outlined in
Section 4.1.1 with variational inequality formulation given by (4.19). Example 4.3, in
turn, corresponded to the case of a centralized carbon taxation scheme with a fixed
bound on the carbon emissions, as described in Section 4.1.2, with corresponding
variational inequality given by (4.26). Examples 4.4, corresponded to the centralized
scheme but with a variable carbon emission bound and the variational inequality
model is given by (4.30). The results of the computations are given in Table 4.2.
4.2.1 Example 4.1
The data for the first numerical example is given below. The functional forms
of the power generating cost functions, the transaction cost functions, the operating
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cost functions, the emission generation functions, and the demand price functions
were identical to those in Example 4.1 in Wu et al. (2006).
The carbon emission generation functions were of the following form,
egm(qgm) = egmqgm; g = 1, 2;m = 1, 2
with all of the terms: egm; g = 1, 2; m = 1, 2 set equal to 1.
The power generating cost functions for the power generators were given by:
f11(q1) = 2.5q
2
11 + q11q21 + 2q11, f12(q2) = 2.5q
2
12 + q11q12 + 2q22,
f21(q1) = .5q
2
21 + .5q11q21 + 2q21, f22(q2) = .5q
2
22 + q12q22 + 2q22.
n11 n12 n21 n22
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Figure 4.2. The Electric Power Supply Chain Network for the Numerical Examples
The transaction cost functions faced by the power generators and associated with
transacting with the power suppliers were given by:
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c111(q111) = .5q
2
111 + 3.5q111, c112(q112) = .5q
2
112 + 3.5q112, c121(q121) = .5q
2
121 + 3.5q121,
c122(q122) = .5q
2
122 + 3.5q122, c211(q211) = .5q
2
211 + 2q211, c212(q212) = .5q
2
212 + 2q212,
c221(q221) = .5q
2
221 + 2q221, c222(q222) = .5q
2
222 + 2q222.
The operating costs of the power generators, in turn, were given by:
c1(Q
1) = .5(
∑2
i=1 qi1)
2, c2(Q
1) = .5(
∑2
i=1 qi2)
2.
The demand market price functions at the demand markets were:
ρ31(d) = −1.33d1 + 366.6, ρ32 = −1.33d2 + 366.6,
and the transaction costs between the power suppliers and the consumers at the
demand markets were given by:
cˆ1sk(q
1
sk) = q
1
sk + 5, s = 1, 2; k = 1, 2.
All other transaction costs were assumed to be equal to zero.
In Example 4.1, the bounds were as follows: B¯11 = B¯12 = B¯21 = B¯22 = 100. The
computed equilibrium electric power flows and demands and the optimal taxes are
given in Table 4.2. Note that the imposed bounds were sufficiently high so that all
optimal taxes were identically equal to 0.00 since the carbon emissions generated by
each genco and power plant combination were less than the imposed bound. The total
carbon emissions were: 22.57, 9.93, 22.90, and 92.37, respectively, for genco 1/power
plant 1; genco 1/power plant 2, and so on.
The price of electric power at the first demand market was 268.33 and at the
second demand market the price was also 263.33. The demand was 73.89 at each
demand market.
The optimality/equilibrium conditions were satisfied with excellent accuracy.
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4.2.2 Example 4.2
Example 4.2 was constructed from Example 4.1 except that now the emission
factor e11 = 2. Hence, its value was now doubled. Additionally, the bounds were all
set as follows: B¯11 = B¯12 = B¯21 = B¯22 = 23. Hence, the bounds were tightened on
all the genco power plants, in comparison to the bounds imposed in Example 4.1.
The equilibrium solution is given in Table 4.2. Again, the endogenous carbon taxes
had the desired effect in that the carbon emissions at each genco/power plant did not
exceed the imposed bounds of 23. Interestingly, the carbon taxes increased for all the
gencos and power plants although it was only the first genco and his first power plant
that had its emissions factor doubled. The demand for electric power at the demand
markets decreased to 40.30 at each demand market since the price of electric power
had now increased and it is equal to 313.00 at both demand markets.
4.2.3 Example 4.3
In Example 4.3, a single centralized carbon taxation scheme was assumed in which
the bound on carbon emissions was fixed. The remaining data were given in Example
4.1 except that in Example 4.3, B¯ = 100. Note that this bound represents the bound
on the total amount of carbon emitted by all the power plants of all the gencos in
the electric power supply chain network. The computed solution for Example 4.3 is
given in Table 4.2. The demand was 50.00 at each of the two demand markets and
the demand market price was 300.10.
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Table 4.2. The Solutions to Examples 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4
Equilibrium Solution Example 4.1 Example 4.2 Example 4.3 Example 4.4
Computed Equilibrium Power Flows
q∗11 22.56 11.51 15.20 20.41
q∗12 9.93 23.02 6.63 8.96
q∗21 22.90 23.02 15.53 20.74
q∗22 92.38 23.05 62.65 83.68
q∗111 11.28 5.76 7.60 10.20
q∗112 11.28 5.76 7.60 10.20
q∗121 4.97 11.51 3.31 4.48
q∗122 4.97 11.51 3.31 4.48
q∗211 11.45 11.51 7.76 10.37
q∗212 11.45 11.51 7.76 10.37
q∗221 46.19 11.52 31.32 41.84
q∗222 11.28 5.76 31.32 1.84
h∗1 73.89 40.30 50.00 66.90
h∗2 73.89 40.30 50.00 66.90
q1∗11 36.94 20.15 25.00 33.45
q1∗12 36.94 20.15 25.00 33.34
q1∗21 36.94 20.15 25.00 33.45
q1∗22 36.94 20.15 25.00 33.45
Computed Equilibrium Demands
d∗1 73.89 40.30 50.00 66.90
d∗2 73.89 40.30 50.00 66.90
Computed Optimal Taxes
τ∗11 0.00 77.86 n/a n/a
τ∗12 0.00 92.38 n/a n/a
τ∗21 0.00 105.41 n/a n/a
τ∗22 0.00 185.96 n/a n/a
Computed Optimal Tax
T ∗ n/a n/a 115.50 33.79
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4.2.4 Example 4.4
In Example 4.4 it was assumed that the carbon taxation scheme was centralized
but now the bound was a function of the tax. Example 4.4 had the same input data
as Example 4.3 but the bound on the carbon emissions was now elastic and given by:
B(T ) = T +100.
The equilibrium solution is reported in Table 4.4. The total carbon emissions were
equal to 133.79 with the value of B(T ) = 133.79. The demand was 66.90 at each
demand market and the demand market price was 277.63 at each demand market.
The optimal carbon tax was now T = 33.79.
4.3 Summary and Conclusions
In this Chapter, a modeling and computational framework that may help policy-
makers to determine the optimal carbon taxes on the power plants in the electric
power generation industry was presented. This general electric power supply chain
network modeling framework utilizes variational inequality theory and is capable
of identifying the optimal carbon taxes as well as the equilibrium electric power
transaction flows and the demands for electric power (along with the associated prices)
under three distinct carbon taxation environmental policies. Specifically, the first
model, a completely decentralized scheme, allows the policy-makers to determine
the optimal tax for each individual electric power plant which guarantees that the
emission bound or quota of each plant is not exceeded. The second and third models,
on the other hand, both enforce a “global” emission bound on the entire industry by
imposing a uniform tax rate on the generating plants. However, the second policy
assumes that the global emission bound is fixed while the third policy allows the
bound to be a function of the tax.
The three variational inequality models were decomposable into subproblems that
can be efficiently solved using the Euler method. Four numerical examples were pre-
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sented to illustrate the impacts of the three distinct carbon taxation policies on the
electric power supply chain networks. These numerical examples also demonstrate
how policy-makers can determine the optimal taxes in order to achieve the environ-
mental objectives.
The research is a contribution to the growing research in the development of
rigorous mathematical frameworks for environmental-energy modeling.
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CHAPTER 5
SPATIALLY DIFFERENTIATED TRADE OF PERMITS
FOR MULTIPOLLUTANT ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY
CHAINS
Electric power plants emit several different air pollutants, such as carbon dioxide
(CO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrous oxide (NOx), and mercury (Hg) with differing
environmental impacts. For example, carbon dioxide is a major cause of global cli-
mate change; sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide are responsible for acid rain and fine
particle concentrations in the atmosphere; nitrous oxide also contributes to ground-
level ozone, and mercury may travel vast distances before deposited in, for example,
waterways, bioaccumulating in the food chain resulting in impaired neurological de-
velopment (Hanisch (1988), Burtraw et al. (2005)). Moreover, SO2, NOx, and Hg
have important spatial characteristics; that is, the impacts of these pollutants depend
critically on the location of their sources and where their impacts are realized.
Although most environmental regulations attempt to control one pollutant at a
time, integrated multipollutant regulations have advantages over the standard piece-
meal approach. Multipollutant approaches can account for the substitutability or
complementarity of emissions from power plants. As one pollutant is reduced, an-
other may rise, as in, for example, if an electric power generating firm invests in low
sulfur coal to reduce SO2 emissions, this will result in an increased amount of NOx
and Hg emissions (Rubin et al. (1997, 2001)). However, to exploit the complemen-
tarity effects of pollutants, firms may invest in electrostatic precipitators (EPSs) that
will reduce SO2 and NOx together. Thus, a generator will choose a technology that is
not the cheapest, but reduces multiple pollutants while meeting the current pollutant
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standard (Schwarz (2005)). Furthermore, the relationship between pollutants may
vary between seasons, across regions, and, possibly, over time as the composition of
the atmosphere changes (WRAP (2003)).
Because of such advantages, there have been several existing and proposed reg-
ulations to control multiple pollutants. The Regional Clean Air Incentives Market
(RECLAIM) program was implemented in California to control NOx and SO2 pol-
lutants; the proposed but not enacted Clear Skies was a national cap to reduce SO2,
NOx, and Hg; and the US Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Air Interstate
Rule (CAIR) capped emissions of SO2 and NOx in a large region covering more than
twenty states, mostly east of the Mississippi, and the District of Columbia (Palmer,
Burtraw, and Shih (2007)).
There are two types of emission trading policies, project-based (generators pur-
chase credits from a project aimed to reduce emissions) and an allowance market (also
known as cap and trade programs). In the latter type, electric power generators are
given credits (or allowances) by a central environmental authority. The advantage
of emissions trading is that credit trading generates pollution prices that distribute
emissions control in a cost-effective manner. For additional background on tradable
pollution permits, see Tietenberg (1985), Nagurney, Dhanda, and Stranlund (1997),
Montero (1997, 2001), Nagurney, Ramanujam, and Dhanda (1998), Tschirhart and
Wen (1999), and the book by Dhanda, Nagurney, and Ramanujam (1999).
In this Chapter, I model the trading of emission rights by electric power producers
who emit multiple pollutants with impacts that depend on the spatial dispersion of
sources and receptors (for additional background on the electric power industry and
associated modeling issues, see Hogan (1992), Kahn (1998), Zaccour (1998), Jing-
Yuan and Smeers (1999), Boucher and Smeers (2001), Nagurney and Matsypura
(2005a)). In the Introduction of this proposal, I noted that I will develop a modeling
and computational framework that may help policy-makers control emissions in the
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electric power industry in the form of both a taxation scheme, as presented in Chapter
4, and an emission trading program, as in this Chapter.
However, unlike Chapter 4, this Chapter considers multiple pollutants. The con-
trol of multiple, spatially differentiated pollutants via emission trading calls for mul-
tiple pollution permit markets. Moreover, unlike the previous literature, I emphasize
the use of alternative power production technologies as well as the underlying sup-
ply chain aspects of electric power generation and distribution. The results in this
Chapter are particularly relevant given the current trends in environmental policies
governing emissions in the electric power industry. The new model allows for the
determination of the equilibrium numbers and prices of the various tradable pollu-
tion permits simultaneously with the equilibrium electric power flows and prices. The
model builds upon the electric power supply chain model with alternative power plant
technologies developed by Wu et al. (2006), which, however, only considered a single
pollutant (and, in effect, a single receptor point).
This Chapter is based on Woolley, Nagurney, and Stranlund (2008) and is or-
ganized as follows. In Section 5.1, the model of the electric supply chain network
with different power plant technologies is presented with the inclusion of multipollu-
tant tradable permits and multiple receptor points. It is also demonstrated that the
environmental standards are achieved. In Section 5.2, the computational procedure
which exploits the structure of the problem is described. Also, numerical examples
are provided. Section 5.3 summarizes the results in this Chapter and presents the
conclusions.
5.1 The Electric Power Supply Chain Network Model with
Multipollutant Tradable Permits
I now develop the model that captures the behavior of the electric power supply
chain network decision-makers in the presence of a multipollutant permit trading
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scheme. The decision-makers in the electric power supply chain are the electric power
generators, with their associated power plants, the suppliers, the transmission service
providers, and the consumers at the demand markets. The equilibrium conditions
of the electric power supply chain network will be given as well as the equivalent
variational inequality formulation.
The electric power supply chain network is represented in Figure 5.1 with the
top tier of nodes consisting of the G power generators (also referred to as “gencos”),
enumerated by 1, . . . , g, . . . , G. Power generators are the decision-makers who own
and operate the M power plants, with a typical power plant technology denoted by
m, and depicted in the second tier of nodes in Figure 5.1. Such nodes are enumer-
ated as 11, . . . , GM with node gm denoting the m-th power plant of genco g. The
gencos produce electric power using the different power plants, which are powered,
for example, by different forms of technology such as coal, natural gas, uranium, oil,
sun, wind, etc., and with different associated costs and environmental impacts. The
gencos sell the electric power to the power suppliers in the third tier of nodes in the
electric power supply chain, as depicted in Figure 5.1.
In Figure 5.1, I also represent the R receptor points, with a typical receptor point
denoted by r, associated with the pollutants generated by the power plants. These
receptor points are spatially separated. It is also assumed that there are J pollutants
with a typical pollutant denoted by j.
The suppliers do not physically handle the electricity, but function as interme-
diaries who only hold and trade the right for the electric power. The nodes cor-
responding to the power suppliers are enumerated as: 1, . . . , s, . . . , S with node s
corresponding to supplier s. Suppliers sell the electric power to the consumers at the
different demand markets via the V transmission service providers, who are the enti-
ties who own and operate the electric power transmission and distribution systems.
A typical transmission provider is denoted by v.
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Transmission service providers are not represented as nodes in the network model,
since they do not make decisions such as to where or from whom the electric power
will be delivered (see also Nagurney and Matsypura (2005a) and Wu et al. (2006)).
The bottom-tiered nodes in Figure 5.1 represent the demand markets, which can
differ by their geographic location or the type of associated consumers; for example,
whether they correspond to businesses or households. The nodes corresponding to
the demand markets are enumerated as: 1, . . . , k, . . . ,K with node k corresponding
to demand market k. The majority of the notation needed for the model is given in
Table 5.1. An equilibrium solution is denoted by “∗”. All vectors are assumed to be
column vectors, except where noted otherwise.
m11 m· · · 1 · · · m1M · · · mG1 m· · · G · · · mGM
Transmission Service
Providers
m1 · · · mG
?
S
S
SSw


/ ?
S
S
SSw


/
m1 · · · mSSuppliers
Power Plants
m1 · · · mK
S
S
SSw?


/
S
S
SSw?


/
Demand Markets
Power Generators
1,· · · ,V 1,· · · ,V
m1 mR Receptor
Points
· · ·
Figure 5.1. The Electric Power Supply Chain Network with Power Plants and
Associated Technologies and with Pollutant Receptor Points
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Table 5.1. The Notation for the Electric Power Supply Chain Network Model with
Power Plants (cf. Wu et al. (2006))
Notation Definition
qgm quantity of electricity produced by generator g using power
plant m, where g = 1, . . . , G;m = 1, . . . ,M
qm G-dimensional vector of electric power generated by the gencos
using power plant m with components: g1m, . . . , gGm
q GM -dimensional vector of all the electric power outputs
generated by the gencos at the power plants
Q1 GMS-dimensional vector of electric power flows between the
power plants of the power generators and the power suppliers
with component gms denoted by qgms
Q2 STK-dimensional vector of power flows between suppliers and
demand markets with component stk denoted by qtsk and
denoting the flow between supplier s and demand market k via
transmission provider t
d K-dimensional vector of market demands with component k
denoted by dk
fgm(qm) power generating cost function of power generator g using power
plant m with marginal power generating cost with respect to qgm
denoted by ∂fgm
∂qgm
cgms(qgms) transaction cost incurred by power generator g using power
plant m in transacting with power supplier s with marginal
transaction cost denoted by ∂cgms(qgms)
∂qgms
h S-dimensional vector of the power suppliers’ supplies of the
electric power with component s denoted by hs, with
hs ≡
∑G
g=1
∑M
m=1 qgms
cs(h) ≡ cs(Q1) operating cost of power supplier s with marginal operating
cost with respect to hs denoted by
∂cs
∂hs
and the marginal
operating cost with respect to qgms denoted by
∂cs(Q1)
∂qgms
ctsk(q
t
sk) transaction cost incurred by power supplier s in transacting with
demand market k via transmission provider t with marginal
transaction cost with respect to qtsk denoted by
∂ctsk(q
t
sk)
∂qtsk
cˆgms(qgms) transaction cost incurred by power supplier s in transacting with
power generator g for power generated by plant m with marginal
transaction cost denoted by ∂cˆgms(qgms)
∂qgms
cˆtsk(Q
2) unit transaction cost incurred by consumers at demand market k
in transacting with power supplier s via transmission provider t
ρ3k(d) demand market price function at demand market k
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I now focus on the notation for the permits. Similar to the discussion in Nagurney
and Dhanda (2000) and Montgomery (1972), let ljgmr; j = 1, . . . , J ; g = 1, . . . , G;
m = 1, . . . ,M ; r = 1, . . . , R denote the number of permits/licenses for pollutant of
type j held by genco g that uses power plant m, and which affects receptor point r
with lj0gmr denoting the initial allocation. Group the former permits into the JGMR-
dimensional vector l.
Let ejgmr; j = 1, . . . , J ; g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M ; r = 1, . . . , R denote the unit
contribution of the ambient concentration of pollutant type j affecting the receptor
point r generated per unit of electric power produced by genco g using his power
plant m. Hence, the total amount of ambient concentration of pollutant j at receptor
point r associated with genco g and power plant m is ejgmrqgm.
5.1.1 The Behavior of the Power Generators and Their Optimality Con-
ditions
Let ρ∗1gms denote the unit price charged by power generator g for the transaction
with power supplier s for electric power produced at plant m with g = 1, . . . , G; m =
1, . . . ,M , and s = 1, . . . , S. ρ∗1gms is an endogenous variable and can be determined
once the complete electric power supply chain network equilibrium model is solved.
Let τ j∗r ; j = 1, . . . , J ; r = 1, . . . , R denote the price of the permit at equilibrium
for pollutant of type j of emission affecting receptor point r. These prices are also
endogenous to the model and will be determined once the complete model is solved.
It is assumed that each electric power generator seeks to determine his optimal
production portfolio across his power plants and his sales allocations of the electric
power to the suppliers as well as the optimal holdings of pollution permits in order to
maximize his own profit. Since one can assume that each individual power generator
is a profit-maximizer, the objective function of power generator g can be expressed
as follows:
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Maximize
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
ρ∗1gmsqgms −
M∑
m=1
fgm(qm)−
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
cgms(qgms)
−
J∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
R∑
r=1
τ j∗r (l
j
gmr − lj0gmr). (5.1)
The first term in the objective function (5.1) represents the revenue of power gen-
erator g and the next two terms represent his power generation cost and transaction
costs, respectively. The last term denotes the expenditure or revenue from transacting
permits for the generator based on the total pollutants by his power plants affecting
the ambient concentrations at the receptor points.
The structure of the network in Figure 5.1 guarantees that the conservation of flow
equations associated with the electric power production and distribution are satisfied.
Conservation of flow equation (5.2) below states that the amount of power generated
at a particular power plant (and corresponding to a particular genco) is equal to the
electric power transacted by the genco from that power plant with all the suppliers
and this holds for each of the power plants, subject to:
S∑
s=1
qgms = qgm, m = 1, . . . ,M. (5.2)
Equation (5.3) below states that each power plant cannot pollute at an amount
greater than the plant is licensed to at that receptor point.
ljgmr ≥ ejgmrqgm, j = 1 . . . J ;m = 1 . . . ,M ; r = 1, . . . , R. (5.3)
The following non-negativity conditions must also hold:
qgms ≥ 0, m = 1, . . . ,M ; s = 1, . . . , S,
ljgmr ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , J ;m = 1, . . . ,M ; r = 1, . . . , R. (5.4)
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Hence, the optimization problem of power generator g; g = 1, . . . , G consists
of (5.1), subject to constraints: (5.2) and (5.3), with the nonnegativity assumption
on the electric power outputs at the power plants and the number of permits (cf.
following (5.3)). Assume now, as was done in Nagurney, Liu, and Woolley (2006)
and Wu et al. (2006), that the generating cost and the transaction cost functions for
each power generator are continuously differentiable and convex, and that the power
generators compete in a noncooperative manner in the sense of Nash (1950, 1951).
The optimality conditions for all power generators, under the above assumptions (cf.
Nagurney (1999)), coincide with the solution of the following variational inequality:
determine (q∗, Q1∗, l∗, λ∗) ∈ K15 satisfying
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fgm(q
∗
m)
∂qgm
+
J∑
j=1
R∑
r=1
λj∗gmre
j
gmr
]
× [qgm − q∗gm]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
− ρ∗1gms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms]
+
J∑
j=1
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
R∑
r=1
[
τ j∗r − λj∗gmr
]× [ljgmr − lj∗gmr]
+
J∑
j=1
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
R∑
r=1
[
lj∗gmr − ejgmrq∗gm
]× [λjgmr − λj∗gmr] ≥ 0, ∀(q,Q1, l, λ) ∈ K15, (5.5)
where K15 ≡ {(q,Q1, l, λ)|(q,Q1, l, λ) ∈ RGM+GMS+2JGMR+ and (5.2) holds}.
Note that λjgmr is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the (jmr)-th constraint
(5.3), which can be referred to as a shadow price.
5.1.2 The Equilibrium Conditions for the Permits
Furthermore, one would know that (cf. Dhanda, Nagurney, and Ramanujam
(1999)) the multipollutant permit market is also subject to equilibrium conditions
given by the following. For each pollution permit of type j; j = 1, . . . , J and receptor
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point r; r = 1, . . . , R, a multipollutant tradable permit scheme is said to be in
equilibrium if:
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[lj0gmr − lj∗gmr]
 = 0, if τ
j∗
r > 0,
≥ 0, if τ j∗r = 0.
(5.6)
Expression (5.6) states that if the market price of a permit for pollutant of type j
and receptor point r is positive, then there is no excess of permits for that pollutant at
that receptor point; if the price is zero, then there can be an excess of such permits.
Clearly, these equilibrium conditions guarantee that the total number of required
permits cannot exceed the initial allocation of permits by the regulatory agency for
each receptor point and pollutant.
The optimality conditions for all power generators simultaneously (cf. (5.5)),
under the above assumptions (cf. Nagurney (1999)), coupled with the equilibrium
conditions (5.6) for all pollutant types and receptor points, coincide, in turn, with
the solution of the following variational inequality: determine (q∗, Q1∗, l∗, λ∗, τ ∗) ∈ K25
satisfying
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fgm(q
∗
m)
∂qgm
+
J∑
j=1
R∑
r=1
λj∗gmre
j
gmr
]
× [qgm − q∗gm]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
− ρ∗1gms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms]
+
J∑
j=1
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
R∑
r=1
[
τ j∗r − λj∗gmr
]× [ljgmr − lj∗gmr]
+
J∑
j=1
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
R∑
r=1
[
lj∗gmr − ejgmrq∗gm
]× [λjgmr − λj∗gmr]
+
J∑
j=1
R∑
r=1
[
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
(lj0gmr − lj∗gmr)
]
× [τ jr − τ j∗r ] ≥ 0, ∀(q,Q1, l, λ, τ) ∈ K25, (5.7)
where K25 ≡ {(q,Q1, l, λ, τ)|(q,Q1, l, λ, τ) ∈ RGM+GMS+2JGMR+JR+ and (5.2) holds}.
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5.1.3 The Behavior of Power Suppliers and Their Optimality Conditions
The power suppliers transact with the power generators and with the consumers at
the demand markets through the transmission service providers. Suppliers are aware
as to the types of power plants used and associated costs when purchasing electric
power from the power generators. Analogous to the gencos, it is assumed that the
power suppliers compete with one another in a noncooperative manner.
Since electric power cannot be stored, the following conservation of flow constraint
states that the total amount of electricity sold by a power supplier is equal to the total
electric power that he purchased from the generators and produced via the different
power plants available to the generators, that is:
K∑
k=1
V∑
v=1
qvsk =
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
qgms, s = 1, . . . , S. (5.8)
Let ρv∗2sk denote the price charged by power supplier s to demand market k via
transmission service provider v. This price is determined endogenously in the model
once the entire network equilibrium problem is solved. One can assume that each
power supplier seeks to maximize his own profit, hence the optimization problem
faced by supplier s may be expressed as follows:
Maximize
K∑
k=1
V∑
v=1
ρv∗2skq
v
sk − cs(Q1)−
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
ρ∗1gmsqgms −
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
cˆgms(qgms)
−
K∑
k=1
V∑
v=1
cvsk(q
v
sk) (5.9)
subject to:
K∑
k=1
V∑
v=1
qvsk =
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
qgms, (5.10)
qgms ≥ 0, g = 1, . . . , G;m = 1, . . . ,M,
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qvsk ≥ 0; k = 1, . . . , K; v = 1, . . . , V. (5.11)
The first term in (5.9) denotes the revenue of supplier s from the sale of electric-
ity to the demand market k via transmission service provider v, with the associated
operating cost in the second term. The third term denotes the cost to purchase
electricity for each supplier from each genco, and the last two terms represent the as-
sociated transaction costs for transactions with each genco and each demand market,
respectively.
It is assumed that the transaction costs and the operating costs in (5.9) are all
continuously differentiable and convex, and that the power suppliers compete in a
noncooperative manner. Hence, the optimality conditions for all suppliers, simulta-
neously, under the above assumptions, can be expressed as the following variational
inequality: determine (Q2∗, Q1∗) ∈ K35 such that
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
V∑
v=1
[
∂cvsk(q
v∗
sk)
∂qvsk
− ρv∗2sk
]
× [qvsk − qv∗sk ]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cs(Q
1∗)
∂qgms
+
∂cˆgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
+ ρ∗1gms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms] ≥ 0, (5.12)
∀(Q2, Q1) ∈ K35, where K35 ≡ {(Q2, Q1)|(Q2, Q1) ∈ RSV K+GMS+ and (5.8);
equivalently (5.10) holds}.
For notational convenience, and as was done in Wu et al. (2006), let
hs ≡
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
qgms, s = 1, . . . , S. (5.13)
As defined in Table 5.1, the operating cost of power supplier s, cs, is a function of
the total electricity inflows to the power supplier, that is:
cs(h) ≡ cs(Q1), s = 1, . . . , S. (5.14)
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Hence, his marginal cost with respect to hs is equal to the marginal cost with respect
to qgms:
∂cs(h)
∂hs
≡ ∂cs(Q
1)
∂qgms
, s = 1, . . . , S;m = 1, . . . ,M ; g = 1, . . . , G. (5.15)
After the substitution of (5.13) and (5.15) into (5.12), and algebraic simplification,
one would obtain a variational inequality equivalent to (5.12), as follows: determine
(h∗, Q2∗, Q1∗) ∈ K45 such that
S∑
s=1
∂cs(h
∗)
∂hs
× [hs − h∗s] +
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
V∑
v=1
[
∂cvsk(q
v∗
sk)
∂qvsk
− ρv∗2sk
]
× [qvsk − qv∗sk ]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cˆgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
+ ρ∗1gms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms] ≥ 0, (5.16)
∀(h,Q2, Q1, ) ∈ K45, where K45 ≡ {(h,Q2, Q1)|(h,Q2, Q1) ∈ RS(1+V K+GM)+
and (5.10) and (5.13) hold}.
5.1.4 The Equilibrium Conditions for the Demand Markets
At each demand market k the following conservation of flow equation must be
satisfied:
dk =
S∑
s=1
V∑
v=1
qvsk, k = 1, . . . , K. (5.17)
For each power supplier s; s = 1, ..., S, and transaction mode v; v = 1, ..., V , the
market equilibrium conditions at demand market k take the form:
ρv∗2sk + cˆ
v
sk(Q
2∗)
 = ρ3k(d
∗), if qv∗sk > 0,
≥ ρ3k(d∗), if qv∗sk = 0.
(5.18)
According to Nagurney and Matsypura (2005a), Nagurney, Liu, and Woolley
(2006), and Wu et al. (2006), consumers at the demand market will purchase electric-
ity from a supplier via a transmission service provider if the price that the consumer
125
at the demand market is willing to pay is equal to the price charged by the power
supplier plus the unit transaction cost. However, if the purchase price plus the unit
transaction cost exceeds the purchase price that the consumer is willing to pay, then
no transaction will take place. The equivalent variational inequality, given that,
in equilibrium, condition (5.18) must hold simultaneously for all demand markets:
k = 1, . . . , K, takes the form: determine (Q2∗, d∗) ∈ K55, such that
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
V∑
v=1
[
ρv∗2sk + cˆ
v
sk(Q
2∗)
]× [qvsk − qv∗sk ]− K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk − d∗k] ≥ 0, (5.19)
∀(Q2, d) ∈ K55, where K55 ≡ {(Q2, d)|(Q2, d) ∈ RKSV+K+ and (5.17) holds}.
5.1.5 The Equilibrium Conditions for the Electric Power Supply Chain
Network with Multipollutant Permits
In equilibrium, the optimality conditions for all the power generators, the opti-
mality conditions for all the power suppliers, and the equilibrium conditions for all
the demand markets as well as the equilibrium conditions for the permits must be
simultaneously satisfied so that no decision-maker has any incentive to alter his trans-
actions. I now formally state the equilibrium conditions for the entire electric power
supply chain network along with the variational inequality formulation, which follows
directly from the definition.
Definition 5.1 (Electric Power Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with
Multipollutant Permits)
The equilibrium state of the electric power supply chain network with power plants and
multipollutant permits is one where the electric power flows between the tiers of the
network coincide and the electric power flows and the multipollutant tradable permits
and prices satisfy the sum of conditions (5.7), (5.16), and (5.19).
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Theorem 5.1 (Variational Inequality Formulation of the Electric Power
Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Multipollutant Permits)
The equilibrium conditions governing the electric power supply chain network
according to Definition 5.1 coincide with the solution of the variational inequality
given by: determine the vector of equilibrium electric power production quantities and
flows, the demands, the number of permits, the shadow prices, and the permit prices
(q∗, h∗, Q1∗, Q2∗, d∗, l∗, λ∗, τ ∗) ∈ K65 satisfying:
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
[
∂fgm(q
∗
m)
∂qgm
+
J∑
j=1
R∑
r=1
λj∗gmre
j
gmr
]
× [qgm − q∗gm] +
S∑
s=1
∂cs(h
∗)
∂hs
× [hs − h∗s]
+
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
S∑
s=1
[
∂cgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
+
∂cˆgms(q
∗
gms)
∂qgms
]
× [qgms − q∗gms]
+
S∑
s=1
K∑
k=1
V∑
v=1
[
∂cvsk(q
v∗
sk)
∂qvsk
+ cˆvsk(Q
2∗)
]
× [qvsk − qv∗sk ]−
K∑
k=1
ρ3k(d
∗)× [dk − d∗k]
+
J∑
j=1
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
R∑
r=1
[
τ j∗r − λj∗gmr
]× [ljgmr − lj∗gmr]
+
J∑
j=1
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
R∑
r=1
[
lj∗gmr − ejgmrq∗gm
]× [λjgmr − λj∗gmr]
+
J∑
j=1
R∑
r=1
[
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
(lj0gmr − lj∗gmr)
]
× [τ jr − τ j∗r ] ≥ 0,∀(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, l, λ, τ) ∈ K65,
(5.20)
where K65 ≡ {(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, l, λ, τ)|(q, h,Q1, Q2, d, l, λ, τ)
∈ RGM+S+GMS+SKV+K+2JGMR+JR+ and (5.2), (5.10), (5.13), and (5.17) hold}.
Variational inequality (5.20) is now put into standard form (cf. (2.1)), which can
be expressed as:
〈F (X∗)T , X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (5.21)
where X ≡ (q, h,Q1, Q2, d, l, λ, τ) ∈ RGM+S+GMS+SKV+K+2GMRJ+RJ+ and F (X) as a
column vector consisting of the column vectors (Pgm, Hs,Λgms, Gskv, Dk, Ljgmr, Cjgmr,
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Tjr) with indices: g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M ; s = 1, . . . , S; k = 1, . . . , K; v =
1, . . . , V ; j = 1, . . . , J ; r = 1, . . . , R, and the specific components of F given by the
functional terms preceding the multiplication signs in (5.20), respectively. The term
〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product in n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn.
Additional theoretical results are now provided which are important for environ-
mental decision-making and policy-making. Similar results can be found in Dhanda,
Nagurney, and Ramanujam (1999), but not generalized to the electric power industry
with multiple power plants. Let E¯jr ; j = 1, . . . , J ; r = 1, . . . , R, denote the imposed
environmental standard for receptor r and emission type j. One can now state the
following:
Theorem 5.2 (Equilibrium Pattern Independence from Initial Permit Al-
location)
If lj0gmr ≥ 0, for all j = 1, . . . , J ; g = 1, . . . , G; m = 1, . . . ,M , and r = 1, . . . , R, and∑G
g=1
∑M
m=1 l
j0
gmr = E¯
j
r , for j = 1, . . . , J ; r = 1, . . . , R with each E¯
j
r positive and fixed,
then the equilibrium pattern (q∗, h∗, Q1∗, Q2∗, d∗, l∗, λ∗, τ ∗) is independent of {lj0gmr}.
Proof:
The last term in (5.20) (unlike the first seven in (5.20) which are independent of
lj0gmr) depends only on the sum
∑G
g=1
∑M
m=1 l
j0
gmr, for a fixed receptor point j and a
fixed pollutant of type j.
In the next Theorem, I provide a means for the selection of the sums of the initial
permit/license allocation so that the imposed environmental standards are achieved.
Theorem 5.3 (Attainment of Environmental Standards)
An equilibrium vector, satisfying variational inequality (5.20), attains the environ-
mental quality standards represented by vector E¯ = (E¯1, . . . , E¯R) where
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E¯r = (E¯
1
r , . . . , E¯
J
r ) for r; r = 1, . . . , R, provided that the following is satisfied:
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
lj0gmr = E¯
j
r , ∀r,∀j. (5.22)
Proof:
It is then clear from the assumption and variational inequality (5.20) that
lj∗gmr ≥ ejgmrq∗gm, j = 1 . . . J ;m = 1 . . . ,M ; r = 1, . . . , R. (5.23)
It then follows from equilibrium conditions (5.6) that
E¯jr =
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
lj0gmr ≥
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
lj∗gmr ≥
G∑
g=1
M∑
m=1
ejgmrq
∗
gm (5.24)
for all j = 1, . . . , J ; r = 1, . . . , R.
Theorem 5.3 provides a mechanism for the determination of the sums of the initial
permit/license allocations so that the environmental standards are attained. Indeed,
all one needs to do is to set the initial permit allocation so that (5.22) is satisfied.
This is illustrated with examples in the next Section.
5.2 Numerical Examples
Clearly, as also pointed out in Chapter 4, Wu et al. (2006) proposed an Euler
method for the electric power supply chain network equilibrium problem with power
plants and reassigned carbon taxes and showed that the electric power supply chain
problem with preassigned taxes could be transformed into a transportation network
equilibrium problem over an appropriately constructed abstract network or supernet-
work.
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In the model in this Chapter, as well as the models presented in Chapter 4, the
variational inequality (5.20) directly can no longer be transformed into a transporta-
tion network equilibrium problem as was also done by Nagurney (2006a) for supply
chain network equilibrium problems. However, the connection can still be exploited
by noticing that the variational inequality problems in this Chapter are defined over
feasible sets that are, in effect, decomposable into subproblems in the flows and sub-
problems in the licenses, the shadow prices, and the license prices. Furthermore, the
former subproblems retain the transportation network structure identified in Wu et
al. (2006) and this can be exploited algorithmically. Hence, the Euler method (cf.
Section 2.5.1) was implemented in FORTRAN and the computer system used was a
Sun system at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
For completeness, several numerical examples are presented. These examples are
from Woolley, Nagurney, and Stranlund (2008). The examples consisted of two power
generators, each of which had two power plants. There were two power suppliers and
two demand markets with a single transmission provider. It was also assumed that
there was a single pollutant and a single receptor point, as shown in Figure 5.2.
5.2.1 Example 5.1
The data for the first example is given below. The functional forms of the power
generating cost functions, the transaction cost functions, the operating cost functions,
and the demand price functions are identical to those in Example 5.1 in Wu et al.
(2006).
The emission terms: egm; g = 1, 2; m = 1, 2 were all equal to 1. The power
generating cost functions for the power generators were given by:
f11(q1) = 2.5q
2
11 + q11q21 + 2q11, f12(q2) = 2.5q
2
12 + q11q12 + 2q22,
f21(q1) = .5q
2
21 + .5q11q21 + 2q21, f22(q2) = .5q
2
22 + q12q22 + 2q22.
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Figure 5.2. The Electric Power Supply Chain Network with a Single Receptor Point
for the Examples
The transaction cost functions faced by the power generators and associated with
transacting with the power suppliers were given by:
c111(q111) = .5q
2
111 + 3.5q111, c112(q112) = .5q
2
112 + 3.5q112,
c121(q121) = .5q
2
121 + 3.5q121, c122(q122) = .5q
2
122 + 3.5q122,
c211(q211) = .5q
2
211 + 2q211, c212(q212) = .5q
2
212 + 2q212,
c221(q221) = .5q
2
221 + 2q221, c222(q222) = .5q
2
222 + 2q222.
The operating costs of the power generators, in turn, were given by:
c1(Q
1) = .5(
2∑
i=1
qi1)
2, c2(Q
1) = .5(
2∑
i=1
qi2)
2.
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The demand market price functions at the demand markets were:
ρ31(d) = −1.33d1 + 366.6, ρ32 = −1.33d2 + 366.6,
and the transaction costs between the power suppliers and the consumers at the
demand markets were given by: cˆ1sk(q
1
sk) = q
1
sk + 5, s = 1, 2; k = 1, 2. All other
transaction costs were assumed to be equal to zero.
In Example 5.1, the emissions standard, E¯ = 100, with the initial license allocation
given by: l011 = l
0
12 = l
0
21 = l
0
22 = 25. The equilibrium electric power flows and demands
and the equilibrium licenses and prices are given in Table 5.2. The demand was 50.00
at each demand market and the demand market price at each market for electric
power was 300.10.
5.2.2 Example 5.2
Example 5.2 had the same data as Example 5.1, but now the emissions standard
was tightened so that E¯ = 50. The initial license allocation was now given by:
l011 = l
0
12 = l
0
21 = l
0
22 = 12.5. The equilibrium solution is given in Table 5.2. It is clear
that, as predicted by the theory, the environmental standard was achieved.
5.2.3 Example 5.3
Example 5.3 had the identical data to that in Examples 5.1 and 5.2, except that
the environmental standard was further tightened to E¯ = 20 with the new initial
license allocation given by: l011 = l
0
12 = l
0
21 = l
0
22 = 5. The new equilibrium pattern
is reported in Table 5.2. In this example, it is also clear that the equilibrium license
numbers are such that the environmental standard was attained.
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5.2.4 Example 5.4
Example 5.4 had the same data as Example 5.3 except that the second demand
market price function for electric power was modified to:
ρ32(d) = −1.33d2 + 733.30.
The new equilibrium electric power flow, license, and price pattern is also reported
in Table 5.2. In this example, there was zero demand for electric power at the first
demand market. As in the preceding examples, the environmental standard was
achieved. Note that as the equilibrium price of the permits increases, as expected, as
the environmental standard was tightened for each successive example.
5.3 Summary and Conclusions
As noted earlier, pollution by electric power entities can be controlled by price,
in the form, for example, of a carbon tax that is imposed for emissions that ex-
ceed a predetermined bound (and as modeled in Wu et al. (2006) and Nagurney,
Liu, and Woolley (2006), or by quantity, as in the case of emission trading schemes.
In this Chapter, a multipollutant permit trading model was developed in the case
of electric power supply chains in which there are different technologies associated
with electric power production. The governing equilibrium conditions of the model
were derived and showed that it satisfies a finite-dimensional variational inequality
problem. Moreover, it was demonstrated that the model guarantees that the envi-
ronmental standards are achieved, provided that the initial license allocation is set
accordingly. Finally, it was described how the equilibrium electric power flows and
the pollution permits/licenses, along with their prices could be computed. For com-
pleteness, several numerical examples were provided. Future research will include
the identification of efficient computational procedures for large-scale electric power
supply chains with tradable pollution permits.
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Table 5.2. The Solutions to Examples 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4
Equilibrium Solution Example 5.1 Example 5.2 Example 5.3 Example 5.4
Equilibrium Electric Power Flows
q∗11 15.20 7.48 2.85 2.87
q∗12 6.63 3.17 1.10 1.10
q∗21 15.53 7.82 3.19 3.20
q∗22 62.65 31.53 12.86 12.91
q∗111 7.60 3.74 1.43 1.43
q∗112 7.60 3.74 1.43 1.43
q∗121 3.31 1.59 0.55 0.55
q∗122 3.31 1.59 0.55 0.55
q∗211 7.76 3.91 1.59 1.60
q∗212 7.76 3.91 1.59 1.60
q∗221 31.32 15.77 6.43 6.46
q∗222 31.32 15.77 6.43 6.46
h∗1 50.00 25.00 10.00 10.00
h∗2 50.00 25.00 10.00 10.00
q1∗11 25.00 12.50 5.00 0.00
q1∗12 25.00 12.50 5.00 10.00
q1∗21 25.00 12.50 5.00 0.00
q1∗22 25.00 12.50 5.00 10.00
Equilibrium Demands
d∗1 50.00 25.00 10.00 0.00
d∗2 50.00 25.00 10.00 20.00
Equilibrium Pollution Permit Price and Shadow Prices
τ∗ = λ∗11 = λ∗12 = λ∗21 = λ∗22 115.50 236.38 308.91 656.96
Equilibrium Permits/Licenses
l∗11 15.20 7.48 2.85 2.87
l∗12 6.63 3.17 1.10 1.10
l∗21 15.53 7.82 3.19 3.20
l∗22 62.65 31.53 12.86 12.91
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The research in this Chapter is the first to incorporate the substitutability and
complementarity effects of multiple pollutants. This research can aid a regulatory
agency in the determination of the number of permits required to achieve the re-
duction of emissions below a pre-determined bound. Moreover, this model focuses
specifically on electric power supply chains and the effects of governmental mandates
regarding environmental standards on the associated prices and quantities. The im-
portance of environmental-energy modeling to address market failures in energy is
growing as awareness of pollution effects, emission abatement technologies, and gov-
ernment policies are changing. A limitation of the model is the requirement of the
electric power industry to report accurate and true data regarding the costs of pro-
ducing electricity. A future application of this model could include the empirical
implementation of a tradable permit system, such as, for example, for the electric
power supply chain of New England (see Liu and Nagurney (2008)).
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CHAPTER 6
ENVIRONMENTAL AND COST SYNERGY IN SUPPLY
CHAIN NETWORK INTEGRATION IN MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS
The adoption of advanced pollution abatement technologies can be the result of
policy instruments (as related to Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of this dissertation), or
in an effort to increase market share by appealing to the environmentally conscious
consumer. Roper Starch Worldwide (1997) noted that more than 75% of the public
switch to a brand associated with the environment when price and quality are equal.
Firms are increasingly realizing the importance of their environmental impacts and
the return on the bottom line (Hart and Ahuja (1996)). For example, 3M saved
almost $500 million by implementing over 3000 projects that have reduced emissions
by over 1 billion pounds since 1975 (Walley and Whitehead (1994)). It has also been
argued that sound environmental practices reduce risk to the firm (Feldman, Soyka,
and Ameer (1997)).
Due to the visibility and the number of mergers/acquisitions that have been oc-
curring it is important to understand and study the synergy results for managerial
benefits from an environmental standpoint. In the first nine months of 2007 alone,
according to Thomson Financial, worldwide merger activity hit $3.6 trillion, surpass-
ing the total from all of 2006 combined (Wong (2007)). Companies merge for various
reasons, some of which include such benefits as acquired technologies, and greater
economies of scale that improve productivity or cut costs (Chatterjee (1986)).
Successful mergers can add tremendous value; however, with a failure rate esti-
mated to be between 74% and 83% (Devero (2004)), it is worthwhile to develop tools
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to better predict the potential for creating strategic gains in the form of collusive,
financial, and operational synergy (Chatterjee (1986)). Specifically, sources of op-
erational synergy include market power (changes in market share (Brush (1996)) or
cost savings effects (Chang (1988), Eccles, Lanes, and Wilson (1999)) that can be
measured by evaluating the changes in the equity value of production costs of merg-
ing firms (Chatterjee (1986)). The ability of a tool to aid in managerial decisions is
dependent on its proper use and deployment so that the merger meets the anticipated
value. Thus, it should be noted that a successful merger depends on the ability to
measure the anticipated synergy of the proposed merger, if any (cf. Chang (1988)).
In particular, it has been argued that the supply chain network structure pre and post
a merger is crucial in identifying the operational synergy (cf. Nagurney (2009) and
the references therein) associated with mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, Chatter-
jee (2007) recognized that, based on a survey of academic research, interviews and
anecdotal evidence that it is much easier to achieve success regarding mergers and
acquisitions when the stated goal of a proposed merger is its potential for cost reduc-
tion (than its potential to increase revenue). He further emphasized that, regarding
horizontal industry consolidations, there is strong academic evidence that such merg-
ers, which are motivated by capacity reduction, are one of the few merger categories
that seem to succeed.
However, with the growing investment and industrialization in developing nations,
it is also important to evaluate the overall impact of merger activities at not only the
operational level, but also as related to environmental impacts. There is enormous
potential for developing countries to adopt cleaner production, given current tech-
nologies as well as the levels of private capital investments. For example, between
1988-1995, multinational corporations invested nearly $422 billion worth of new fac-
tories, supplies, and equipment in these countries (World Resources Institute (1998)).
Through globalization, firms of industrialized nations can acquire those firms in de-
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veloping nations that offer lower production costs; however, more than not, combined
with inferior environmental concerns. As a result of the industrialization of developing
countries, the actions taken today greatly influence the future scale of environmental
and health problems.
Farrell and Shapiro (2001) study synergy effects, that is, cost savings, as related
to economies of scale, competition, and consumer welfare that could only be ob-
tained post-merger. They specifically claim that direct competition has an impact on
merger-specific synergies. Soylu et al. (2006) analyzed synergy among different en-
ergy systems using a multiperiod, discrete-continuous mixed integer linear program
(see also Xu (2007)). Lambertini and Mantovani (2007) conclude that horizontal
mergers can contribute to reduce negative externalities related to the environment.
They state that, “in the presence of a negative externality appearing in consumer
surplus from merger activity, if shrinking the industry output translates into a suf-
ficiently large reduction of the negative externality, then the overall balance may in
fact be positive”; however they did not consider synergy effects or a supply chain
framework. There is virtually no literature to-date that discusses the relationship
between post-merger operational synergy and the effects on the environment and,
thus, ultimately, society, which is addressed from a quantitative perspective in this
Chapter.
As noted in the Introduction, the proponents for a system view structure of the
supply chain (cf. Section 1.2.1.2), which is utilized in this Chapter, include the foster-
ing of relationships, coordination, integration, and management in order to achieve
greater consumer satisfaction and service reliability, which is necessary to be com-
petitive in the current economic environment (Zsidisin and Siferd (2001)). Sarkis
(2003) demonstrated that environmental supply chain management, also referred to
as the green supply chain, is necessary to address environmental concerns. For exam-
ple, the Ford Motor company demanded that all of its 5000 worldwide suppliers with
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manufacturing plants obtain a third party certification of environmental management
system (EMS) by 2003 (Rao (2002)).
This Chapter, towards the end, develops a multicriteria decision-making optimiza-
tion framework that not only minimizes costs but also minimizes emissions, as in the
sustainable supply chain developed in Chapter 3. However, the main focus of this
Chapter is on the system-optimized case (cf. Section 2.4), unlike Chapter 3 which
addressed the user-optimized case (see Section 2.3 for a discussion on the relationship
between System-Optimization and User-Optimization). This Chapter is built on the
recent work of Nagurney (2009) who developed a system-optimization perspective for
supply chain network integration in the case of horizontal mergers. This Chapter also
focuses on the case of horizontal mergers (or acquisitions) and I extend the contribu-
tions in Nagurney (2009) to include multicriteria decision-making and environmental
concerns. In particular, in this Chapter, the synergy effects associated with a merger
are analyzed in terms of the operational synergy, that is, the reduction, if any, in the
cost of production, storage, and distribution, as well as the environmental benefits
in terms of the reduction of associated emissions (if any). This has not been done
before in the literature.
This Chapter is based on Nagurney andWoolley (2009) and is organized as follows:
the pre-merger supply chain network model is developed in Section 6.1 (consider, for
example, such production chains as Perdue Farms vs. Tyson Foods). Section 6.1
also include the horizontally merged (or acquired) supply chain model (see also Rice
and Hoppe (2001)). The method of quantification of the synergistic gains, if any, be
provided in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3 numerical examples are presented and the
Chapter is concluded with Section 6.4.
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6.1 The Pre- and Post-Merger Supply Chain Network Mod-
els
This Section develops the pre- and post-merger supply chain network models with
environmental concerns using a system-optimization approach (cf. Section 2.4). Sec-
tion 6.1.1 describes the underlying network of the pre-merger related to each individ-
ual firm and their respective activities. Section 6.1.2 develops the post-merger model.
Each firm is assumed to act as a multicriteria decision-maker (cf. Section 1.2.1.1) so
as to not only minimize costs, but also, as per competitive and consumer pressures
(Srivastara (2007), Lambertini and Mantovani (2007)), to minimize the emissions
generated (see also Nagurney, Dong, and Mokhtarian (2002b) and references within).
6.1.1 The Pre-Merger Supply Chain Network Model with Environmental
Concerns
I first formulate the pre-merger multicriteria decision-making optimization prob-
lem faced by Firm A and Firm B as follows and refer to this model as Case 0.
Following Nagurney (2009), it is assumed that each firm is represented as a network
of its economic activities, as depicted in Figure 6.1. It is also assumed that each firm
produces a homogenous product. Each firm i; i = A,B, has niM manufacturing facili-
ties/plants; niD distribution centers, and serves n
i
R retail outlets. Let Gi = [Ni, Li] for
i = A,B denote the graph consisting of nodes and directed links representing the eco-
nomic activities associated with each firm i. Also let G0 = [N0, L0] ≡ ∪i=A,B[Ni, Li].
The links from the top-tiered nodes i; i = A,B in each network in Figure 6.1 are
connected to the manufacturing nodes of the respective firm i, which are denoted,
respectively, by: M i1, . . . ,M
i
niM
, and these links represent the manufacturing links.
These models generalize the framework proposed in Nagurney (2009) to capture the
environmental impacts associated with mergers (and acquisitions).
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The links from the manufacturing nodes, in turn, are connected to the distribution
center nodes of each firm i; i = A,B, which are denoted by Di1,1, . . . , D
i
nDi,1
. These
links correspond to the shipment links between the manufacturing plants and the dis-
tribution centers where the product is stored. The links joining nodes Di1,1, . . . , D
i
niD,1
with nodes Di1,2, . . . , D
i
niD,2
for i = A,B correspond to the storage links. Finally, there
are shipment links joining the nodes Di1,2, . . . , D
i
niD,2
for i = A,B with the retail outlet
nodes: Ri1, . . . , R
i
niR
for each firm i = A,B. Each firm i has its own individual retail
outlets where it sells the product, as depicted in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1. The Supply Chain Networks of Firms A and B Prior to the Merger
Assume that there is a total cost associated with each link (cf. Figure 6.1) of the
network corresponding to each firm i; i = A,B. The links are denoted by a, b, etc.,
and the total cost on a link a by cˆa. The demands for the product are assumed as
given and are associated with each firm and retailer pair. Let dRik denote the demand
for the product at retailer Rik associated with firm i; i = A,B; k = 1, . . . , n
i
R. A path
is defined as a sequence of links joining an origin node i = A,B with a destination
node Rik. Let xp denote the nonnegative flow of the product on path p. A path
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consists of a sequence of economic activities comprising manufacturing, storage, and
distribution. The following conservation of flow equations must hold for each firm i:
∑
p∈P 0
Ri
k
xp = dRik , i = A,B; k = 1, . . . , n
i
R, (6.1)
where P 0
Rik
denotes the set of paths connecting (origin) node i with (destination) retail
node Rik.
Let fa denote the flow of the product on link a. The following conservation of
flow equations must also be satisfied:
fa =
∑
p∈P 0
xpδap, ∀a ∈ L0, (6.2)
where δap = 1 if link a is contained in path p and δap = 0, otherwise. Here P
0 denotes
the set of all paths in Figure 6.1, that is, P 0 = ∪i=A,B;k=1,...,niRP 0Rik . Clearly, since I
am first considering the two firms prior to any merger the paths associated with a
given firm have no links in common with paths of the other firm. This changes (see
also Nagurney (2009)) when the mergers occur, in which case the number of paths
and the sets of paths also change, as do the number of links and the sets of links, as
described in Section 6.1.2.
The path flows must be nonnegative, that is,
xp ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P 0. (6.3)
The path flows are grouped into the vector x.
The total cost on a link, be it a manufacturing/production link, a shipment/
distribution link, or a storage link is assumed to be a function of the flow of the
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product on the link; see, for example, Nagurney (2009) and the references therein.
Hence, one would have that
cˆa = cˆa(fa), ∀a ∈ L0. (6.4)
It is assumed that the total cost on each link is convex, is continuously differentiable,
and has a bounded second order partial derivative. Assumptions of convexity and con-
tinuous differentiability are common in the economics literature regarding production
cost functions (see, e.g., Gabay and Moulin (1980), Friedman (1982), Tirole (1988)
and the references therein). Further more due to increasing congestion such assump-
tions are also reasonable regarding the transportation/shipment links (see Dafermos
and Sparrow (1969)). A special case of the total cost function (6.4) that satisfies
the above assumptions is a linear, separable function, such that cˆa = hafa for ha
nonnegative (see also Nagurney (2008)).
The units for measurement of the emissions is now discussed. I propose the use
of the carbon equivalent for emissions, which is commonly used in environmental
modeling and research (Nagurney (2006b), Wu et al. (2006)), as well as in practice as
employed by the Kyoto Protocol (Reilly et al. (1999)), to aid in the direct comparison
of environmental impacts of differing pollutants. Emissions are typically expressed in
a common metric, specifically, in million metric tons of carbon equivalent (MMTCE)
(USEPA (2005)).
It is also assumed that there are nonnegative capacities on the links with the
capacity on link a denoted by ua, ∀a ∈ L0. This is very reasonable since the manu-
facturing plants, the shipment links, as well as the distribution centers, which serve
also as the storage facilities can be expected to have capacities, in practice.
In addition, it is assumed, as given, emission functions for each economic link
a ∈ L0, and denoted by ea, where
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ea = ea(fa), ∀a ∈ L0, (6.5)
where ea denotes the total amount of emissions generated by link a in processing an
amount fa of the product. It is reasonable to assume that the amount of emissions
generated is a function of the flow on the associated economic link (see, for example,
Dhanda, Nagurney, and Ramanujam (1999) and Nagurney, Qiang, and Nagurney
(2009) and the references therein). It is assumed that the emission functions have the
same properties as the total cost functions (6.4) above.
Since the firms, pre-merger, have no links in common (cf. Figure 6.1), their
individual cost minimization problems can be formulated jointly as follows:
Minimize
∑
a∈L0
cˆa(fa) (6.6)
subject to: constraints (6.1) – (6.3) and
fa ≤ ua, ∀a ∈ L0. (6.7)
In addition, since I am considering multicriteria decision-making with environ-
mental concerns, the minimization of emissions generated can, in turn, be expressed
as follows:
Minimize
∑
a∈L0
ea(fa) (6.8)
subject to: constraints (6.1) – (6.3) and (6.7).
One can now construct a value total cost function, which is referred to as the
generalized total cost (cf. Fishburn (1970), Chankong and Haimes (1983), Yu (1985),
Keeney and Raiffa (1992), Nagurney and Dong (2002)), associated with the two
criteria faced by each firm. αia can be assumed the price that each firm, i, would be
willing to pay for each unit of emission on link a; which represents the environmental
144
concern for each firm, i, on link a. A higher αia represent a greater concern for
the environment. Specifically, for notational convenience and simplicity, for firms
i = A,B and links a ∈ Li, let αia ≡ 0 if link a /∈ Li and αia = αi, otherwise, where
αi is decided upon by the decision-making authority of firm i. Consequently, the
multicriteria decision-making problem, pre-merger, can be expressed as:
Minimize
∑
a∈L0
∑
i=A,B
cˆa(fa) + αiaea(fa) (6.9)
subject to: constraints (6.1) – (6.3) and (6.7).
Note that the optimization problem above is equivalent to each firm solving its
multicriteria decision-making problem independently. Observe that this problem is,
as is well-known in the transportation literature (cf. Beckmann, McGuire, and Win-
sten (1956), Dafermos and Sparrow (1969)), a system-Optimization problem but in
capacitated form and with multicriteria decision-making; see also Patriksson (1994),
Nagurney (2000, 2006b), and the references therein. Under the above imposed as-
sumptions, the optimization problem is a convex optimization problem. If it is further
assumed that the feasible set underlying the problem represented by the constraints
(6.1) – (6.3) and (6.7) is non-empty, then it follows from the standard theory of
nonlinear programming (cf. Bazaraa, Sherali, and Shetty (1993)) that an optimal
solution exists.
Let K06 denote the set where K06 ≡ {f |∃x ≥ 0, and (6.1) − (6.3) and (6.7) hold},
and f is the vector of link flows. Also, associate the Lagrange multiplier βa with
constraint (6.7) for link a and denote the associated optimal Lagrange multiplier by
β∗a. This term may also be interpreted as the price or value of an additional unit
of capacity on link a. The variational inequality formulation of the problem is now
provided.
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Theorem 6.1
The vector of link flows f ∗0 ∈ K06 is an optimal solution to the pre-merger problem if
and only if it satisfies the following variational inequality problem with the vector of
nonnegative Lagrange multipliers β∗0:
∑
a∈L0
∑
i=A,B
[
∂cˆa(f
∗
a )
∂fa
+ αia
∂ea(f
∗
a )
∂fa
+ β∗a]× [fa − f ∗a ] +
∑
a∈L0
[ua − f ∗a ]× [βa − β∗a] ≥ 0,
∀f ∈ K06,∀βa ≥ 0,∀a ∈ L0. (6.10)
Proof: See Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1989) and Nagurney (1993).
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Figure 6.2. The Supply Chain Network after Firms A and B Merge
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6.1.2 The Post-Merger Supply Chain Network Model with Environmen-
tal Concerns
I now formulate the post-merger case, referred to as Case 1, in which the manufac-
turing facilities produce the product and then ship it to any distribution center and
the retailers can obtain the product from any distribution center. Since the product
is assumed to be homogeneous, after the merger the retail outlets are indifferent at
which manufacturing plant the product was produced. Figure 6.2 depicts the post-
merger supply chain network topology. Note that there is now a supersource node 0
which represents the merger of the firms with additional links joining node 0 to nodes
A and B, respectively.
The post-merger optimization problem is concerned with total cost minimization
as well as the minimization of emissions. Specifically, the nodes and links associated
with network G0 depicted in Figure 6.1 are retained but now the additional links
connecting the manufacturing plants of each firm and the distribution centers and
the links connecting the distribution centers and the retailers of the other firm are
now added. The network underlying this merger is referred to as G1 = [N1, L1]. The
total cost functions, as in (6.4), and emission functions, as in (6.5), are associated
with the new links. It is assumed, for simplicity, that the corresponding functions on
the links emanating from the supersource node are equal to zero.
A path p now (cf. Figure 6.2) originates at node 0 and is destined for one of the
bottom retail nodes. Let xp now in the post-merger network configuration given in
Figure 6.2 denote the flow of the product on path p joining (origin) node 0 with a
(destination) retailer node. Then the following conservation of flow equations must
hold: ∑
p∈P 1
Ri
k
xp = dRik , i = A,B; k = 1, . . . , n
i
R, (6.11)
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where P 1
Rik
denotes the set of paths connecting node 0 with retail node Rik in Figure 6.2.
Due to the merger, the retail outlets can obtain the product from any manufacturing
plant and any distributor. The set of paths P 1 ≡ ∪i=A,B;k=1,...,niRP 1Rik .
In addition, as before, let fa denote the flow of the product on link a. Hence, the
following conservation of flow equations must be satisfied:
fa =
∑
p∈P 1
xpδap, ∀a ∈ L1. (6.12)
Of course, one would also have that the path flows must be nonnegative, that is,
xp ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P 1. (6.13)
It is assumed, again, that the links representing the manufacturing activities, the
shipment, and the storage activities possess nonnegative capacities, denoted as ua,
∀a ∈ L1. This can be expressed as
fa ≤ ua, ∀a ∈ L1. (6.14)
It is assumed that, post-merger, the value associated with the environmental emis-
sion cost minimization criterion is denoted by α and this value is nonnegative. This is
reasonable since, unlike in the pre-merger case, the firms are now merged into a single
decision-making economic entity and there is now a single value associated with the
emissions generated.
Hence, the following multicriteria decision-making optimization problem can be
solved:
Minimize
∑
a∈L1
[cˆa(fa) + αea(fa)] (6.15)
subject to constraints: (6.11) – (6.14). Note that L1 represents all links in the post-
merger network belonging to firm A and to firm B.
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There are distinct options for the value of α and several are explored in Section 6.3,
in concrete numerical examples. Specifically, in the case that the merger/acquisition
is an environmentally hostile one, then one may set α = 0; in the case that it is
environmentally conscious, then α may be set to 1; and so on, with α being a function
of the firms’ pre-merger values also a possibility.
The solution to the post-merger multicriteria decision-making optimization prob-
lem (6.15) subject to constraints (6.11) through (6.14) can also be obtained as a
solution to a variational inequality problem akin to (6.10) where now a ∈ L1, α is
substituted for αi, and the vectors: f , x, and β have identical definitions as before,
but are re-dimensioned/expanded accordingly. Finally, instead of the feasible set K06
one would now have K16 ≡ {f |∃x ≥ 0, and (6.11) − (6.14) hold}. The solution to the
variational inequality problem governing Case 1 is denoted by f ∗1, β∗1. For complete-
ness, the variational inequality formulation of the Case 1 problem is now provided.
The proof is immediate.
Theorem 6.2
The vector of link flows f ∗1 ∈ K16 is an optimal solution to the post-merger problem
if and only if it satisfies the following variational inequality problem with the vector
of nonnegative Lagrange multipliers β∗1:
∑
a∈L1
[
∂cˆa(f
∗
a )
∂fa
+ α
∂ea(f
∗
a )
∂fa
+ β∗a]× [fa − f ∗a ] +
∑
a∈L1
[ua − f ∗a ]× [βa − β∗a] ≥ 0,
∀f ∈ K16,∀βa ≥ 0,∀a ∈ L1. (6.16)
Finally, the total generalized cost TGC0 associated with Case 0 is defined as the
value of the objective function in (6.9) evaluated at its optimal solution f ∗0 and the
total generalized cost TGC1 associated with Case 1 as the value of the objective func-
tion in (6.15) evaluated at its optimal solution f ∗1. These flow vectors are obtained
from the solutions of variational ienqualities (6.10) and (6.16), respectively. In the
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next Section, it is discussed how one can utilize these two total generalized costs to
determine the strategic advantage or synergy associated with a merger/acquisition. In
addition, TE0 is defined as the total emissions generated under solution f ∗0; TE1 as
the total emissions generated under solution f ∗1, and TC0 and TC1 the corresponding
total costs. Due to the similarity of variational inequalities (6.10) and (6.16) the same
computational procedure can be utilized to compute the solutions. Indeed, one can
utilize the variational inequality formulations of the respective pre- and post-merger
supply chain network problems to then exploit the simplicity of the underlying fea-
sible sets, K06 and K16, which have a network structure identical to that underlying
system-optimized transportation network problems. In particular, in Section 6.3, the
modified projection method (cf. 2.5.2) of Korpelevich (1977) embedded with the equi-
libration algorithm (cf. 2.5.3) of Dafermos and Sparrow (1969) (see also Nagurney
(1993)) is applied to solve all the numerical examples in Matlab and the computer
system used was an IBM system at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
6.2 Quantifying Synergy Associated with Multicriteria
Decision-Making Firms with Environmental Concerns in
Mergers/Acquisitions
The synergy associated with the total generalized costs which captures both the
total costs and the total emissions is denoted by STGC and is defined as follows:
STGC ≡ [TGC
0 − TGC1
TGC0
]× 100%. (6.17)
The synergy can also be measured by analyzing the total costs pre and post the
merger (cf. Eccles, Lanes, and Wilson (1999) and Nagurney (2009)), as well as the
changes in emissions. For example, the synergy based on total costs and proposed by
Nagurney (2009), but not in a multicriteria decision-making context, which is denoted
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here by STC , can be calculated as the percentage difference between the total cost
pre vs the total cost post merger:
STC ≡ [TC
0 − TC1
TC0
]× 100%. (6.18)
The environmental impacts related to the relationship between pre and post
merger emission levels can also be calculated using a similar measure as that of the
total cost. Towards that end, one can also define the total emissions synergy, denoted
by STE as:
STE ≡ [TE
0 − TE1
TE0
]× 100%. (6.19)
6.3 Numerical Examples
In this Section, numerical examples are presented in which one can utilize the
synergy measures defined in Section 6.2. The numerical examples are from Nagurney
and Woolley (2009). Consider firm A and firm B, as depicted in Figure 6.3 for the
pre-merger case. Each firm owns and operates two manufacturing plants, M i1 and
M i2, one distribution center, and provides the product to meet demand at two retail
markets Ri1 and R
i
2 for i = A,B. Figure 6.4 depicts the post-merger supply chain
network. The total cost functions were: cˆa(fa) = f
2
a + 2fa for all links a pre-merger
and post-merger in all the numerical examples below, except for the links post-merger
that join the node 0 with nodes A and B. By convention, these merger links had
associated total costs equal to 0. The definition of the links and the associated
emission functions for all the examples are given in Table 6.1. The modified projection
method embedded with the equilibration algorithm was implemented in Matlab, and
the computer system used was an IBM system at the University of Massachusetts
Amherst. The solutions to the numerical examples are given in Table 6.2 for the
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pre-merger case and in Table 6.3 for the post-merger case. The synergy calculations
are presented in Table 6.4.
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Figure 6.3. The Pre-Merger Supply Chain Network Topology for the Numerical
Examples
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Table 6.1. The Definition of the Links and the Associated Emission Functions for
the Numerical Examples
Link a From Node To Node Ex. 6.1,6.4: ea(fa) Ex. 6.2,6.3: ea(fa)
1 A MA1 10f1 5f1
2 A MA2 10f2 5f2
3 MA1 D
A
1,1 10f3 5f3
4 MA2 D
A
1,1 10f4 5f4
5 DA1,1 D
A
1,2 10f5 5f5
6 DA1,2 R
A
1 10f6 5f6
7 DA1,2 R
A
2 10f7 5f7
8 B MB1 10f8 10f8
9 B MB2 10f9 10f9
10 MB1 D
B
1,1 10f10 10f10
11 MB2 D
B
1,1 10f11 10f11
12 DB1,1 D
B
1,2 10f12 10f12
13 DB1,2 R
B
1 10f13 10f13
14 DB1,2 R
B
2 10f14 10f14
15 MA1 D
B
1,1 10f15 5f15
16 MA2 D
B
1,1 10f16 5f16
17 MB1 D
A
1,1 10f17 10f17
18 MB2 D
A
1,1 10f18 10f18
19 DA1,2 R
B
1 10f19 5f19
20 DA1,2 R
B
2 10f20 5f20
21 DB1,2 R
A
1 10f21 10f21
22 DB1,2 R
A
2 10f22 10f22
153
Table 6.2. The Pre-Merger Solutions to the Numerical Examples
Link a From Node To Node Ex. 6.1 - 6.4: f ∗a
1 A MA1 5.00
2 A MA2 5.00
3 MA1 D
A
1,1 5.00
4 MA2 D
A
1,1 5.00
5 DA1,1 D
A
1,2 10.00
6 DA1,2 R
A
1 5.00
7 DA1,2 R
A
2 5.00
8 B MB1 5.00
9 B MB2 5.00
10 MB1 D
B
1,1 5.00
11 MB2 D
B
1,1 5.00
12 DB1,1 D
B
1,2 10.00
13 DB1,2 R
B
1 5.00
14 DB1,2 R
B
2 5.00
6.3.1 Example 6.1
The demands at the retailers for Firm A and Firm B were set to 5 and the capacity
on each link was set to 15 both pre and post merger. The weights: αia = αi were set
to 1 for both firms i = A,B and for all links a ∈ L0. Thus, I assumed that each firm is
equally concerned with cost minimization and with emission minimization. The pre-
merger solution f ∗0 for both firms had all components equal to 5 for all links except
for the storage links, which had flows of 10. The associated β∗0 had all components
equal to 0, since the flow on any particular link did not meet capacity. The total cost
was 660.00, the total emissions generated was 800.00 and the total generalized cost
was 1460.00.
Post-merger, for each firm, the cost and emission functions were again set to
cˆa(fa) = f
2
a + 2fa and ea(fa) = 10fa, respectively, including those links formed
post-merger. The demand at each retail market was kept at 5 and the capacity
of each link, including those formed post-merger, was set to 15. The weight α, post-
merger, was set to 1. The solution is as follows; see also Table 3. For both firms, the
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manufacturing link flows were 5; 2.5 was the shipment between each manufacturer and
distribution center, 10 was the flow representing storage at each distribution center,
and 2.5 was the flow from each distribution/storage center to each demand market.
The vector of optimal multipliers, β∗1, post-merger, had all its components equal to
0. The total cost was 560.00, the total emissions generated were 800.00, and the total
generalized cost was 1360.00. There were total cost synergistic gains, specifically, at
STC = 15.15%, yet no environmental gains, since STE = 0.00%. Additionally, the
total generalized cost synergy was: STGC = 6.85%.
6.3.2 Example 6.2
Example 6.2 was constructed from Example 6.1 but with the following modifications.
Pre-merger, the emission functions of Firm A were reduced from ea(fa) = 10fa to
ea(fa) = 5fa, ∀a ∈ L0. Hence, Firm A now is assumed to produce fewer emissions
as a function of flow on each link than Firm B. Additionally, pre-merger, the en-
vironmental concern of Firm B was reduced to zero, that is, αBa = 0, for all links
a associated with Firm B, pre-merger. Hence, not only does Firm A emit less as a
function of the flow on each link, but Firm A also has a greater environmental concern
than Firm B. Pre-merger, the optimal solution f ∗0 was identical to that obtained,
pre-merger, for Example 6.1. The total cost was 660.00, the total emissions generated
were 600.00, and the total generalized cost was 860.00. The components of β∗0 were
the same as in Example 6.1.
Post-merger, the emission functions of Firm A were as above and ea(fa) = 5fa, on
all links formed post-merger, and emanating from the original Firm A; the analogous
links for Firm B had emission functions ea(fa) = 10fa. I assumed an amicable
merger. In particular, post-merger, I assumed that α = 0.5. The optimal flow from
node A to each manufacturer was 5.83, the optimal shipment from each original A’s
manufacturer to original A’s distribution center was 3.12, while the distribution to
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B’s distribution center was 2.71. Storage for Firm A possessed a flow of 10.83 and
A shipped from its own distribution/storage center to its own as well as the retail
markets of Firm B in the amount of 2.71. For Firm B, the optimal flow from node B to
its manufacturing facilities was 4.17, with a shipment to its own distribution center of
1.87, and 2.29 to A’s distribution center. The flow at B’s original distribution/storage
center was 9.17. Finally, the flow shipped from the original B to each retail outlet
from its distribution/storage center was 2.29. The total cost was now 566.22, the
total emissions generated were equal to 574.98, and the total generalized cost was
now 853.71.
Thus, the synergies were: STC = 14.21% for the total cost; STE = 4.23% for
the total emissions, and STGC = 0.82% for the total generalized cost. I can see
that, as compared to Example 6.1, that even though cost synergies decreased by
0.94%, the total emission synergies increased by 4.23%, and the total generalized cost
synergy decreased by 6.12%. In the event of an amicable merger between firms that
have different environmental concerns and, thus, activities to reduce emissions, there
was an increase in emission synergy. There was, nevertheless, a tradeoff between
operational synergy gains with environmental benefits. As environmental benefits
are increased, operational synergy decreased, even though, not quite as significantly
as the environmental gains to society. However, it is interesting to note that the total
generalized cost synergy decreased even more drastically than the environmental gains
which signifies the influential effect environmental concerns had on the objective of
the firm pre and post merger.
6.3.3 Example 6.3
Example 6.3 was constructed from Example 6.2 but with the following changes. I
now assumed that the merger was hostile, but with Firm B as the dominant firm,
that is, the post environmental concern be like that of Firm B. Hence, α = 0. The
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pre-merger results are the same as in Example 2, and now I describe the post-merger
results. The flows were symmetric for each original firm, with a flow of 5 from each
manufacturer, a shipment of 2.50 to each distribution center with a flow of 10 in the
storage center, and a product shipment of 2.50 to each retail outlet.
The total cost was 560.00, the total emissions generated were 600.00, and the
total generalized cost was 560.00. Thus, the synergy results were 15.15% for the
total cost, 0.00% for the total emissions, and 34.88% for the total generalized cost.
It is of notable interest that the total cost synergy and the total emission synergy
are identical to those obtained for Example 6.1. However, the total generalized cost
synergy in this example was significantly higher. In Example 6.1, both firms showed
concern for the environment pre and post merger, with αAa = αBa = 1, for all links
a associated with Firm A and Firm B pre-merger; in this example, Firm B showed
no concern for the environment pre-merger, and as the dominant firm, post-merger,
α = 0. So even though there was no benefit, environmentally, and no difference in
total cost, there were significant gains in terms of the total generalized cost of the
merged firm.
6.3.4 Example 6.4
Example 6.4 was constructed from Example 6.1 but with the following modifications.
Pre-merger, I assumed that Firm A is environmentally conscious, that is αAa = 1 for
firm i = A and for all links a associated with Firm A, while Firm B does not display
any concern for the environment, that is, αBa = 0 for all its links. Additionally, I
now assumed that the merger was hostile with Firm A as the dominant firm, that is,
Firm A imposes its environmental concern on Firm B. I assumed that, post-merger,
α = 1. The pre-merger optimal flows are the same as in Example 1. The total cost
was 660.00, the total emissions generated were 800.00, and the total generalized cost
was 1060.00.
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Table 6.3. Post-Merger Solutions to the Numerical Examples
Link a From Node To Node Ex. 1: f ∗a Ex. 2: f
∗
a Ex 3: f
∗
a Ex. 4: f
∗
a
1 A MA1 5.00 5.83 5.00 5.00
2 A MA2 5.00 5.83 5.00 5.00
3 MA1 D
A
1,1 2.50 3.12 2.50 2.50
4 MA2 D
A
1,1 2.50 3.12 2.50 2.50
5 DA1,1 D
A
1,2 10.00 10.83 10.00 10.00
6 DA1,2 R
A
1 2.50 2.71 2.50 2.50
7 DA1,2 R
A
2 2.50 2.71 2.50 2.50
8 B MB1 5.00 4.17 5.00 5.00
9 B MB2 5.00 4.17 5.00 5.00
10 MB1 D
B
1,1 2.50 1.87 2.50 2.50
11 MB2 D
B
1,1 2.50 1.87 2.50 2.50
12 DB1,1 D
B
1,2 10.00 9.17 10.00 10.00
13 DB1,2 R
B
1 2.50 2.29 2.50 2.50
14 DB1,2 R
B
2 2.50 2.29 2.50 2.50
15 MA1 D
B
1,1 2.50 2.71 2.50 2.50
16 MA2 D
B
1,1 2.50 2.71 2.50 2.50
17 MB1 D
A
1,1 2.50 2.29 2.50 2.50
18 MB2 D
A
1,1 2.50 2.29 2.50 2.50
19 DA1,2 R
B
1 2.50 2.71 2.50 2.50
20 DA1,2 R
B
2 2.50 2.71 2.50 2.50
21 DB1,2 R
A
1 2.50 2.29 2.50 2.50
22 DB1,2 R
A
2 2.50 2.29 2.50 2.50
The post-merger results were as follows. The optimal link flows were identical to
those obtained for Example 6.3, post-merger. The total cost was 560.00, the total
emissions generated were 800.00, and the total generalized cost was 1360.00. The
synergy results were: 15.15% for the total cost; 0.00% for the total emissions, and
−28.30% for the total generalized cost. When the dominant firm in the proposed
merger was more concerned with the environmental impacts, the overall total gener-
alized cost synergy was the lowest. This example illustrates the importance of not
only demonstrating concern for the environment but also to take action in order to
reduce the emission functions.
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Table 6.4. Synergy Values for the Numerical Examples
Example 1 2 3 4
TC0 660.00 660.00 660.00 660.00
TC1 560.00 566.22 560.00 560.00
STC 15.15% 14.21% 15.15% 15.15%
TE0 800.00 600.00 600.00 800.00
TE1 800.00 574.98 600.00 800.00
STE 0.00% 4.23% 0.00% 0.00%
TGC0 1460.00 860.00 860.00 1060.00
TGC1 1360.00 853.71 560.00 1360.00
STGC 6.85% 0.73% 34.88% −28.30%
Table 6.5. Post-Merger Solutions to the Variant Numerical Examples
Link a From Node To Node Ex. 1,4: f ∗a Ex. 2: f
∗
a Ex. 3: f
∗
a
1 A MA1 5.00 5.62 5.00
2 A MA2 5.00 5.62 5.00
3 MA1 D
A
1,1 0.00 2.08 2.50
4 MA2 D
A
1,1 0.00 2.08 2.50
5 DA1,1 D
A
1,2 10.00 10.83 9.99
6 DA1,2 R
A
1 0.00 1.77 2.50
7 DA1,2 R
A
2 0.00 1.77 2.50
8 B MB1 5.00 4.37 5.00
9 B MB2 5.00 4.37 5.00
10 MB1 D
B
1,1 0.00 1.04 2.50
11 MB2 D
B
1,1 0.00 1.04 2.50
12 DB1,1 D
B
1,2 10.00 9.17 9.99
13 DB1,2 R
B
1 0.00 1.35 2.50
14 DB1,2 R
B
2 0.00 1.35 2.50
15 MA1 D
B
1,1 5.00 3.54 2.50
16 MA2 D
B
1,1 5.00 3.54 2.50
17 MB1 D
A
1,1 5.00 3.33 2.50
18 MB2 D
A
1,1 5.00 3.33 2.50
19 DA1,2 R
B
1 5.00 3.65 2.50
20 DA1,2 R
B
2 5.00 3.65 2.50
21 DB1,2 R
A
1 5.00 3.23 2.50
22 DB1,2 R
A
2 5.00 3.23 2.50
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Table 6.6. Synergy Values for the Variant Numerical Examples
Example 1 2 3 4
TC0 660.00 660.00 660.00 660.00
TC1 660.00 578.46 560.00 660.00
STC 0.00% 12.35% 15.15% 0.00%
TE0 800.00 600.00 600.00 800.00
TE1 400.00 376.03 450.00 400.00
STE 50.00% 37.33% 25.00% 50.00%
TGC0 1460.00 860.00 860.00 1060.00
TGC1 1060.00 766.47 560.00 1060.00
STGC 27.40% 10.88% 34.88% 0.00%
6.3.5 Variant Numerical Examples
In addition, in order to explore the impacts of improved technologies associated
with distribution/transportation I constructed the following variants of the above
numerical examples. I assumed that the pre-merger data were as in Examples 6.1
through 6.4 as were the post-merger data except that I assumed that the emission
functions associated with the new “merger” links were all identically equal to 0. The
post-merger link flow solutions are given in Table 6.5 and the synergy computations
in Table 6.6 for these additional four examples.
The synergies computed for this variant of Examples 6.1 through 6.4 suggest
an inverse relationship between total cost synergy and emission synergy. It is also
interesting to compare the results for the variants of Example 6.1 and Example 6.4
in Table 6.6. Despite the fact that they both have identical total cost and total
emission synergies, their respective total generalized cost synergies are, nevertheless,
distinct. This can be attributed to the difference in concern for the environment pre-
and post-merger.
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6.4 Summary and Conclusions
In this Chapter, I presented a multicriteria decision-making framework to evaluate
the environmental impacts associated with mergers and acquisitions. The framework
is based on a supply chain network perspective, in a system-optimization context,
that captures the economic activities of a firm such as manufacturing/production,
storage, as well as distribution. I presented the pre-merger and the post-merger
network models, derived their variational inequality formulations, and then defined
a total generalized cost synergy measure as well as a total cost synergy measure
and a total emissions synergy measure. The firms, pre-merger, assigned a weight
representing their individual environmental concerns; post-merger, the weight was
uniform.
Several numerical examples were provided, which, although stylized, demonstrated
the generality of the approach and how the new framework can be used to assess
apriori synergy associated with mergers and acquisitions and with an environmental
focus. Specifically, I concluded that the operating economies (resulting from greater
economies of scale that improve productivity or cut costs) may have an inverse impact
on the environmental effects to society depending on the level of concern that each
firm has for the environment and their joint actions taken to reduce emissions.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to quantify the relation-
ships associated with mergers and acquisitions and possible synergies associated with
environmental emissions. With this Chapter, I can begin to further explore numer-
ous questions associated with mergers and acquisitions, environmental synergies, as
well as industrial organization. For example, I note that this chapter has focused on
horizontal mergers, as was also the case in Nagurney (2009). Additional research is
needed to evaluate the possible synergy associated with vertical integrations and the
impacts on the environment. I expect that related issues be especially relevant to
the electric power industry and the associated supply chains. Of course, application
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of the models and measures in this chapter to real-world practical settings is also of
importance. I plan to pursue empirical applications in the future.
Finally, I emphasize that environmental emissions may have a very strong spatial
component (see also, e.g., Dhanda, Nagurney, and Ramanujam (1999) and the ref-
erences therein). Therefore, extensions of the models in this chapter to an explicit
spatial dimension would also be worthwhile.
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CHAPTER 7
MULTIPRODUCT SUPPLY CHAIN HORIZONTAL
NETWORK INTEGRATION: MODELS, THEORY, AND
COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
Although there are numerous articles discussing multiechelon supply chains, the
majority deal with a homogeneous product (see, for example, Dong et al. (2004),
Nagurney (2006a), and Wang et al. (2007)). Firms are seeing the need to spread
their investment risk by building multiproduct supply facilities, which also gives the
advantage of flexibility to meet changing market demands. According to a study
of the US supply output at the firm-product level between 1972 and 1997, on the
average, two-thirds of US supply firms altered their mix of products every five years
(Bernard et al. (2006)). By running a multiuse plant, costs of supply may be divided
among different products, which may increase efficiencies.
While Chapter 6 studied synergistic effects from horizontal mergers with a single
product, it is interesting to note the relationships between merger activity to multi-
product output. For example, according to a study of the US supply output at the
firm-product level between 1972 and 1997, less than 1 percent of a firm’s product ad-
ditions occurred due to mergers/acquisitions. Actually, 95 percent of firms, engaging
in M&A, were found to adjust their product mix, which can be associated with own-
ership changes (Bernard et al. (2006)). The importance of the decision as to what to
offer (e.g., products and services), as well as the ability of firms to realize synergistic
opportunities of the proposed merger, if any, can add tremendous value. A survey
of 600 executives involved in their companies’ mergers and acquisitions (M&A), con-
163
ducted by Accenture and the Economist Unit (EIU), found that less than half (45%)
achieved expected cost-savings synergies (Byrne (2007)).
This chapter is built on the recent work of Nagurney (2009) who developed a
system-optimization perspective for supply chain network integration in the case of
horizontal mergers/acquisitions. In this chapter, I also focus on the case of horizontal
mergers (or acquisitions) and extend the contributions in Nagurney (2009) to the
much more general and richer setting of multiple product supply chains. This ap-
proach is most closely related to that of Dafermos (1973) who proposed transportation
network models with multiple modes/classes of transportation (cf. Section 2.4.1). In
particular, I develop a system-optimization approach to the modeling of multiproduct
supply chains and their integration and explicitly introduce capacities on the various
economic activity links associated with manufacturing/production, storage, and dis-
tribution. Moreover, in this chapter, the synergy effects associated with horizontal
multiproduct supply chain network integration are analyzed, in terms of the opera-
tional synergy, that is, the reduction, if any, in the cost of production, storage, and
distribution. Finally, the proposed computational procedure fully exploits the un-
derlying network structure of the supply chain optimization problems both pre and
post-integration.
It can be noted that Min and Zhou (2002) provided a synopsis of supply chain
modeling and the importance of planning, designing, and controlling the supply chain
as a whole. Nagurney (2006b), subsequently, proved that supply chain network equi-
librium problems, in which there is cooperation between tiers, but competition among
decision-makers within a tier, can be reformulated and solved as transportation net-
work equilibrium problems. Cheng and Wu (2006) proposed a multiproduct, and mul-
ticriterion, supply-demand network equilibrium model. Davis and Wilson (2006), in
turn, studied differentiated product competition in an equilibrium framework. Mixed
integer linear programming models have been used to study synergy in supply chains,
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which has been considered by Soylu et al. (2006), who focused on energy systems,
and by Xu (2007).
This chapter is based on Nagurney, Woolley, and Qiang (2009) and is organized as
follows. The pre-integration multiproduct supply chain network model is developed
in Section 7.1. Section 7.1 also introduces the horizontally merged (or integrated)
multiproduct supply chain model. The method of quantification of the synergistic
gains, if any, is provided in Section 7.2, along with new theoretical results. In Sec-
tion 7.3 numerical examples are presented, which not only illustrate the richness of
the framework proposed in this chapter, but which also demonstrate quantitatively
how the costs associated with horizontal integration affect the possible synergies.
The chapter is concluded with Section 7.4, in which the results are summarized and
presented along with suggestions for future research.
7.1 The Pre- and Post-Integration Multiproduct Supply Cha-
in Network Models
This Section develops the pre- and post-integration supply chain network multi-
product models using a system-optimization approach (based on the Dafermos (1973)
multiclass model) but with the inclusion of explicit capacities on the various links.
Moreover, here, a variational inequality formulation of multiproduct supply chains
and their integration is provided, which enables a computational approach which fully
exploits the underlying network structure. I also identify the supply chain network
structures both pre and post the merger and construct a synergy measure.
Section 7.1.1 describes the underlying pre-integration supply chain network asso-
ciated with an individual firm and its respective economic activities of manufacturing,
storage, distribution, and retailing. Section 7.1.2 develops the post-integration model.
The models are extensions of the Nagurney (2009) models to the more complex, and
richer, multiproduct domain.
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7.1.1 The Pre-Integration Multiproduct Supply Chain Network Model
First, the pre-integration multiproduct decision-making optimization problem fac-
ed by firms A and B is formulated and I refer to this model as Case 0. It is assumed
that each firm is represented as a network of its supply chain activities, as depicted
in Figure 7.1. Each firm i; i = A,B, has niM manufacturing facilities; n
i
D distribution
centers, and serves niR retail outlets. Let Gi = [Ni, Li] denote the graph consisting of
nodes [Ni] and directed links [Li] representing the supply chain activities associated
with each firm i; i = A,B. Let L0 denote the links: LA ∪ LB as in Figure 7.1. It is
assumed that each firm is involved in the production, storage, and distribution of J
products, with a typical product denoted by j.
RA1
m · · · mRAnAR RB1 m · · · mRBnBR?
HHHHHHj?
 ?
HHHHHHj?

DA1,2 m · · · mDAnAD,2 DB1,2 m · · · mDBnBD,2? ? ? ?
DA1,1 m · · · mDAnAD,1 DB1,1 m · · · mDBnBD,1?
HHHHHHj?
 ?
HHHHHHj?

MA1
m · · · mMAnAM MB1 m · · · mMBnBM
 
 
 	
@
@
@R
 
 
 	
@
@
@R
mA mB
Firm A Firm B
Figure 7.1. Supply Chains of Firms A and B Prior to the Integration
The links from the top-tiered nodes i; i = A,B in each network in Figure 7.1 are
connected to the manufacturing nodes of the respective firm i, which are denoted,
respectively, by: M i1, . . . ,M
i
niM
. These links represent the manufacturing links. The
links from the manufacturing nodes, in turn, are connected to the distribution center
nodes of each firm i; i = A,B, which are denoted by Di1,1, . . . , D
i
nDi,1
. These links
correspond to the shipment links between the manufacturing facilities and the distri-
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bution centers where the products are stored. The links joining nodes Di1,1, . . . , D
i
niD,1
with nodes Di1,2, . . . , D
i
niD,2
for i = A,B, correspond to the storage links for the prod-
ucts. Finally, there are shipment links joining the nodes Di1,2, . . . , D
i
niD,2
for i = A,B
with the retail nodes: Ri1, . . . , R
i
niR
for each firm i = A,B. Each firm i, for simplicity,
and, without loss of generality, is assumed to have its own individual retail outlets
for delivery of the products, as depicted in Figure 7.1, prior to the integration.
The demands for the products are assumed as given and are associated with each
product, and each firm and retail pair. Let dj
Rik
denote the demand for product j;
j = 1, . . . , J , at retail outlet Rik associated with firm i; i = A,B; k = 1, . . . , n
i
R. A
path consists of a sequence of links originating at a node i; i = A,B and denotes
supply chain activities comprising manufacturing, storage, and distribution of the
products to the retail nodes. Let xjp denote the nonnegative flow of product j, on path
p. Let P 0
Rik
denote the set of all paths joining an origin node i with (destination) retail
node Rik. Clearly, since I am first considering the two firms prior to any integration,
the paths associated with a given firm have no links in common with paths of the
other firm. This changes (see also Nagurney (2009)) when the integration occurs, in
which case the number of paths and the sets of paths also change, as do the number
of links and the sets of links, as described in Section 7.1.2. The following conservation
of flow equations must hold for each firm i, each product j, and each retail outlet Rik:
∑
p∈P 0
Ri
k
xjp = d
j
Rik
, i = A,B; j = 1, . . . , J ; k = 1, . . . , niR, (7.1)
that is, the demand for each product must be satisfied at each retail outlet.
Links are denoted by a, b, etc. Let f ja denote the flow of product j on link a. The
following conservation of flow equations must be satisfied:
f ja =
∑
p∈P 0
xjpδap, j = 1 . . . , J ; ∀a ∈ L0, (7.2)
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where δap = 1 if link a is contained in path p and δap = 0, otherwise. Here P
0 denotes
the set of all paths in Figure 7.1, that is, P 0 = ∪i=A,B;k=1,...,niRP 0Rik . The path flows
must be nonnegative, that is,
xjp ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , J ; ∀p ∈ P 0. (7.3)
The path flows are grouped into the vector x.
Note that the different products flow on the supply chain networks depicted in
Figure 7.1 and share resources with one another. To capture the costs, I proceed as
follows. There is a total cost associated with each product j; j = 1, . . . , J , and each
link (cf. Figure 7.1) of the network corresponding to each firm i; i = A,B. The total
cost on a link a associated with product j is denoted by cˆja. The total cost of a link
associated with a product, be it a manufacturing link, a shipment/distribution link,
or a storage link is assumed to be a function of the flow of all the products on the
link; see, for example, Dafermos (1973). Hence, one would have that
cˆja = cˆ
j
a(f
1
a , . . . , f
J
a ), j = 1, . . . , J ; ∀a ∈ L0. (7.4)
The top tier links in Figure 7.1 have total cost functions associated with them
that capture the manufacturing costs of the products; the second tier links have
multiproduct total cost functions associated with them that correspond to the total
costs associated with the subsequent distribution/shipment to the storage facilities,
and the third tier links, since they are the storage links, have associated with them
multiproduct total cost functions that correspond to storage. Finally, the bottom-
tiered links, since they correspond to the shipment links to the retailers, have total cost
functions associated with them that capture the costs of shipment of the products.
It is assumed that the total cost function for each product on each link is convex,
continuously differentiable, and has a bounded third order partial derivative. Since
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the firms’ supply chain networks, pre-integration, have no links in common (cf. Figure
7.1), their individual cost minimization problems can be formulated jointly as follows:
Minimize
J∑
j=1
∑
a∈L0
cˆja(f
1
a , . . . , f
J
a ) (7.5)
subject to: constraints (7.1) – (7.3) and the following capacity constraints:
J∑
j=1
αjf
j
a ≤ ua, ∀a ∈ L0. (7.6)
The term αj denotes the volume taken up by product j, whereas ua denotes the
nonnegative capacity of link a.
Observe that this problem is, as is well-known in the transportation literature
(cf. Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten (1956), Dafermos and Sparrow (1969), and
Dafermos (1973)), a system-optimization problem but in capacitated form. Under
the above imposed assumptions, the optimization problem is a convex optimization
problem. If it is further assumed that the feasible set underlying the problem repre-
sented by the constraints (7.1) – (7.3) and (7.6) is non-empty, then it follows from the
standard theory of nonlinear programming (cf. Bazaraa, Sherali, and Shetty (1993))
that an optimal solution exists.
Let K07 denote the set where K07 ≡ {f |∃x such that (7.1) − (7.3) and (7.6) hold},
where f is the vector of link flows. It is assumed that the feasible set K07 is non-
empty. Lagrange multiplier βa is associated with constraint (7.6) for each a ∈ L0.
The associated optimal Lagrange multiplier is denoted by β∗a. This term may be
interpreted as the price or value of an additional unit of capacity on link a; it is also
sometimes refered to as the shadow price. The variational inequality formulation of
the problem is now provided. For convenience, and since I am considering Case 0,
the solution of variational inequality (7.7) below is denoted as (f 0∗, β0∗) and I refer
to the corresponding vectors of variables with superscripts of 0.
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Theorem 7.1
The vector of link flows f 0∗ ∈ K07 is an optimal solution to the pre-integration problem
if and only if it satisfies the following variational inequality problem with the vector
of nonnegative Lagrange multipliers β0∗:
J∑
j=1
J∑
l=1
∑
a∈L0
[
∂cˆla(f
1∗
a , . . . , f
J∗
a )
∂f ja
+αjβ
∗
a]× [f ja−f j∗a ]+
∑
a∈L0
[ua−
J∑
j=1
αjf
j∗
a ]× [βa−β∗a] ≥ 0,
∀f 0 ∈ K07,∀β0 ≥ 0. (7.7)
Proof: See Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1989) and Nagurney (1999).
7.1.2 The Post-Integration Multiproduct Supply Chain Network Model
The post-integration case, referred to as Case 1, is now formulated. Figure 7.2
depicts the post-integration supply chain network topology. Note that there is now
a supersource node 0 which represents the integration of the firms in terms of their
supply chain networks with additional links joining node 0 to nodes A and B, respec-
tively.
As in the pre-integration case, the post-integration optimization problem is also
concerned with total cost minimization. Specifically, the nodes and links associated
with the network depicted in Figure 7.1 are retained but now the additional links
connecting the manufacturing facilities of each firm and the distribution centers of
the other firm as well as the links connecting the distribution centers of each firm and
the retail outlets of the other firm are added. The network in Figure 7.2, underlying
this integration, is referred to as G1 = [N1, L1] whereN1 ≡ N0∪ node 0 and L1 ≡ L0∪
the additional links as in Figure 7.2. Total cost functions as in (7.4) are associated
with the new links, for each product j. Note that if the total cost functions associated
with the integration/merger links connecting node 0 to node A and node 0 to node
B are set equal to zero, this means that the supply chain integration is costless in
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terms of the supply chain integration/merger of the two firms. Of course, non-zero
total cost functions associated with these links may be utilized to also capture the
risk associated with the integration. Such issues are explored numerically in Section
7.3.
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Figure 7.2. Supply Chain Network after Firms A and B Merge
A path p now (cf. Figure 7.2) originates at the node 0 and is destined for one of
the bottom retail nodes. Let xjp, in the post-integrated network configuration given
in Figure 7.2, denote the flow of product j on path p joining (origin) node 0 with
a (destination) retail node. Then, the following conservation of flow equations must
hold: ∑
p∈P 1
Ri
k
xjp = d
j
Rik
, i = A,B; j = 1, . . . , J ; k = 1, . . . , niR, (7.8)
where P 1
Rik
denotes the set of paths connecting node 0 with retail node Rik in Figure
7.2. Due to the integration, the retail outlets can obtain each product j from any
manufacturing facility, and any distributor. The set of paths P 1 ≡ ∪i=A,B;k=1,...,niRP 1Rik .
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In addition, as before, let f ja denote the flow of product j on link a. Hence, one
must also have the following conservation of flow equations satisfied:
f ja =
∑
p∈P 1
xjpδap, j = 1, . . . , J ; ∀a ∈ L1. (7.9)
Of course, I also have that the path flows must be nonnegative for each product
j, that is,
xjp ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , J ; ∀p ∈ P 1. (7.10)
It is assumed, again, that the supply chain network activities have nonnegative
capacities, denoted as ua, ∀a ∈ L1, with αj representing the volume factor for product
j. Hence, the following constraints must be satisfied:
J∑
j=1
αjf
j
a ≤ ua, ∀a ∈ L1. (7.11)
Consequently, the optimization problem for the integrated supply chain network
is:
Minimize
J∑
j=1
∑
a∈L1
cˆja(f
1
a , . . . , f
J
a ) (7.12)
subject to constraints: (7.8) – (7.11).
The solution to the optimization problem (7.12) subject to constraints (7.8) through
(7.11) can also be obtained as a solution to a variational inequality problem akin to
(7.7) where now a ∈ L1. The vectors f and β have identical definitions as before, but
are re-dimensioned/expanded accordingly and superscripted with a 1. Finally, instead
of the feasible set K07 one would now have K17 ≡ {f |∃x such that (7.8)−(7.11) hold}. It
is assumed that K17 is non-empty. The solution to the variational inequality problem
(7.13) below governing Case 1 is denoted by (f 1∗, β1∗) and the vectors of correspond-
ing variables are denoted as (f 1, β1). I now, for completeness, provide the variational
inequality formulation of the Case 1 problem. The proof is immediate.
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Theorem 7.2
The vector of link flows f 1∗ ∈ K17 is an optimal solution to the post-integration problem
if and only if it satisfies the following variational inequality problem with the vector
of nonnegative Lagrange multipliers β1∗:
J∑
j=1
J∑
l=1
∑
a∈L1
[
∂cˆla(f
1∗
a , . . . , f
J∗
a )
∂f ja
+αjβ
∗
a]× [f ja−f j∗a ]+
∑
a∈L1
[ua−
J∑
j=1
αjf
j∗
a ]× [βa−β∗a] ≥ 0,
∀f 1 ∈ K17,∀β1 ≥ 0. (7.13)
Let TC0 denote the total cost,
∑J
j=1
∑
a∈L0 cˆ
j
a(f
1
a , . . . , f
J
a ), evaluated under the
solution f 0∗ to (7.7) and let TC1,
∑J
j=1
∑
a∈L1 cˆ
j
a(f
1
a , . . . , f
J
a ) denote the total cost
evaluated under the solution f 1∗ to (7.13). Due to the similarity of variational in-
equalities (7.7) and (7.13) the same computational procedure can be utilized to com-
pute the solutions. Indeed, the variational inequality formulations of the respective
pre- and post-integration supply chain network problems are utilized since one can
then exploit the simplicity of the underlying feasible sets K07 and K17 which include
constraints with a network structure identical to that underlying multimodal system-
optimized transportation network problems.
It is worthwhile to distinguish the multiproduct supply chain network models
developed above from the single product models in Nagurney (2009). First, note that
the total cost functions in the objective functions (7.5) and (7.12) are not separable
as they were, respectively, in the single product models in Nagurney (2009). In
addition, since I am dealing now with multiple products, which can be of different
physical dimensions, the corresponding capacity constraints (cf. (7.6) and (7.11)) are
also more complex than was the case for their single product counterparts. It should
also be emphasized that the above multiproduct framework contains, as a special case,
the merger of firms that produce (pre-merger) distinct products, which is captured
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by assigning a demand of zero to those products at the respective demand markets.
Of course, in such a case, the total cost functions would also be adapted accordingly.
Finally, the multiproduct models developed in this chapter allow for non-zero total
costs associated with the top-most merger links (cf. Figure 7.2), which join node 0
to nodes A and B. In Nagurney (2009) it was assume that the corresponding total
costs, in the single product case, were zero. Of course, it would also be interesting
to explore the issue of “retooling” a manufacturing facility, post-merger, for it to be
able to produce the other firm’s product(s) in its original manufacturing facilities.
7.2 Quantifying Synergy Associated with Multiproduct Sup-
ply Chain Network Integration
The synergy is measured by analyzing the total costs prior to and post the supply
chain network integration (cf. Eccles et al. (1999) and Nagurney (2009)). For ex-
ample, the synergy based on total costs and proposed by Nagurney (2009), but now
in a multiproduct context, which is denoted here by STC , can be calculated as the
percentage difference between the total cost pre vs the total cost post the integration:
STC ≡ [TC
0 − TC1
TC0
]× 100%. (7.14)
From (7.14), one can see that the lower the total cost TC1, the higher the synergy
associated with the supply chain network integration. Of course, in specific firm
operations one may wish to evaluate the integration of supply chain networks with
only a subset of the links joining the original two supply chain networks. In that case,
Figure 7.2 would be modified accordingly and the synergy as in (7.14) computed with
TC1 corresponding to that new supply chain network topology.
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One can now provide a theorem which shows that if the total costs associated with
the integration of the supply chain networks of the two firms are identically equal to
zero, then the associated synergy can never be negative.
Theorem 7.3
If the total cost functions associated with the integration/merger links from node 0
to nodes A and B for each product are identically equal to zero, then the associated
synergy, STC, can never be negative.
Proof: It is first noted that the pre-integration supply chain optimization problem
can be defined over the same expanded network as in Figure 7.2 but with the cross-
shipment links extracted and with the paths defined from node 0 to the retail nodes.
In addition, the total costs from node 0 to nodes A and B must all be equal to zero.
Clearly, the total cost minimization solution to this problem yields the same total
cost value as obtained for TC0. One must now show that TC0 − TC1 ≥ 0.
Assume not, that is, that TC0 − TC1 < 0, then, clearly, one would have not
obtained an optimal solution to the post-integration problem, since, the new links
need not be used, which would imply that TC0 = TC1, which is a contradiction.
Another interpretation of this theorem is that, in the system-optimization context
(assuming that the total cost functions remain the same as do the demands), the
addition of new links can never make the total cost increase; this is in contrast to
what may occur in the context of user-optimized networks, where the addition of a
new link may make everyone worse-off in terms of user cost. This is the well-known
Braess paradox (1968); see, also, Braess et al. (2005).
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Figure 7.3. Pre-Integration Supply Chain Network Topology for the Numerical
Examples
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Figure 7.4. Post-Integration Supply Chain Network Topology for the Examples
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7.3 Numerical Examples
In this Section, numerical examples are presented for which the solutions to the
supply chains both pre and post the integration are computed, along with the asso-
ciated total costs and synergies as defined in Section 7.2. The examples were solved
using the modified projection method (see Section 2.5.2, cf. Korpelevich (1977) and
Nagurney (2009)) embedded with the equilibration algorithm (see Section 2.5.3, cf.
Dafermos and Sparrow (1969) and Nagurney (1984)). As discussed in Section 2.5.2,
the modified projection method is guaranteed to converge if the function that enters
the variational inequality is monotone and Lipschitz continuous (provided that a solu-
tion exists). Both these assumptions are satisfied under the conditions imposed on the
multiproduct total cost functions in Section 7.1 as well as by the total cost functions
underlying the numerical examples below. Since it also assumed that the feasible sets
are non-empty, one can be guaranteed that the modified projection method converge
to a solution of variational inequalities (7.7) and (7.13).
The computational procedure was implemented in FORTRAN and utilized a Unix
system at the University of Massachusetts Amherst for the computations. The al-
gorithm was considered to have converged when the absolute value of the difference
between the computed values of the variables (the link flows; respectively, the La-
grange multipliers) at two successive iterations differed by no more than 10−5. In or-
der to fully exploit the underlying network structure, the multiproduct supply chain
networks were first converted into single-product “extended” ones, as discussed in
Dafermos (1973) for multimodal/multiclass traffic networks. The link capacity con-
straints, which do not explicitly appear in the original traffic network models, were
adapted accordingly. The modified projecion method yielded subproblems, at each
iteration, in flow variables and in price variables. The former were computed us-
ing the equilibration algorithm of Dafermos and Sparrow (1969) and the latter were
computed explicitly and in closed form.
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For all the numerical examples, it was assumed that each firm i; i = A,B, was
involved in the production, storage, and distribution of two products, and each firm
had, prior to the integration/merger, two manufacturing plants, one distribution cen-
ter, and supplied the products to two retail outlets.
After the integration of the two firms’ supply chain networks, each retailer was
indifferent as to which firm supplied the products and the integrated/merged firms
could store the products at any of the two distribution centers and could supply any
of the four retailers. Figure 7.3 depicts the pre-integration supply chain network(s),
whereas Figure 7.4 depicts the post-integration supply chain network for the numerical
examples.
For all the examples, it was assumed that the pre-integration total cost functions
and the post-integration total cost functions were nonlinear (quadratic), of the form:
cˆja(f
1
a , f
2
a ) =
2∑
l=1
gjla f
j
af
l
a + h
j
af
j
a , ∀a ∈ L0,∀a ∈ L1; j = 1, 2, (7.15)
with convexity of the total cost functions being satisfied (except, where noted, for the
top-most merger links from node 0).
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Table 7.1. Definition of Links and Associated Total Cost Functions for Example 7.1
Link a From To cˆ1a(f
1
a , f
2
a ) cˆ
2
a(f
1
a , f
2
a )
1 A MA1 1(f
1
1 )
2 + 2f 21 f
1
1 + 11f
1
1 2(f
2
1 )
2 + 2f 11 f
2
1 + 8f
2
1
2 A MA2 2(f
1
2 )
2 + 2f 22 f
1
2 + 8f
1
2 1(f
2
2 )
2 + 2f 12 f
2
2 + 6f
2
2
3 MA1 D
A
1,1 3(f
1
3 )
2 + 2.5f 23 f
1
3 + 7f
1
3 4(f
2
3 )
2 + 2.5f 13 f
2
3 + 7f
2
3
4 MA2 D
A
1,1 4(f
1
4 )
2 + 1.5f 24 f
1
4 + 3f
1
4 3(f
2
4 )
2 + 1.5f 14 f
2
4 + 11f
2
4
5 DA1,1 D
A
1,2 1(f
1
5 )
2 + f 25 f
1
5 + 6f
1
5 4(f
2
5 )
2 + f 15 f
2
5 + 11f
2
5
6 DA1,2 R
A
1 3(f
1
6 )
2 + 1.5f 26 f
1
6 + 4f
1
6 4(f
2
6 )
2 + 1.5f 16 f
2
6 + 10f
2
6
7 DA1,2 R
A
2 4(f
1
7 )
2 + 2f 27 f
1
7 + 7f
1
7 2(f
2
7 )
2 + 2f 17 f
2
7 + 8f
2
7
8 B MB1 4(f
1
8 )
2 + 3f 28 f
1
8 + 5f
1
8 4(f
2
8 )
2 + 3f 18 f
2
8 + 6f
2
8
9 B MB2 1(f
1
9 )
2 + 1.5f 29 f
1
9 + 4f
1
9 4(f
2
9 )
2 + 1.5f 19 f
2
9 + 6f
2
9
10 MB1 D
B
1,1 2(f
1
10)
2 + 3f 210f
1
10 + 3.5f
1
10 3(f
2
10)
2 + 3f 110f
2
10 + 4f
2
10
11 MB2 D
B
1,1 1(f
1
11)
2 + 2.5f 211f
1
11 + 4f
1
11 4(f
2
11)
2 + 2.5f 111f
2
11 + 5f
2
11
12 DB1,1 D
B
1,2 4(f
1
12)
2 + 3f 212f
1
12 + 6f
1
12 2(f
2
12)
2 + 3f 112f
2
12 + 5f
2
12
13 DB1,2 R
B
1 3(f
1
13)
2 + 3f 213f
1
13 + 7f
1
13 4(f
2
13)
2 + 3f 113f
2
13 + 10f
2
13
14 DB1,2 R
B
2 4(f
1
14)
2 + .5f 214f
1
14 + 4f
1
14 4(f
2
14)
2 + .5f 114f
2
14 + 12f
2
14
15 MA1 D
B
1,1 4(f
1
15)
2 + 2f 215f
1
15 + 6f
1
15 4(f
2
15)
2 + 2f 115f
2
15 + 7f
2
15
16 MA2 D
B
1,1 4(f
1
16)
2 + 2f 216f
1
16 + 6f
1
16 3(f
2
16)
2 + 2f 116f
2
16 + 7f
2
16
17 MB1 D
A
1,1 1(f
1
17)
2 + 3.5f 217f
1
17 + 4f
1
17 4(f
2
17)
2 + 3.5f 117f
2
17 + 5f
2
17
18 MB2 D
A
1,1 4(f
1
18)
2 + 3f 218f
1
18 + 9f
1
18 4(f
2
18)
2 + 3f 118f
2
18 + 7f
2
18
19 DA1,2 R
B
1 4(f
1
19)
2 + 3.5f 219f
1
19 + 7f
1
19 1(f
2
19)
2 + 3.5f 119f
2
19 + 9f
2
19
20 DA1,2 R
B
2 2(f
1
20)
2 + 3f 220f
1
20 + 5f
1
20 4(f
2
20)
2 + 3f 120f
2
20 + 6f
2
20
21 DB1,2 R
A
1 4(f
1
21)
2 + 2.5f 221f
1
21 + 3f
1
21 3(f
2
21)
2 + 2.5f 121f
2
21 + 9f
2
21
22 DB1,2 R
A
2 3(f
1
22)
2 + 2f 222f
1
22 + 4f
1
22 4(f
2
22)
2 + 2f 122f
2
22 + 3f
2
22
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Table 7.2. Pre-Integration Optimal Product Flow Solutions to Examples 7.1, 7.2,
and 7.3
Link a From Node To Node f 1∗a f
2∗
a
1 A MA1 8.50 .80
2 A MA2 1.50 9.20
3 MA1 D
A
1,1 8.50 .80
4 MA2 D
A
1,1 1.50 9.20
5 DA1,1 D
A
1,2 10.00 10.00
6 DA1,2 R
A
1 5.00 5.00
7 DA1,2 R
A
2 5.00 5.00
8 B MB1 0.00 8.03
9 B MB2 10.00 1.97
10 MB1 D
B
1,1 0.00 8.03
11 MB2 D
B
1,1 10.00 1.97
12 DB1,1 D
B
1,2 10.00 10.00
13 DB1,2 R
B
1 5.00 5.00
14 DB1,2 R
B
2 5.00 5.00
7.3.1 Example 7.1
Example 7.1 served as the baseline for the computations. The Example 7.1 data
are now described. The pre and post-integration total cost functions for products 1
and 2 are listed in Table 7.1. The links post-integration that join the node 0 with
nodes A and B had associated total costs equal to zero for each product j = 1, 2,
for Examples 7.1 through 7.3. The demands at the retail outlets for Firm A and
Firm B were set to 5 for each product. Hence, dj
Rik
= 5 for i = A,B; j = 1, 2, and
k = 1, 2. The capacity on each link was set to 25 both pre and post integration, so
that: ua = 25 for all links a ∈ L0; a ∈ L1. The weights: αj = 1 were set to 1 for
both products j = 1, 2, both pre and post-integration; thus, it was assumed that the
products are equal in volume.
The pre-integration optimal solutions for the product flows for each product for
Examples 7.1 through 7.3 are given in Table 7.2. Note that Example 7.1, pre-
integration, was used as the basis from which variants post-integration were con-
structed, yielding Examples 7.2 and 7.3, as described below.
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The post-integration optimal solutions are reported in Table 7.3 for product 1 and
in Table 7.4 for product 2.
Since none of the link flow capacities were reached, either pre- or post-integration,
the vectors β0∗ and β1∗ had all their components equal to zero. The total cost, pre-
merger, TC0 = 5, 702.58. The total cost, post-merger, TC1 = 4, 240.86. Please also
refer to Table 7.5 for the total cost and synergy values for this example as well as for
the next two examples. The synergy STC for the supply chain network integration
for Example 7.1 was equal to 25.63%.
It is interesting to note that, since the distribution center associated with the
original Firm A has total storage costs that are lower for product 1, whereas Firm
B’s distribution center has lower costs associated with the storage of product 2, that
Firm A’s original distribution center, after the integration/merger, stores the majority
of the volume of product 1, while the majority of the volume of product 2 is stored,
post-integration, at Firm B’s original distribution center. It is also interesting to note
that, post-integration, the majority of the production of product 1 takes place in Firm
B’s original manufacturing plants, whereas the converse holds true for product 2. This
example, hence, vividly illustrates the types of supply chain cost gains that can be
achieved in the integration of multiproduct supply chains.
7.3.2 Example 7.2
Example 7.2 was constructed from Example 7.1 but with the following modifica-
tions. An idealized situation is now considered in which it is assumed that the total
costs associated with the new integration links; see Table 7.1 (links 15 through 22)
for each product were identically equal to zero.
Post-integration, the optimal flow for each product, for each firm, has now changed;
see Table 7.3 and Table 7.4. It is interesting to note that now the second manufactur-
ing plant associated with the original Firm B produces the majority of product 1 but
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the majority of product 1 is still stored at the original distribution center of Firm A.
Indeed, the zero costs associated with distribution between the original supply chain
networks lead to further synergies as compared to those obtained for Example 7.1.
Since, again, none of the link flow capacities were reached, either pre- or post-
integration, the vectors β0∗ and β1∗ had all their components equal to zero. The total
cost, post-merger, TC1 = 2, 570.27. The synergy STC for the supply chain network
integration for Example 7.2 was equal to 54.93%. Observe that this obtained synergy
is, in a sense, the maximum possible for this example since the total costs for both
products on all the new links are all equal to zero.
7.3.3 Example 7.3
Example 7.3 was constructed from Example 7.2 but with the following modifica-
tions. It is now assumed that the capacities associated with the links that had zero
costs between the two original firms had their capacities reduced from 25 to 5. The
computed optimal flow solutions are given in Table 7.3 for product 1 and in Table
7.4 for product 2.
The computed vector of Lagrange multipliers β1∗ is now provided. All terms were
equal to zero except those for links 15 through 20 since the sum of the corresponding
product flows on each of these links was equal to the imposed capacity of 5. In
particular, now: β∗15 = 40.82, β
∗
16 = 59.79, β
∗
17 = 14.35, β
∗
18 = 53.59, β
∗
19 = 79.95, and
β∗20 = 68.39.
The total cost, post-merger, was now TC1 = 3, 452.34. The synergy STC for the
supply chain network integration for Example 7.3 was equal to 39.46%. Hence, even
with substantially lower capacities on the new links, given the zero costs, the synergy
associated with the supply chain network integration in Example 7.3 was quite high,
although not as high as obtained in Example 7.2.
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Table 7.3. Post-Integration Optimal Flow Solutions to the Examples for Product 1
Link a From To Ex. 1 f 1∗a Ex. 2 f
1∗
a Ex. 3 f
1∗
a
1 A MA1 5.94 0.76 5.36
2 A MA2 0.53 0.00 1.98
3 MA1 D
A
1,1 5.94 0.00 5.36
4 MA2 D
A
1,1 0.53 0.00 1.98
5 DA1,1 D
A
1,2 18.27 19.24 17.34
6 DA1,2 R
A
1 5.00 5.00 5.00
7 DA1,2 R
A
2 3.27 4.24 4.27
8 B MB1 6.25 1.67 5.00
9 B MB2 7.29 17.57 7.66
10 MB1 D
B
1,1 0.00 0.00 0.00
11 MB2 D
B
1,1 1.73 0.00 2.66
12 DB1,1 D
B
1,2 1.73 0.76 2.66
13 DB1,2 R
B
1 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 DB1,2 R
B
2 0.00 0.00 1.93
15 MA1 D
B
1,1 0.00 0.76 0.00
16 MA2 D
B
1,1 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 MB1 D
A
1,1 6.25 1.67 5.00
18 MB2 D
A
1,1 5.55 17.57 5.00
19 DA1,2 R
B
1 5.00 5.00 5.00
20 DA1,2 R
B
2 5.00 5.00 3.07
21 DB1,2 R
A
1 0.00 0.00 0.00
22 DB1,2 R
A
2 1.73 0.76 0.73
Firm B’s original distribution center now stores more of product 1 and 2 than it
did in Example 7.2 (post-integration). Also, because of capacity reductions associated
with the cross-shipment links there is a notable reduction in the volume of shipment
of product 1 from the second manufacturing plant of Firm B to Firm A’s original
distribution center and in the shipment of product 2 from Firm A’s original second
manufacturing plant to Firm B’s original distribution center.
7.3.4 Variant Numerical Examples
I then proceeded to ask the following question: assuming that the links, post-
merger, joining node 0 to nodes A and B no longer had zero associated total cost
for each product but, rather, reflected a cost associated with merging the two firms.
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Table 7.4. Post-Integration Optimal Flow Solutions to the Examples for Product 2
Link a From To Ex. 1 f 2∗a Ex. 2 f
2∗
a Ex. 3 f
2∗
a
1 A MA1 3.44 4.66 5.00
2 A MA2 11.81 11.88 8.74
3 MA1 D
A
1,1 0.00 0.88 0.00
4 MA2 D
A
1,1 4.91 0.48 3.74
5 DA1,1 D
A
1,2 4.91 4.82 3.74
6 DA1,2 R
A
1 1.52 0.00 0.61
7 DA1,2 R
A
2 2.58 0.00 1.20
8 B MB1 2.34 3.46 3.58
9 B MB2 2.42 0.00 2.68
10 MB1 D
B
1,1 2.34 0.00 3.58
11 MB2 D
B
1,1 2.42 0.00 2.68
12 DB1,1 D
B
1,2 15.09 15.18 16.26
13 DB1,2 R
B
1 4.88 2.72 5.00
14 DB1,2 R
B
2 4.30 2.46 3.07
15 MA1 D
B
1,1 3.44 3.78 5.00
16 MA2 D
B
1,1 6.89 11.40 5.00
17 MB1 D
A
1,1 0.00 3.46 0.00
18 MB2 D
A
1,1 0.00 0.00 0.00
19 DA1,2 R
B
1 0.12 2.28 0.00
20 DA1,2 R
B
2 0.70 2.54 1.93
21 DB1,2 R
A
1 3.48 5.00 4.39
22 DB1,2 R
A
2 2.42 5.00 3.80
Table 7.5. Total Costs and Synergy Values for the Examples
Measure Example 7.1 Example 7.2 Example 7.3
Pre-Integration TC0 5,702.58 5,702.58 5,702.58
Post-Integration TC1 4,240.86 2,570.27 3,452.34
Synergy Calculations STC 25.63% 54.93% 39.46%
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It was further assumed that the cost (cf. (7.15)) was linear and of the specific form
given by
cˆja = h
j
af
j
a = hf
j
a , j = 1, 2
for the upper-most links (cf. Figure 7.4). Hence, it was assumed that all the hja
terms were identical and equal to an h. At what value would the synergy then for
Examples 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 become negative? Through computational experiments
these values were determined. In the case of Example 7.1, if h = 36.52, then the
synergy value would be approximately equal to zero since the new total cost would
be approximately equal to TC0 = 5, 702.58. For any value larger than the above
h, one would obtain negative synergy. This has clear implications for mergers in
terms of supply chain network integration and demonstrates that the total costs
associated with the integration/merger itself have to be carefully weighed against the
cost benefits associated with the integrated supply chain activities. In the case of
Example 7.2, the h value was approximately equal to 78.3. A higher value than this
h for each such merger link would result in the total cost exceeding TC0 and, hence,
negative synergy would result.
Finally, for completeness, the corresponding h in the case of Example 7.3 is de-
termined which found the value to be h = 78.3, as in Example 7.2.
7.4 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I developed multiproduct supply chain network models, which
allow one to evaluate the total costs associated with manufacturing/production, stor-
age, and distribution of firms’ supply chains both pre and post-integration. Such
horizontal integrations can take place, for example, in the context of mergers and
acquisitions, an activity which has garnered much interest and momentum recently.
The model(s) utilize a system-optimization perspective and allow for explicit upper
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bounds on the various links associated with manufacturing, storage, and distribution.
The models are formulated and solved as variational inequality problems.
In addition, a proposed multiproduct synergy measure is utilized to identify the
potential cost gains associated with such horizontal supply chain network integrations.
It is proved that, in the case of zero “merging” costs, that the associated synergy can
never be negative. Solutions to several numerical examples were computed for which
the optimal product flows and Lagrange multipliers/shadow prices associated with
the capacity constraints both before and after the integration were determined. The
computational approach allows one to explore many issues regarding supply chain
network integration and to effectively ascertain the synergies prior to any implemen-
tation of a potential merger. In addition, it was determined, computationally, for
several examples, what identical linear costs would yield zero synergy, with higher
values resulting in negative synergy.
There are numerous questions that remain and that be considered for future re-
search. It would be interesting to develop competitive variants of the models in a
game theoretic context and to also explore elastic demands. Also, this chapter does
consider the time dimension in that it models the supply chain networks before and
after the proposed merger and, hence, it considers two distinct points in time. For
certain applications it may be useful to have a more detailed time discretization with
accompanying network structure. Finally, it would be very interesting to explicitly
incorporate the risks associated with supply chain network integration within this
framework.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This dissertation focuses on supply chain issues including sustainability, policy
analysis, merger and integration, while incorporating multicriteria decision-making
of the key players throughout the supply chain with their associated interaction.
Models were presented for multitiered supply chain networks where the multiple
decision-makers face conflicting objectives in a competitive economic environment.
I provide new theoretical interpretations between a sustainable supply chain network
with distinct environmental criteria and an electric power supply chain model with a
taxation scheme. With the focus on a specific supply chain application, the electric
power industry, the association between a taxation and tradable permit scheme can
be realized. Moreover, I examined the relationship between environmental and cost
synergies through pre and post horizontal integration of supply chain networks as well
as provided the more general and richer multiproduct domain regarding supply chain
integration. The methodology utilized throughout the dissertation was variational
inequality theory.
Specifically, in Chapter 3, I built on the work of Nagurney and Toyasaki (2003),
which introduced environmental concerns into a supply chain network equilibrium
framework (see also Nagurney, Dong, and Mokhtarian (2002b)) to develop the multi-
tiered, multicriteria supply chain network model with distinct manufacturing plants
for each manufacturer with associated environmental emissions. This network mod-
eling framework is capable of identifying the equilibrium supply chain transaction
flows and the demands (along with the associated prices). This new supply chain net-
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work model with environmental concerns was then transformed into a transportation
network equilibrium model with elastic demands over an appropriately constructed
abstract network or supernetwork. The benefits including a new interpretation of
the equilibrium conditions governing sustainable supply chains in terms of path flows
has been recently shown by Nagurney (2006a) (see also Nagurney (2000), Nagurney
and Liu (2005), Nagurney (2006b), and Wu et al. (2006)). The contributions of
this Chapter further demonstrated the generality of the concepts of transportation
network equilibrium, originally proposed in the seminal book of Beckmann, McGuire,
and Winsten (1956) (see also Boyce, Mahmassani, and Nagurney (2005)).
Additionally, numerical examples were conducted to illustrate the usefulness of
the model. Specifically, it was shown that environmentally conscious consumers
could significantly reduce the environmental emissions through the economics and
the underlying decision-making behavior in the supply chain network. Interestingly,
I establish that the prices associated with the environmental criteria of the vari-
ous decision-makers can be interpreted as taxes, which is addressed in Chapter 4.
However, Chapter 4 addresses a taxation scheme on a specific supply chain network
application, the electric power industry, but those taxes are determined endogenously,
while the prices associated with the environmental criteria in Chapter 3 are set ex-
ogenously. Chapter 3 is based on Nagurney, Liu, and Woolley (2007) but includes
the generalization of emission functions which aids in the numerous applications of
the model.
In Chapter 4, I developed a general modeling and computational framework in
a specific supply chain network application as I just mentioned, the electric power
generation industry, that may help policymakers to determine the optimal carbon
taxes on the power plants, the equilibrium electric power transaction flows and the
demands for electric power (along with the associated prices). There were three dis-
tinct carbon taxation environmental policies and models presented. The first model
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was a completely decentralized scheme, allowing the policy-makers to determine the
optimal tax for each individual electric power plant which guarantees that the emis-
sion bound or quota of each plant is not exceeded. The second and third models,
on the other hand, both enforce a “global” emission bound on the entire industry by
imposing a uniform tax rate on the generating plants. However, the second policy
assumes that the global emission bound is fixed while the third policy allows the
bound to be a function of the tax. The numerical examples illustrate the impacts of
the distinct carbon taxation policies on the electric power supply chain networks and
demonstrate how policy-makers can determine the optimal taxes in order to achieve
the environmental objectives. As the bound was tightened in the numerical examples,
it was noted that the permit price and demand market price increased while emissions
and demand decreased. Chapter 4 is based on Nagurney, Liu, and Woolley (2006)
but, as in Chapter 3, includes the generalization of emission functions which aids in
the numerous applications of the model.
While pollution by electric power entities can be controlled by price, in the form,
for example, of a carbon tax that is imposed for emissions that exceed a predetermined
bound as is modeled in Chapter 4 of the dissertation (see also Wu et al. (2006)), it
can also be controlled by quantity, as was addressed in Chapter 5 of the dissertation,
in the case of an emission trading scheme. Specifically, in Chapter 5, a multipollutant
permit trading model was developed in the case of electric power supply chains in
which there are different technologies associated with electric power production. The
equilibrium electric power flows and the pollution permits/licenses, along with their
prices could be computed with several numerical examples provided. Interestingly,
assuming the same cost and emission functions, a single centralized carbon taxation
scheme with a fixed bound on carbon emissions had the same result on electricity price
and demand as an initial tradable permit license allocation that totaled the taxation
scheme bound used in Chapter 4. It was also noted that the equilibrium price of the
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permits increases, as expected, as the environmental standard was tightened. The
research in this Chapter is the first to incorporate the substitutability and comple-
mentarity effects of multiple pollutants. This research can aid a regulatory agency
in the determination of the number of permits required to achieve the reduction of
emissions below a pre-determined bound. Chapter 5 is based on Woolley, Nagurney,
and Stranlund (2009) but, as in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, includes the generalization
of emission functions which aids in the numerous applications of the model.
While Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 focused on the impact of policy instruments on
the behavior of the decision-makers throughout the supply chain, Chapter 6 and
Chapter 7 study the impact of supply chain merger/integration in an effort to create
synergistic gains and appeal to the environmentally conscious consumer, built on
the work of Nagurney (2009). Specifically, in Chapter 6, I present a multicriteria
supply chain network decision-making framework, in a system-optimization context,
to evaluate the environmental impacts associated with mergers and acquisitions that
captures the economic activities of a firm pre- and post-merger. The firms, pre-
merger, were assigned a weight representing their individual environmental concerns;
post-merger, the weight was uniform. The product flows along with the cost and
resulting emissions could be computed pre and post-merger with several numerical
examples provided to calculate synergistic gains, if any.
The numerical examples demonstrated that the operating economies may have
an inverse impact on the environmental effects to society depending on the level
of concern that each firm has for the environment and their joint actions taken to
reduce emissions. There was a tradeoff between operational synergy gains with en-
vironmental benefits. As environmental benefits are increased, operational synergy
decreased, even though, not quite as significantly as the environmental gains to so-
ciety. I also explored the impacts of improved technologies associated with distribu-
tion/transportation. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to quantify
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the relationships associated with mergers and acquisitions and possible synergies as-
sociated with environmental emissions. Chapter 6 is based on Nagurney and Woolley
(2009).
In Chapter 7, I considered the multiproduct dimension of supply chains with dis-
tinct firms and their horizontal integration. I developed the multiproduct supply chain
network models prior to and post their horizontal integration with explicit capacities
associated with the economic activities of production, storage, and distribution; an
approach that is closely related to that of Dafermos (1973) who proposed transporta-
tion network models with multiple classes of transportation. I build on the novel
work of Nagurney (2009) to also focus on the case of horizontal mergers (or acquisi-
tions) and I extend the contributions in Nagurney (2009) to the much more general
and richer setting of multiple product supply chains. I utilize a system-optimization
perspective for the model development and I propose a measure, which allows one to
quantify and assess, from a supply chain network perspective, the synergy benefits
associated with the integration of multiproduct firms through mergers/acquisitions.
The flows and prices of the various commodities could be computed with several nu-
merical examples provided. Chapter 7 is based on Nagurney, Woolley, and Qiang
(2009).
8.1 Future Research
I will continue my research in complex supply chain decision-making on network
systems. First, I would like to build on my recent work in Chapter 7 and extend upon
this framework to also consider the multiproduct case with environmental concerns. I
will study the impact of environmental concerns through merger/acquisions of supply
chain networks that include manufacturers, distribution outlets, and the final demand
at the retail markets. To my knowledge, there is currently no literature to date that
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incorporates the study of the merger/integration of multiproduction firms and their
respective supply chains and the resulting impact on the quality of the environment.
Additionally, I will study supply chain integration though vertical integration
versus separation and the resulting effects on anticipated operational synergy. This
work can then be extended to incorporate associated environmental emissions and
aid in the study of the relationship of cost synergistic effects to the environmental
impact of the proposed merger/integration.
Finally, the work on supply chain mergers/integration could also be extended to
include regulatory requirements regarding environmental practices as it is important
to understand not only the environmental and cost relationship, but the policy im-
plications on resulting emissions. Additional issues related to mergers/integration of
supply chains include risk and uncertainty and the associated effect on the success
rate of proposed mergers.
Moreover, I will combine the work in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 regarding a tax-
ation and tradable permit scheme for the electric power supply chain generation,
distribution, and consumption network to include the empirical implementation for
the electric power supply chain of New England (see Liu and Nagurney (2009)).
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